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Preface 
 
 
The recent economic crisis starting in autumn 2008 led not only to a large decrease in output, but 
it also caused an astonishingly severe fall in trade. While real GDP in the OECD area fell by 4.8 
percent and 3.2 percent in the first and second quarter of 2009, trade eventually “collapsed” with 
OECD export volumes contracting by 15.7 percent and 14.7 percent in the first two quarters of 
2009 (OECD, 2010). Besides compositional effects in terms of industries affected and the 
shortage in available trade finance, the role of international production networks has been at the 
centre of the discussion over the causes of this trade collapse. While some scholars have 
highlighted the role of vertical linkages and trade in intermediates as transmission mechanism for 
economic shocks (Bems et al., 2009), others have argued that trade within international 
production networks has been more resilient than other trade (Altomonte and Ottaviano, 2009).  
This debate reflects the importance of international production networks for today‟s world 
economy. The central element of these networks is trade in intermediates, which connects the 
different production stages across countries. In this dissertation, we analyse the economic 
fundamentals that determine the patterns of trade in intermediates and contribute thereby to a 
better understanding of international production networks and provide guidance to countries 
regarding essential policy questions: How large is the detrimental effect of trade costs for trade in 
intermediates? What are the main factors that affect the comparative advantage of countries 
regarding trade in intermediates? Which policies can help countries to become or to remain an 
integral part of production networks? Does trade in intermediates differ from other trade flows? 
Can countries use the same policies to address trade in intermediates and trade in consumption 
goods? How important is the activity of multinational enterprises for production networks and 
trade in intermediates in particular?  
This dissertation consists of four chapters, which are self-contained and can be read 
independently of each other.
1
 In Chapter 1, we analyse services trade liberalisation, which is a 
                                                     
1
 Chapter 1 is joint work with Peter Egger, Chapter 2 is joint work with Sébastien Miroudot and Chapter 3 
is joint work with Roberta Piermartini and Elisa Gamberoni. 
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prerequisite for international production networks to arise. In particular, we study the 
determinants of services liberalisation undertaken by countries under the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) of 1995. In Chapters 2-4, we analyse different aspects of the patterns 
of trade in intermediates. In Chapter 2, we assess the determinants of bilateral trade in 
intermediate goods and services. In Chapter 3, we investigate the role of institutions and transport 
infrastructure as sources of comparative advantage for intermediate goods. In Chapter 4, we 
study trade in intermediates in the context of the activities of multinational enterprises by 
assessing the determinants of the share of intra-firm trade in total trade of intermediates. When 
analysing the determinants, the sources of comparative advantage and intra-firm trade for 
intermediates, we emphasise the peculiarities of intermediates and the differences in trade 
patterns between intermediates and final consumption goods.  
In Chapter 1, we assess the determinants of services trade liberalisation as captured by the 
specific commitments undertaken by countries under the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS) of 1995. In particular, we analyse the weighted coverage ratio of commitments 
for the two modes of services supply cross-border supply (mode 1) and commercial presence 
(mode 3). We develop a new classification for the specific commitments of 106 countries 
regarding market access and national treatment for 155 services sectors and 4 modes of supply.
2
 
The classification reveals that liberalisation under the GATS was rather limited with countries 
scheduling commitments in only 42 out of 155 sectors on average, which corresponds to a 
coverage ratio of 27 percent. While high income countries made commitments in 49 percent of 
possible cases, middle and low income countries have coverage ratios of 20.4 percent and 9.9 
percent respectively.  
This chapter represents the first comprehensive assessment of the economic fundamentals 
determining the GATS commitments for cross-border trade and commercial presence in services 
across all service sectors. While general equilibrium models of trade and multinational 
enterprises (Markusen, 2002 and 2006; Egger, Larch and Pfaffermayr, 2007) promise largest 
welfare gains to small and poor economies, we find that large and rich countries scheduled more 
liberal commitments under the GATS. A possible explanation for these results is the lack of 
comprehensive domestic regulation in service sectors of poor countries. Related concerns on 
other policy objectives such as consumer protection and the fear of not being able to regulate in 
the future might have prevented developing countries from undertaking binding commitments. 
To take properly into account the interdependence of countries due to the fact that the GATS 
agreement is the outcome of multilateral negotiations, we employ spatial econometrics modelling 
                                                     
2
 While a similar exercise has been conducted by Hoekman (1996), this chapter goes further by applying a 
more sophisticated weighting scheme for mode 3. 
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by including the neighbours‟ weighted coverage ratio as explanatory variable. We find that 
countries are more likely to commit to more extensive liberalisations, if their natural trading 
partners/neighbours do so as well. Hence, there is significant herding behaviour in liberalising 
service transactions. 
Surprisingly, empirical research on trade in intermediates has been limited so far. While some 
studies developed their own classification of intermediates relying on whether the terms “parts” 
or “components” are used in the product code (Yeats, 2001; Schott, 2003), only few studies 
(Bergstrand and Egger, 2010) have used the Broad Economic Categories (BEC) classification of 
the United Nations. In Chapters 2-4, we take advantage of this gap in the literature and employ 
the BEC classification to assess patterns of trade in intermediates. The BEC classification groups 
commodities according to their main end use into intermediate goods, capital goods and 
consumption goods, which are the three basic classes of goods in the System of National 
Accounts. While the first version of the BEC classification was issued in 1971, in our analyses, 
we use the fourth and most current revision of the classification that was released in 2003 and 
that identifies intermediates, capital goods and consumption goods in terms of the Standard 
International Trade Classification, Rev.3 (SITC, Rev.3) and of the Harmonized Commodity 
Description and Coding System, 2002 version, (HS02). By assessing the various patterns of trade 
in intermediates, this dissertation helps in advancing analytical results in a rather unexplored 
field. Moreover, we use the BEC classification as starting point to create novel datasets that allow 
studying new aspects of trade in intermediates. In particular, in Chapter 2 we combine trade in 
intermediate goods with input-output tables to create a bilateral trade dataset that includes not 
only the industry of origin but also the dimension of the using industry, i.e. the industry that is 
actually using the intermediate input in its production process. The novelty of Chapter 4 is that it 
combines the “use” dimension of trade as captured by the BEC classification with the ownership 
dimension of trade, i.e. intra-firm and arm‟s length trade. This allows us to provide the first 
analysis of intra-firm trade for intermediates, capital goods and consumption goods.  
In Chapter 2 we create a comprehensive dataset of bilateral trade in intermediate goods and 
services for 42 countries over the period 1995-2005. By combining trade data with input-output 
tables, we create a novel dataset that includes i) bilateral trade in intermediate services and ii) the 
using industry dimension in addition to the industry of origin. This dataset allows us to obtain the 
very first insights into the determinants of trade in intermediate services, thereby addressing a 
rather unexplored field in the empirical trade literature. Furthermore, the information on both the 
industry of origin and the using industry enables us to estimate inter- as well as intra-industry 
gravity regressions. 
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More specifically, we use the BEC classification to identify intermediate goods at the 5-digit 
level of the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), Rev.3 for a large number of 
countries. Unfortunately, given the high level of aggregation of services trade data, no similar 
classification exists for trade in services. We overcome this constraint by relying on OECD input-
output tables. While input-output tables are not bilateral, they have the advantage of providing a 
breakdown of imported services into intermediate services and services used for final 
consumption. To obtain bilateral trade in services at the industry level, we multiply bilateral 
imports of services from trade data with the share of intermediate inputs in imported services 
from input-output tables. The second novelty of our dataset addresses the shortcoming that trade 
data are collected according to the industry of origin and give therefore no indication regarding 
the using industry. We again employ input-output tables to distribute bilateral trade in 
intermediate goods and services over using industries.  
Figure 1 shows that intermediate goods and services dominate world trade, accounting for 56.2 
percent of trade in goods and for 73.2 percent of trade in services in our dataset. Furthermore, it 
shows that the share of trade in intermediates in total trade increased only slightly during the past 
decade. 
Figure 1: Share of intermediates in total trade 
 
We assess the determinants of trade in intermediates using the gravity model (Anderson, 2003), 
which is the workhorse model in empirical trade analysis explaining bilateral trade patterns as a 
function of trade costs and market sizes of countries. In pooled gravity regressions, we find that 
trade costs matter more for intermediate goods than for consumption goods. However, in 
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regressions by industry the opposite pattern is found for some industries pointing to the 
importance of industry and product characteristics in explaining trade patterns. Finally, using 
instrumental variables regressions, we find a complementary relationship between bilateral 
inward FDI and bilateral imports of intermediates. Our findings also suggest that the impact of 
both trade costs and bilateral FDI is stronger on intra-industry imports than on inter-industry 
imports of intermediates. These results indicate that vertical production networks are more likely 
to be integrated within the same industry than across industries and that trade costs matter more 
for production stages that are closely connected. These findings open up important research 
questions that might be assessed more thoroughly using firm level data. For instance, Alfaro and 
Charlton (2009) use firm level data to show that firms are more likely to own production stages 
close to their own activity. 
An important policy implication of our findings is that countries should aim at lowering trade 
costs for intermediates, since empirical research indicates that imports of intermediates can 
increase the productivity of domestic firms that use them (Amiti and Konings, 2007). 
Furthermore, our work underlines the importance of improving the collection of data on trade in 
intermediates for research and policymaking. For instance, accounting correctly for trade in 
intermediates is essential for the calculation of trade flows in value-added (Johnson and Noguera, 
2009, and Daudin et al., 2009) or incorporating the different impact of trade costs on trade in 
intermediates and consumption goods can improve for instance the modelling of the gains from 
trade (Feltenstein and Plassmann, 2008). 
Besides assessing the determinants of trade using gravity regressions, much empirical research in 
international trade has investigated whether trade flows actually follow a comparative advantage 
pattern. In an influential paper, Romalis (2004) predicts that a country will produce and export 
more in industries that use intensively those production factors the country is abundant in. 
Romalis empirically confirms this comparative advantage pattern of trade for traditional 
production factors such as physical and human capital. Recent research has emphasised that the 
quality of institutions and timeliness in exporting constitute alternative sources of comparative 
advantage. Nunn (2007) and Levchenko (2007) show that the quality of legal institutions can be a 
source of comparative advantage for countries since better contract enforcement can reduce the 
underinvestment of firms arising from the hold-up problem between contracting parties. Another 
strand of the empirical trade literature has emphasised that timeliness, i.e. the ability to export 
within short time delays, is an important determinant of trade (Hummels, 2001; Evans and 
Harrigan, 2005; Djankov et al., 2010).  
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In Chapter 3 we follow these studies and assess traditional and alternative sources of comparative 
advantage. The main contribution of the analysis is that it is the first study that thoroughly 
assesses comparative advantage patterns in trade separately for trade in intermediates and for 
trade in final consumption goods. In particular, we extend the existing findings by showing that 
the quality of institutions and the timeliness in exporting, i.e. the quality of transport 
infrastructure, provide a comparative advantage in exporting intermediate goods that are 
institutional-intensive or time-sensitive, respectively. 
We use the BEC classification to break down trade flows into intermediate goods and 
consumption goods. We follow the empirical strategy of Nunn (2007) and assess the comparative 
advantage pattern of trade by looking at industry exports of countries to the world at the 6-digit 
level of the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) in the year 2000. To test for 
comparative advantage, we interact industry variables with country variables. The coefficients of 
these interaction terms allow us to assess whether better institutions and better transport 
infrastructure increase relatively more exports in institutional-intensive and time-sensitive 
industries, respectively. 
We indeed find that the quality of institutions and the quality of transport infrastructure are 
sources of comparative advantage for trade in intermediate goods. In particular, two results 
underline the importance of a country‟s ability to timely delivery for trade in intermediate goods. 
First, the quality of transport infrastructure is a more important factor in explaining the pattern of 
trade in intermediate goods than the quality of institutions. Second, while countries with a good 
transport infrastructure export relatively more time-sensitive intermediates and consumption 
goods, this comparative advantage pattern of trade is significantly stronger for intermediates. 
These findings have important policy implications as they suggest that investing in infrastructure 
and fostering trade facilitation would significantly boost a country's participation in production 
networks. 
In Chapter 4 we assess trade in intermediate goods in the context of the activities of multinational 
enterprises by distinguishing between intra-firm trade in intermediates and arm‟s length trade in 
intermediates. We combine data from the U.S. Census Bureau on U.S. intra-firm imports in the 
year 2000 at the Harmonized System 6-digit (HS6) level with the BEC classification to identify 
intra-firm and arm‟s length trade in intermediate goods, capital goods and consumption goods. 
By providing a breakdown of trade flows according to the dimensions of use and ownership, this 
novel dataset allows a more nuanced analysis of trade of multinational enterprises in the context 
of international production networks. Table 1 gives a broad overview of the respective patterns of 
US imports. In 2000 trade in intermediates accounted for 47 percent of U.S. imports while intra-
 
 PREFACE 
7 
 
firm transactions accounted for 48 percent. Hence, intra-firm trade and trade in intermediates are 
both significant in terms of volumes constituting almost 50 percent of U.S. imports each. The 
descriptive statistics furthermore reveal that the share of intra-firm imports in total imports is 
much higher for capital goods (59.4 percent) and intermediates (43.5 percent) than for 
consumption goods (19 percent). This discrepancy in the share of intra-firm trade, between 
intermediates and capital goods on the one hand and consumption goods on the other hand, 
provides a motivation for a distinct empirical analysis of intra-firm trade by type of good.  
Table 1: Decomposition of U.S. imports in 2000 by ownership and main end use  
 
Since most trade theories think of intra-firm trade as trade in intermediates, it seems essential also 
from a theoretical perspective to assess the determinants of intra-firm trade by type of good, 
especially distinguishing between intra-firm trade in intermediates and trade in final goods. 
Recent theoretical contributions (Grossman and Helpman, 2003; Antràs, 2003; Antràs and 
Helpman, 2004 and 2008) underscore the importance of incomplete contracts for the 
organisational decision of firms when sourcing a specialised intermediate input from a supplier. 
Following this literature, we explain the share of intra-firm trade in total trade by focusing on the 
hold-up problem as a main reason for the decision of firms whether to source intermediates from 
a foreign affiliate through intra-firm trade or from an independent supplier through arm‟s length 
trade. The hold-up problem refers to the exploitation of a contracting party by its counterparty 
because the contract is incomplete or not enforceable, while the investment undertaken is 
relationship-specific, i.e. worth less outside the relationship. We especially emphasise the role of 
contract enforcement as guaranteed by a country‟s legal institutions and the differences between 
intermediate inputs and final goods regarding the hold-up problem. Recent empirical papers such 
as Bernard et al (2010a and 2010b), Nunn and Trefler (2008) and Costinot et al. (2009) test 
predictions of these models. However, none of these papers distinguishes between intra-firm 
trade in intermediate goods and intra-firm trade in final goods except for Bernard et al. (2010b), 
who test the robustness of their main results by excluding final goods in regressions. Hence, by 
providing a systematic analysis of intra-firm trade in intermediates as compared to intra-firm 
trade in other good types, we are able to bridge the gap between empirical research and 
theoretical models on intra-firm trade. 
Main end use   
(BEC classification)
Number of HS6 
lines
Imports in Mill. 
USD
Total imports 
(%)
Intra-firm 
imports (%)
Arm's length 
imports (%)
Total 5,082 1,156,801.0 100.0% 47.5% 51.2%
Intermediate 3,153 545,316.3 47.1% 43.5% 53.9%
Consumption 1,235 244,898.6 21.2% 27.2% 72.7%
Capital 672 219,876.8 19.0% 59.4% 40.5%
Not classified 22 146,708.7 12.7% 78.9% 20.9%
 
 PREFACE 
8 
 
We analyse the pattern of U.S. intra-firm imports at the HS6 level relying on country variables, 
product (industry) variables and the interaction of product (industry) and country characteristics. 
Our empirical estimation strategy follows closely Bernard et al. (2010a) in terms of variables 
used but also in terms of functional form, especially by considering both the extensive and the 
intensive margin of intra-firm trade.  
We find that intra-firm trade at the HS6 product level is significantly higher for intermediates and 
capital goods as compared to consumption goods. In line with predictions from transaction cost 
models (Grossman and Helpman, 2003) and empirical findings (Bernard et al., 2010a), we find 
that better contract enforcement in a country reduces intra-firm trade relative to arm‟s length 
trade. According to the transaction cost approach, improvements in contract enforcement make 
the hold-up problem less severe so that the cost of outsourcing decreases relative to the cost of 
integration leading to a respective reduction in the share of intra-firm trade. Moreover, our results 
show that contract enforcement is more important for intermediates and capital goods relative to 
consumption goods at both the extensive and the intensive margin of intra-firm trade indicating 
that the hold-up problem is more important for intermediates and capital goods. A possible 
explanation for this result is that intermediates and capital goods require more relationship-
specific investments of contracting parties as compared to consumption goods. Intermediates and 
capital goods are often tailored to the needs of the final good producer so that both the supplier 
and the final good producer might undertake substantial relationship-specific investment. A 
further reason for the higher share of intra-firm trade of capital and intermediate goods relative to 
consumption goods might be the context in which these goods are traded. While intermediate and 
capital goods are mainly traded between a final good producer and a supplier, much of the trade 
in final goods is taking place between the final good producer and a distributor, i.e. a retailer or a 
wholesale trader. The final good producer will tailor the good to the tastes of the consumer and 
the relationship with the distributor is not likely to require much relationship-specific investment. 
Hence, besides new analytical findings, this chapter also underlines the importance of being very 
precise when bringing theoretical models to empirical testing.  
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1 The Determinants of GATS Commitment 
Coverage
*
 
1.1 Introduction 
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) launched in 1995 is considered to be the 
major outcome of the Uruguay Round. The agreement establishes a catalogue of rules and 
disciplines addressing commercial presence (such as foreign direct investment) in the service 
sector, trade in services, and even cross-border factor movements (such as the activity of 
expatriates). These rules and disciplines are targeted towards liberalising trade in services, 
thereby paralleling the objectives of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) which 
were meant for goods trade only. The GATS introduces the following key concepts of rules and 
disciplines: 
 Most favoured nation (MFN) clause ensures that member countries may not be 
selectively discriminated. 
 Market access and national treatment: In GATS, the following six market access 
restrictions are in principle prohibited: limitations on 1) the number of service 
suppliers allowed, 2) the value of transactions or assets, 3) the total quantity of 
service output, 4) the number of natural persons employed, 5) the type of legal 
entity allowed for the foreign service supplier, and 6) the participation of foreign 
capital in relative or absolute values. National treatment is a principle of non-
discrimination and demands a treatment of foreign services suppliers which is no 
less favourable than that accorded to domestic providers. 
While the MFN principle is a general rule, application of the market access and national 
treatment principles depends on each country‟s commitments: 
 Horizontal commitments in terms of market access and national treatment apply 
to all sectors listed by a country as long as no sector-specific exceptions are made 
(see the next point). 
                                                     
*
 This chapter is joint work with Peter Egger, Department of Management, Technology and Economics (D-
MTEC), Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule Zürich (ETHZ). 
 
 THE DETERMINANTS OF GATS COMMITMENT COVERAGE 
12 
 
 Specific commitments are the country-and-sector-specific exceptions from the 
market access and national treatment principles. And for either of these principles 
the agreement distinguishes among four modes of supplying a service:  
o Mode 1 – cross-border supply (classical trade in services such as bank 
transfer or telephone calls) 
o Mode 2 – consumption abroad (e.g., tourism) 
o Mode 3 – commercial presence; (e.g., through foreign direct investment) 
o Mode 4 – movement of natural persons (e.g., the activity of expatriates)  
While MFN follows a negative list approach (the MFN principle applies as long as no 
exemptions are notified to and applied under the auspices of the WTO), horizontal as well as 
specific commitments follow a „conditional‟ positive list approach. The latter means that 
horizontal commitments are effective only for the sectors listed (and as long as no specific 
commitments/exemptions apply). Restrictions with regard to market access and/or national 
treatment become transparent only for the listed sectors. For unlisted sectors, countries are not 
bound in the type of restrictions implemented. Hence, the rules and principles under GATS bring 
about conditional transparency regarding restrictions of service transactions. Unconditional 
transparency about restrictions is not reached, because the restrictions for unlisted sectors may be 
more or less severe than those of the actually listed ones. Accordingly, a longer list of notified 
restrictions does not necessarily reflect a higher (maximum) level of impediments to service 
transactions. This is only true conditional on a sector‟s listing at all. In general, it is therefore 
unclear whether a longer list of sectors and partial commitments in GATS on average reflects an 
attitude towards liberalisation (through transparency) or towards protection (through restrictions). 
We assume that unlisted sectors are most restrictive. 
It is this paper‟s purpose to study the economic fundamentals behind the coverage ratio of 
commitments (i.e., a country-specific weighted share of restrictions across sectors). In particular, 
we aim at understanding the deterministic part of this coverage ratio by means of econometric 
analysis against the background of general equilibrium work on trade and investment 
liberalisation. Given our theoretical motivation, we restrict our analysis to the determinants of 
commitments in commercial presence (Mode 3) and cross-border supply (Mode 1), since these 
two modes correspond most closely to foreign direct investment in services and “traditional” 
service trade, respectively. Among the four modes of supplying a service, commercial presence is 
clearly the most important one to the average GATS participant country. For instance, Hoekman 
(2006) reports that service sales by US foreign affiliates were around 50 per cent higher than US 
cross-border service exports in 2003. For the case of Tunisia, Konan and Maskus (2006) estimate 
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that 75 per cent of potential service liberalisation gains may be achieved through Mode 3 
liberalisation.  
Previous work on specific commitments in GATS has been either purely descriptive or focused 
on the financial sector. We aim at undertaking the first assessment of the economic fundamentals 
behind the extent of GATS commitments for trade and foreign direct investment in services 
across all service sectors. We put forward three sets of results: (i) large and rich (capital-
abundant) economies tend to be more inclined towards liberalising service activities than small 
and poor ones, even though the latter group of economies should experience the larger welfare 
gains from doing so, according to economic theory. Explanations for this result might be found in 
the negotiation process and in poor domestic regulatory frameworks of service sectors in 
developing countries; (ii) „experienced‟ liberalisers (namely, countries that were involved in free 
trade agreements prior to GATS) are more inclined towards liberalising services than other 
countries; and (iii) countries engage more likely in extensive service liberalisation through 
GATS, if their natural trading partners (neighbours) do so as well. The latter is an indication of 
herding behaviour in trade and investment liberalisation.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section we shortly explain the extent of 
liberalisation under the GATS. In Section 1.3 we summarise insights from general equilibrium 
theory on trade and multinational enterprises with respect to the expected impact of liberalisation 
and provide hypotheses about the determinants of commitments. In the empirical part of the 
paper in Section 1.4 we provide a descriptive analysis of GATS commitments, formulate 
empirical specifications for estimation and report the associated results. The Section 1.5 
concludes with a summary of the most important findings. 
1.2 Trade and Investment Liberalisation under GATS? 
While GATS introduces rules and disciplines on market access and national treatment related to 
service sector economic activity, it is not entirely clear how to think about its consequences in the 
context of trade and investment liberalisation. In principle, there are two channels through which 
the introduction of rules and disciplines could have had liberalising or quasi-liberalising effects 
on service trade and investment. One is the greater transparency of actually applied (or 
applicable) restrictions by country and sector from an investor‟s or exporting firm‟s point of view 
– greater transparency may be viewed as a quasi-reduction of barriers to trade and investment. A 
second possible channel is the reduction of restrictions in the course of their explicit formulation 
under GATS – a sort of race to the bottom caused by the requirement to make restrictions 
transparent. 
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While the role of GATS in creating greater transparency for exporters and multinational firms is 
uncontroversial, the accepted view about the second channel is that countries did not use 
commitments to a major extent for considerable liberalisation but mainly bound the status quo of 
their trade and investment regimes.
3
 According to this view, GATS only quasi-liberalises trade 
and investment through greater transparency and legal security in the listed sectors at the country-
level. However, the specific commitments in GATS reflect the restrictiveness of a country‟s trade 
and/or investment policy and, therefore, a country‟s general attitude towards liberalisation in 
these regards. Consequently, we may argue that countries which benefit most in welfare terms 
from trade and investment liberalisation should not only exhibit the lowest level of restrictions 
but also have a high incentive to make this fact transparent under GATS by notifying liberal 
commitments. 
Regarding the (quasi-)liberalising nature of GATS, it is useful to recall the nature of 
commitments. First, GATS is a multilateral agreement where commitments are made unilaterally 
by countries. Hence, there is no discrimination between partner countries.
4
 Accordingly, testable 
hypotheses about the determinants of GATS commitments (as quasi-liberalising standards for 
service trade and investment) can be gathered from the literature on the welfare effects of trade 
and investment liberalisation. This is the task of the subsequent section.  
1.3 Theoretical Background 
In order to provide predictions about the determinants of the GATS specific commitments, we 
rely on the general equilibrium theory of trade and multinational enterprises. In particular, 
guidance about a reduced-form relationship between economic fundamentals and the welfare 
effects of trade and/or investment liberalisation can be gathered from Markusen (2006), 
Markusen and Strand (2007) and Markusen, Rutherford and Tarr (2005), who explicitly address 
liberalisation in service trade. Insights from that line of research may be augmented by findings 
in Markusen (1997, 2002) and Egger, Larch, and Pfaffermayr (2007), who provide a welfare 
analysis of trade and investment liberalisation with a focus on goods transactions.  
Markusen (2006) presents a set of general equilibrium models in order to investigate the welfare 
consequence of service offshoring with an industrialised (skilled labour-abundant) and a 
                                                     
3
 See Hoekman (1996) among others. A certain amount of liberalization was reached in the financial 
services and telecommunications sector as a result from after-1995 negotiations. 
4
 However, since negotiations turned out to be difficult in the Uruguay Round, countries were allowed to 
list exemptions from the MFN principle in a further annex to GATS. These exemptions should have lasted 
not more than ten years in principle, i.e., no longer than until 2004. A second deviation from the MFN 
principle in GATS is allowed by preferential trade liberalization through Economic Integration Agreements 
between countries that have “substantial sectoral coverage”.  
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developing (unskilled labour-abundant) country. The most comprehensive model he uses is a 
knowledge-capital model
5
 of the multinational firm with three production factors (skilled and 
unskilled labour, know-how) and two goods (unskilled labour intensive Y, skilled labour 
intensive X). The production of good X can be fragmented into high-tech manufacturing M, 
which can be done only in the industrialised country and in middle-skill intensive services S, 
which might be offshored to the developing country. One of the crucial features of this model is 
that the firm specific know-how factor, which only the industrialised country is endowed with, is 
complementary with skilled labour in producing services S. Since the developing country lacks 
the complementary know-how factor, skilled labour is initially cheap there, although it is scarce. 
Liberalisation then implies that multinational firms move their firm-specific know-how to the 
developing country, where it works with cheaper skilled labour. While skilled labour will lose in 
North and gain in South, simulations predict that both countries might gain from liberalisation in 
welfare terms. However, while the developing country typically gains from fragmentation of 
service production, the skilled-labour abundant country may lose if it is too large. The reason for 
this potential welfare loss is an adverse terms-of-trade effect, which increases with the relative 
size of the industrialised country: if the industrialised country fragments X production by 
offshoring services and specialising in high-tech manufacturing, it loses its monopoly/market 
power and the price of X will fall.  
Markusen and Strand (2007) build on Markusen (2006) and analyse the consequences of service 
trade and investment liberalisation policies in a two-final-good, two-factor, two-country general 
equilibrium model of trade and multinational enterprises. They put the emphasis of their analysis 
on the consequences of service trade/offshoring for industrialised countries and therefore solve 
the model for a world with a small, skilled labour-abundant and a large, unskilled-labour 
abundant country. Services are modelled as intermediates in the production of a final 
manufacturing good and might be fragmented in two ways. First, the production of services 
might be geographically separated from the final goods production, leading to cross-border trade 
in service inputs (Mode 1). Second, services themselves can be fragmented into an upstream 
headquarters activity and a downstream production activity, giving rise to foreign direct 
investment in services (Mode 3). Markusen and Strand (2007) compare welfare and equilibrium 
characteristics of four regimes (no trade and foreign investment allowed, only trade is feasible, 
only foreign investment is feasible and both trade and investment are allowed). In an extension 
they distinguish between two types of skilled labour: managers and routine skilled workers, with 
                                                     
5
 Markusen‟s knowledge-capital model is a framework where national, horizontal multinational and 
vertical multinational firms may arise endogenously in general equilibrium (Markusen, 2002). In that 
model, multinational firms employ skilled labour to create firm-specific assets which can be used in more 
than a single production facility without any extra costs. 
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the latter working in the downstream service activities which may be offshored. Simulation 
results indicate that trade liberalisation creates at least as large of a welfare gain for a small, 
skilled-labour abundant country as investment liberalisation does. While combined trade and 
investment liberalisation is equally desirable to trade or investment liberalisation alone in a two-
factor model with skilled and unskilled labour, it brings the highest welfare gains in a three-factor 
model with two types of skilled workers. However, while managers gain much, routine skilled 
workers gain only few and the wage of unskilled labour is likely to fall. 
Markusen, Rutherford, and Tarr (2005) consider a monopolistic competition model with producer 
services used as intermediate inputs. They do not formally distinguish between service trade and 
foreign direct investment. Two goods are produced by two factors, skilled labour and a composite 
factor. However, one good requires additionally a service input in production. This service input 
might be provided by domestic or foreign firms. While domestic firms use the two domestic 
factors in the production of this service, foreign firms additionally use a composite imported 
factor, whose price might be driven up by investment barriers. Liberalisation implies a fall in the 
cost of this imported factor. Markusen, Rutherford and Tarr (2005) conclude that trade and 
producer service investment liberalisation increase aggregate welfare in a developing country, but 
are particularly beneficial for skilled workers. Even though foreign services and domestic skilled 
labour are substitutes in partial equilibrium (we might say, in the short run), they are 
complements in general equilibrium (we might say, in the long run): foreign service providers 
substitute for domestic firms what then lowers demand for domestic skilled workers, since 
foreign service firms replace parts of the skilled labour with the imported foreign input. However, 
the resulting lower cost of service inputs leads to an expansion of the final good sector, which 
uses skilled labour intensively. This increase in demand for domestic skilled labour more than 
outweighs the reduction in demand from substitution of domestic service firms.  
Previous and current research on trade and investment liberalisation in models with a focus on 
goods (rather than services) production comes to similar conclusions with respect to the welfare 
consequences of liberalisation. The findings in Markusen (2002) for a knowledge-capital model 
with goods production suggest that small countries almost always gain from investment 
liberalisation while large countries may lose. The reason is that small and (unskilled) labour 
abundant countries‟ inward investments react more sensitively to investment liberalisation than 
those in large and skilled labour (or capital) abundant ones. These results are confirmed also for 
unilateral investment liberalisation in Egger, Larch and Pfaffermayr (2007): small and/or capital-
scarce countries gain more from unilateral investment liberalisation than large and/or capital-
abundant ones.  
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Summarising the general equilibrium models mentioned above we can provide predictions about 
which countries should benefit most from trade and investment liberalisation in services and 
hence should have the highest coverage ratios in their commitments. Although the focus of our 
analysis is on commercial presence, we also look at the determinants of Mode 1 commitments, 
since the revisited literature often covers the effects of both trade and investment liberalisation. 
The role of country size and relative endowments tends to be similar for trade and investment 
liberalisation in the models mentioned above. Hence, predictions with respect to Modes 1 and 3 
are the same.
6
 Small countries typically gain more from trade and/or investment liberalisation, 
and therefore we expect that the coverage of Modes 1 and 3 commitments is higher for small 
countries. Hypotheses with respect to skilled-labour are less clear, since the literature promises 
welfare gains to both skilled labour-abundant countries (Markusen 2006, Markusen and Strand 
2007) and developing countries (Markusen 2006, Markusen, Rutherford, and Tarr 2005) from 
trade and investment liberalisation in services. However, Markusen (2006) finds that a skilled 
labour-abundant country may lose if it is too large. Egger, Larch and Pfaffermayr (2007) come to 
a closely related result, namely that capital-scarce countries benefit more from investment 
liberalisation than from trade liberalisation. Their finding is especially relevant here since it 
considers welfare consequences from a country‟s unilateral investment liberalisation. Hence, 
skilled-labour scarce countries should be less restrictive in their GATS commitments for sectors 
listed. Since empirical evidence suggests that capital and skilled labour endowments are highly 
correlated, and data on capital is available for a larger number of countries, we put the emphasis 
on country size and capital-labour ratios in explaining the GATS commitments. However, we 
also run some specifications with measures of skilled-to-unskilled labour endowments instead of 
capital-labour ratios.  
1.4 Empirical Analysis 
1.4.1 Previous Studies 
The first and most comprehensive evaluation of the specific commitments in the GATS has been 
done by Hoekman (1996). A more recent evaluation has been provided by Adlung and Roy 
(2005).
7
 However, both Hoekman and Adlung and Roy provide only a descriptive analysis of the 
GATS specific commitments. Previous attempts to explain the determinants of GATS 
                                                     
6
 Also, the obligation to make a commitment for each mode of supply if a sector is listed, led to a similar 
extent of liberalization across modes. 
7
 In contrast to Hoekman‟s work, their analysis covers more recent accession countries, more recent 
liberalizations from extended negotiations in the telecommunication and financial sector, as well as current 
offers from countries in the Doha Development Round. 
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commitments have been undertaken only for specific sectors. For instance, Harms, Mattoo and 
Schuhknecht (2003) explore the determinants of the GATS commitments in the financial sector 
of the agreement achieved in 1997.
8
 They motivate most of their explanatory variables using a 
political economy model. Membership in a coalition group, unionisation, financial development 
and foreign presence are found to be the main determinants for liberal GATS commitments in the 
financial sector. Valckx (2004) extends the analysis of Harms, Mattoo and Schuhknecht with 
respect to the impact of commitments in the financial sector on financial crisis. He finds several 
macroeconomic variables to have some explanatory power for liberal commitments in the 
financial sector.  
Contrary to Harms, Mattoo and Schuhknecht (2003) and Valckx (2004), we do not focus on a 
single sector but investigate the determinants of commitments in all sectors. Furthermore, we 
base our classification on the commitments made when the GATS came into force in 1995. For 
the sake of a sharper empirical design, we do not consider results from extended negotiations 
after 1995 in the financial services and the telecommunications sector. A final difference to 
previous work is that we treat EU member countries as separate entities, since they differ with 
regard to the type of listed commitments.
9
  
1.4.2 Classification of Specific Commitments 
Countries can make specific commitments for 155 service sectors. The listing of the 
commitments follows a positive-negative list approach: Countries are free to choose on how 
many service sectors they want to include in their national schedule of specific commitments. For 
unlisted sectors, countries are not bound in the type of restrictions implemented. However, if a 
country lists a sector, it must post commitments for each mode of supply and with respect to the 
market access and the national treatment principles. Hence, the market access and the national 
treatment principles set the boundaries to the breadth and depth of commitments. Countries are 
obliged to mention only restrictions and regulations within the scope of these two principles. 
When making a commitment, countries may choose among three broad types of commitments: 
none (full commitment), bound (partial commitment) and unbound (no commitment/full 
discretion).  
An entry of „none‟ implies that a country guarantees full market access/national treatment for a 
certain sector and mode of supply. The „bound‟ category comprises all partial commitments, i.e., 
a country then guarantees market access/national treatment subject to the restrictions listed. If a 
                                                     
8
 Service negotiations continued in the financial sector after 1995 and were concluded in December 1997.  
9
 Since EU countries have a joint schedule of commitments, they have the same number of listed sectors 
and commitments, respectively. However, individual EU member countries made different commitments in 
terms of liberality.  
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country chooses „unbound‟, it does not commit to any market access/national treatment for a 
sector and mode. 
In the classification of commitments under Mode 1, we follow Hoekman (1996) and assign the 
three commitment types none, bound and unbound values of 1, 0.5 and 0, respectively. These 
values reflect different degrees of restrictiveness. Commitments under Mode 3 are typically more 
extensive and more detailed than those under Mode 1. This reflects the predominant importance 
of commercial presence as mode of supply in service trade. Therefore, we use a more detailed 
restrictiveness index in order to classify commitments for Mode 3. For the identification of 
barriers to foreign direct investment in services we rely on Hardin and Holmes (1997) and 
subsequent work by Golub (2003). They distinguish three broad types of restrictions: foreign 
equity limits, screening and approval procedures, and other restrictions including mainly the 
movement of people and operational restrictions. However, in the construction and weighting of 
our index we follow more closely Harms, Mattoo, and Schuhknecht (2003). While the former 
two studies construct the restrictiveness index by cumulatively weighting all investment barriers 
a country has in place, we weight only the most restrictive measure of a single commitment, i.e., 
one commitment/one sector is assigned only one weight. We use this approach because we rely 
on GATS as our only source of information, while Hardin and Holmes (1997) and Golub (2003) 
use other sources, too. Furthermore, in GATS no other restrictions with respect to market access 
and national treatment than those mentioned are allowed. Hence, if a commitment in a certain 
sector is rather liberal, we can be sure about the restrictiveness of rules is in place. While Harms, 
Mattoo, and Schuhknecht (2003) focus on market access commitments, we combine market 
access and national treatment commitments in the calculation of our restrictiveness measure. In 
particular, for each listed sector the more restrictive commitment type, either market access or 
national treatment, is used in the calculation of the index. Overall, this obtains a balanced and 
fairly complete measure of a country‟s service liberalisation status which takes into account that 
the advantages of a free market access commitment in a sector can easily be offset by a quite 
restrictive national treatment commitment. Table 1.1 shows the classification scheme for the 
three commitment types (none, bound, and unbound, respectively). We used two slightly 
different, alternative weighting schemes for Mode 3 as summarised in the table. Since the 
obtained measures of liberalisation for Mode 3 are quite similar and the empirical results are 
insensitive to choosing variant 3i versus 3ii, we report subsequent results only for one scheme, 
namely 3i. 
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Table 1.1: Weighting scheme for commitments 
 
If only an aggregated sector is listed, we assume that commitments apply to all sub-sectors. 
Similarly, if only a part of a service sector is included, we typically use the corresponding weight 
for the entire sector. Furthermore, we assume that no information/no commitment is more 
restrictive than any information/commitment, no matter which one. Hence, if a sector is not listed 
it is attributed a value of zero in our quantitative measure of liberalisation. Also an entry of 
unbound, indicating that the country keeps full policy discretion, is counted as zero in the 
calculation of the liberalisation index. Contrary to Hardin and Holmes (1997) and Golub (2003), 
but following Harms, Mattoo, and Schuknecht (2003) we assume that restrictions regarding the 
approval of investment are more/at least as restrictive as foreign equity limits.  
We construct our liberalisation measure as a weighted coverage ratio:  
Commitment Weight 
 Mode 1 Mode 3i Mode 3ii 
    
SECTOR NOT LISTED 0 0 0 
UNBOUND 0 0 0 
    
BOUND: 0.5   
Foreign equity allowed    
Monopoly or No new entry  0.1 0.1 
1-19%  0.35 0.4 
20-34%  0.4 0.4 
35-49%  0.45 0.4 
50-74%  0.7 0.75 
75-99%  0.75 0.75 
    
Screening and approval    
Investor must show economic benefits  0.25 0.25 
Economic needs test  0.25 0.25 
Discretionary licensing  0.25 0.25 
Licensing/approval/authorization required  0.35 0.4 
    
Other restrictions    
Majority of managers/board of directors must be national or resident  0.5 0.5 
Citizenship requirement  0.5 0.5 
At least 1 (1/3) of managers/board of directors must be national or 
resident  0.65 0.65 
Residency requirement - living at least 3 (1) years in the country  0.65 0.65 
Requirement w.r.t. legal form   0.75 0.75 
Act/Law which applies  0.75 0.75 
Notification/Registration requirement  0.75 0.75 
Other minor restrictions  0.75 0.75 
    
NONE 1 1 1 
 
 
 THE DETERMINANTS OF GATS COMMITMENT COVERAGE 
21 
 
,S,j,N,i, m
S
countweighted
WCov
S
j
mi
mi 


1    ;1    ;31for              
 
1
 
where m, i, and j, are indices for mode, country, and sector. The weighted coverage ratio 
miWCov  for country i is the weighted count of posted commitments of Mode m divided by the 
number of sectors the country could eventually list (S=155). Since the most liberal commitment 
possible („none‟) is assigned a value of one, the number of all sectors S – listed and unlisted – 
corresponds to free service trade. Hence, our coverage ratio indicates the share/extent of 
liberalisation, i.e., it is the weighted share of service sectors a country has been willing to 
liberalise. The weighted coverage ratio is driven by two factors, the number and the liberality of 
commitments made. If a country listed only few sectors, its weighted coverage ratio will be 
small, since the numerator of WCovmi declines while S remains unaffected. Hence, for the 
interpretation of WCovmi as a measure of a country‟s service liberalisation, it is crucial that non-
listed sectors are less liberalised.
10
  
1.4.3 Features of the Coverage Ratios 
In summarising the commitments we group countries into low, middle and high income countries 
according to the World Bank classification for 1995. 25 countries are classified as low income, 
47 countries as middle income and 34 countries as high income. The detailed country 
composition of the three groups and the weighted coverage ratio for Mode 3 is shown in Table 
1.9 in Appendix 1.A.
11
 Table 1.2 reports summary statistics of commitments in Mode 1 and 3 for 
the three country groups. 
                                                     
10
 We checked for the sensitivity of this assumption by using the number of all sectors a country listed any 
commitments in instead of S=155 in the denominator of WCovmi. However, then, both the number of 
countries covered and the explanatory power of the model in terms of R
2
 drops substantially. 
11
 We include the same countries as Hoekman (1996) plus the 12 EU countries in our analysis. Thus, also 
countries which scheduled commitments by mid 1994 but became member of the WTO at a later point in 
time are included, i.e., China (2001), Congo (1997), but not Algeria (not member yet).  
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Table 1.2: Averages for specific commitments indicators by country income group as of 1995 
 
On average, countries listed only 42 out of 155 sectors. This corresponds to a coverage ratio of 
only 27.1 percent.
12
 Richer countries listed more commitments on average. While the average 
income country has a coverage of 49 percent, middle and low income countries have one of 20.4 
and 9.9 percent, respectively, across all sectors.  
For the calculation of the weighted coverage ratios (WCov), weights of Table 1.1 reflecting 
different degrees of restrictiveness are used. Since the weighting schemes differ between Mode 1 
and Mode 3, the weighted coverage ratio can only be compared across different sector groups but 
not across modes. Furthermore, the weighted coverage ratio must be equal to or lower than the 
normal coverage ratio. It would be the same if all sectors listed by a country were fully liberalised 
(none). Similar to the simple (un-weighted) coverage ratio, the weighted coverage ratio is on 
average higher for rich countries. For Mode 3 and all sectors, high income countries exhibit a 
weighted coverage ratio of 41.1 percent compared to ones of 12.4 and 6.1 percent for the middle 
and low income countries.  
Furthermore, we calculated the weighted coverage for two subsets of the 155 sectors. First, we 
excluded the financial and the telecommunications services from the coverage, because 
negotiations continued until 1997 in these two groups of sectors. Second, we calculated the 
weighted coverages for 46 business sectors only. While the weighted coverage ratio remains 
basically unchanged for the first group, for business services it is even higher for middle and high 
income countries relative to low income countries than with the benchmark measures.  
 
                                                     
12
 The number of commitments does not vary across modes since countries must make a commitment for 
every mode if a sector is listed. Hence, the number of commitments for a mode corresponds to the number 
of sectors listed by a country. 
  Mode 1 Mode 3 
 Income group 
Statistic All Low Middle High All Low Middle High 
Countries 106 25 47 34 106 25 47 34 
Number of commitments 42.0 15.4 31.7 76.0 42.0 15.4 31.7 76.0 
Coverage ratio 27.1 9.9 20.4 49.0 27.1 9.9 20.4 49.0 
Weighted coverage ratio (WCov) 19.2 5.6 12.2 38.7 20.1 6.1 12.4 41.1 
WCov, without financial and telecomm. services 19.1 4.5 12.3 39.3 20.8 4.7 12.8 43.5 
WCov, only business services 24.2 2.9 14.9 52.7 27.4 4.7 16.5 59.2 
Notes:         
Income groups according to World Bank 1995: Low, Middle, High. Source: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/OGHIST.xls 
Coverage ratio of posted commitments relative to number of possible commitments.    
Weighted coverage ratio of weighted commitments made to number of possible commitments.  
For WCov, weights as in Table 1 are used. For Mode 3, we use scheme 3i in Table 1.    
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1.4.4 Specification 
In the light of the theoretical hypotheses summarised in Section 1.2, we may specify the weighted 
coverage ratio of GATS commitments announced in 1995 under Modes 1 or 3 in the following 
way:
13 
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Notice that the left-hand-side appears in a logistically transformed way to ensure that the 
predictions of the model will fall in the possible support region for WCov. Xk,i is the kth of K 
explanatory variables in the model, 
0,m  is a mode-specific constant, km,  are unknown 
parameters, and 
imu ,  is a stochastic error term.  
Section 1.2 suggests using (the log of) country size and (the log of) capital-labour ratios 
endowments as two determinants (among the Xk) of trade and/or investment liberalisation. 
Furthermore, we include two variables indicating the extent of trade liberalisation prior to GATS 
membership in terms of the fraction of partner countries trade is liberalised via a customs union 
or free trade area (FTA) or via another preferential trade agreement (PTA). We expect these 
variables to be positively related to the GATS coverage rates coverage since countries inclined 
towards goods trade (and partly also service) liberalisation at the bilateral level in the past should 
more likely be willing to also liberalise trade in services unilaterally. This argument is indirectly 
supported by Ornelas (2005). In a somewhat different context, he shows that (goods trade) 
regionalism through FTA membership is a building block to multilateral trade liberalisation, 
which is intended by the GATS. Additionally, we use dumping and antidumping measures, 
capturing barriers to goods trade, as additional controls. On the one hand, we employ information 
about the number of anti-dumping cases a country had filed against other economies prior to 
1990. On the other hand, we use the number of cases other economies had filed against this 
country. Similar to the previous arguments about FTAs and PTAs, these two variables should be 
related to a country‟s active use of trade policy.  
Summary statistics of explanatory variables are shown in Table 1.3. We use the log of real GDP 
in US dollars for the year 1993 (from the World Bank‟s World Development Indicators) as a 
measure of country size to explain the coverage ratios announced in year 1995. Furthermore, we 
include the log of capital per capita ratios in 1993 estimated by the perpetual inventory method as 
                                                     
13
 We use a logistic transformation of the coverage ratio on the left-hand side to make sure that the model 
predictions will lie in the interval [0, 1]. 
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a proxy for capital labour ratios. To construct capital stocks, we use data on gross fixed capital 
formation from the World Development Indicators.
14
 Information about FTA and PTA is taken 
from the WTO. Note that in our unilateral context these variables measure the fraction of 
countries a particular economy had bilaterally liberalised trade with prior to 1990. Data on 
antidumping are taken from Egger and Nelson (2007).
15
  
Table 1.3: Summary statistics for explanatory variables used in regressions 
 
1.4.5 Regression Results 
Table 1.4 presents regression results using the logistically transformed coverage ratio for all 
sectors of Modes 1 and 3 as the dependent variable and different sets of explanatory variables. 
We start with a basic regression (1) using only size and the capital-labour ratio on the right-hand-
side. The results can be summarised as follows.
16
 
 
                                                     
14
 An annual depreciation rate of 13.3 percent is assumed throughout. Notice that starting years of the 
investment data vary for the benchmark results. However, we ran alternative regressions where we used 
capital stock data which were based on investment data from 1990-1993 only. It turns out that the results 
are insensitive to that modification.  
15
 We measure the use of dumping measures of country i as the total number of antidumping cases filed 
against country i by others since 1970 up to 1990. In contrast, the number of antidumping measures used 
by country i is the number of cases filed by country i against others since 1970 up to 1990. We do not 
consider cases later than 1990 to avoid any feedback effects from GATS on the use of dumping and 
antidumping measures. 
16
 One to maximal four countries are lost with the logistic transformation, because their coverage ratios 
equals the lower bound 0. 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max  
Log real GDP (1993) 87 24.084 2.280 19.280 29.642  
Log capital per capita (1993) 87 8.273 1.593 5.116 11.014  
Higher School attained (%) 77 0.092 0.087 0.001 0.463  
FTA (free trade area membership) 87 0.015 0.029 0.000 0.080  
PTA (preferential trade agreement membership) 87 0.017 0.029 0.000 0.087  
AD (anti-dumping cases filed; active) 87 51.345 124.908 0.000 704.000  
AD* (anti-dumping cases filed; passive)  87 46.483 91.643 0.000 594.000  
Notes:       
Higher School attained (%) is the percentage of "higher school attained" in the total population in 1990. 
FTA is the fraction of countries an economy was engaged with in free trade agreements notified to the 
 WTO between 1970 and 1990.      
PTA is the fraction of countries an economy was engaged with in free trade agreements notified to the 
 WTO between 1970 and 1990.      
AD is the number of cases filed by a country against others since 1970 up to 1990.  
AD*  is the number of antidumping cases filed against a country by others since 1970 up to 1990. 
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Table 1.4: Regression results for the determinants of weighted GATS commitment coverage of all sectors services 
 Mode 1 Mode 3 
Explanatory variables (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)  
Log GDP (1993) 0.220 *** 0.139 ** 0.204 *** 0.108  0.196 * 0.321 *** 0.267 *** 0.302 *** 0.291 *** 0.338 *** 
  (0.049)  (0.062)  (0.067)  (0.100)  (0.108)  (0.044)  (0.055)  (0.059)  (0.103)  (0.111)  
Log capital per capita (1993) 0.581 *** 0.402 *** 0.392 ***     0.498 *** 0.336 *** 0.341 ***     
  (0.080)  (0.101)  (0.101)      (0.079)  (0.094)  (0.094)      
Higher school attained (%)       5.007 *** 5.844 ***        4.405 *** 5.829 *** 
        (1.334)  (1.491)         (1.271)  (1.463)  
FTA    14.668 *** 10.288 ** 29.564 *** 20.883 ***    15.532 *** 10.250 ** 26.534 *** 17.261 *** 
    (3.908)  (5.165)  (3.270)  (4.784)     (3.569)  (4.694)  (3.498)  (4.762)  
PTA      -9.231 **   -10.628 **      -4.476    -7.097  
      (4.629)    (5.117)       (3.907)    (4.342)  
AD    0.001  0.000  0.000  -0.002 **    0.000  -0.001  -0.001  -0.004 *** 
    (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)     (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
AD*    0.001  0.001  0.003 ** 0.002     0.001  0.001  0.002  0.001  
    (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)     (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  
EU      0.200    0.707 *      0.578 **   1.150 *** 
      (0.262)    (0.376)       (0.232)    (0.339)  
Constant  -11.980 *** -8.847 *** -10.074 *** -5.562 ** -7.381 *** -13.690 *** -11.343 *** -12.089 *** -9.730 *** -10.746 *** 
  (1.073)  (1.687)  (1.803)  (2.306)  (2.465)  (1.006)  (1.479)  (1.600)  (2.429)  (2.610)  
                       
Countries  86  84  84  75  75  89  87  87  77  77  
R
2
   0.603   0.642   0.664   0.618   0.650   0.646   0.687   0.696   0.643   0.668   
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***significant at 1%; ** at 5%; * at 10%. The dependent variable is the weighted coverage ratio of the respective mode. 
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The explanatory power of the model based on two explanatory variables only is remarkable. The 
R
2
 is 0.603 and 0.646 for Modes 1 and 3, respectively. For the less parsimonious models (2)-(5), 
the R
2
 takes values between 0.6 and 0.7. Both country size and capital per capita have a positive 
coefficient which is significant at the 1 percent level in (1).
 
In (2) and (3), we add the 
aforementioned trade friction/liberalisation indicators as well as dummy variable, indicating 
whether an economy was a member of the EU prior to 1996 or not.
17
 Results regarding country 
size and capital per capita are confirmed to be robust in these less parsimonious specifications: 
large and capital abundant countries are more liberal in terms of the weighted coverage for both 
Modes 1 and 3. The variable FTA, indicating the average fraction of partner countries in free trade 
agreements between 1970 and 1990, has a significant positive impact on the weighted coverage 
ratio for both Modes 1 and 3. The coefficient of FTA is significantly different from zero at 1 per 
cent in (2) and at 5 per cent in (3), respectively. On the contrary, PTA membership (which 
represents a less effective form of trade regionalism than FTA membership) is associated with less 
effective service liberalisation. This negative effect is significant at the 5 percent level in equation 
(3) for Mode 1 but it is insignificant for Mode 3. The coefficients of the antidumping variables 
AD and AD* are not significantly different from zero, neither in equation (2) not in (3). In 
regression (3) we also included the aforementioned dummy for EU membership, which is 
significantly positive at 5 percent for Mode 3. 
Since the theoretical models we rely upon mostly employ skilled-to-unskilled labour ratios rather 
than capital-labour ratios, we employ a specification based on a measure thereof instead of 
capital-labour ratios. In equations (4) and (5) of Table 1.4, we use the higher school attainment 
ratio from the Barro-Lee dataset on Educational Attainment (2001) as a measure of skilled labour 
abundance instead of capital abundance. Note that in all other regards regressions (4) and (5) are 
the same as (2) and (3). Not surprisingly, the schooling variable takes as a positive coefficient and 
is significant at 1 per cent in (4) and (5) for both modes, similar to the capital-labour ratio in 
models (2) and (3). Also the results for the other explanatory variables remain fairly stable. While 
real GDP is still significant for Mode 3, it becomes insignificant in (4) and is significant only at 
10 percent in (5) for Mode 1. However, it should be mentioned that using the skilled-to-unskilled 
labour ratio rather than the capital-labour ratio involves a fairly sizable loss of observations so 
that we should be careful with comparing the results. 
Overall, the results regarding the impact of relative factor endowments are somewhat surprising 
from a theoretical perspective. Theory predicts that small and poor (unskilled labour abundant or 
labour abundant) economies should obtain the largest gains from liberalisation. Yet, empirical 
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 Since the number of commitments is the same for all EU countries, the weighted coverage ratios differ 
because of different degrees of restrictiveness in each country‟s commitments. 
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results indicate that these countries are less inclined towards liberalisation of services trade and 
investment than others. Possible explanations may be found in the design of the negotiation 
process
18
 and in regulatory concerns about service sectors. Large countries can more easily make 
concessions to negotiating partners than small countries in order to obtain a desired commitment. 
Hence, the commitment coverage of large countries may be broader than that of small countries, 
because they are able to outweigh domestic protectionist pressure with access gains more easily 
than small economies.   
Hoekman and Mattoo (2007) mention asymmetric export interests and domestic regulatory 
concerns as two reasons for limited liberalisation in GATS: industrialised and developing 
countries differ in their export interests relative to the mode of supply. While industrialised 
economies mainly seek market access for their multinational enterprises, i.e., liberalisation under 
Mode 3, they oppose liberalisation under Mode 4, the temporary movement of people. Overall, 
interests in liberalisation of services on the part of industrialised countries are very different from 
those of developing countries. Accordingly, the missing reciprocity of interests in liberalising 
service transactions at least within different modes under GATS may explain the low 
commitment coverage of developing countries as compared to GATT. Other explanations relate 
to the fact that poor countries often lack comprehensive domestic regulation in service sectors. 
They might decide to not make a commitment because (i) without functioning domestic 
regulations potential benefits from liberalisation may not be realised, (ii) domestic regulators 
might be afraid that commitments in GATS prohibit the introduction of new welfare-improving 
regulations in the future, and (iii) countries are not allowed to introduce new restrictions after a 
GATS commitment is made.   
1.4.6 Extensions 
1.4.6.1 Results for Subsets of Sectors  
                                                     
18
 Negotiations in services take the form of a request–offer approach. Thereby, requests are typically made 
bilaterally in the form of letters between countries. Then, offers are published multilaterally in the form of a 
schedule of commitments. After analysing the offers of other economies, a country will start again with 
posting bilateral requests. The process ends when countries jointly accept the whole schedule of 
commitments. GATS builds on the principle of joint acceptance of member countries. In contrast, the 
negotiation process for GATT is a more bilateral approach and also evolved over time: bilateral 
concessions in GATT, for example, tariff cuts, are subsequently automatically „multilateralised‟ by the 
MFN principle. 
 
 THE DETERMINANTS OF GATS COMMITMENT COVERAGE 
28 
 
In Table 1.5 and Table 1.6 we report results using the weighted coverages of a subset of sectors as 
the dependent variable. Results are reported for the two least parsimonious models for either 
mode, i.e., specifications (3) and (5) as in Table 1.4, respectively. In Table 1.5 the weighted 
coverage excludes the financial and the telecommunications sectors.
19
  
Table 1.5: Determinants of weighted commitment coverage excluding financial and telecomm. 
services  
 
The previous results are confirmed for the chosen sub-sectors with regard to the main variables of 
interest. The signs of coefficients and the significance levels remain identical for real GDP, 
capital per capita, and the schooling variable. While the coefficients do not change sign for any 
variable, the significance level of variables indicating previous trade liberalisation/distortions 
changes slightly to the better. Only the impact of EU membership is less significant than before in 
specification (5) for Mode 1 and specification (3) for Mode 3.  
In Table 1.6 we use the weighted coverage of 46 business services as the dependent variable. 
Since many countries have not included any business service sector in their list of commitments 
                                                     
19
 The reason is that the GATS participants as of 1995 decided to continue with negotiations with respect to 
liberalization in financial and telecommunication services, and an agreement was reached only in 1997. 
 Mode 1 Mode 3  
Explanatory variables    (3)   (5)   (3)   (5)    
Log GDP (1993) 0.211 *** 0.215 * 0.329 *** 0.362 ***  
  (0.071)  (0.117)  (0.064)  (0.114)   
Log capital per capita (1993) 0.413 ***   0.332 ***    
  (0.103)    (0.100)     
Higher school attained (%)   5.629 ***    6.261 ***  
    (1.508)     (1.473)   
FTA  12.226 ** 22.482 *** 13.455 ** 18.834 ***  
  (5.726)  (5.407)  (5.286)  (5.207)   
PTA  -9.493 ** -11.938 ** -6.252  -9.869 **  
  (4.694)  (5.288)  (4.245)  (4.542)   
AD  0.000  -0.003 *** -0.001  -0.004 ***  
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)   
AD*  0.002  0.003 * 0.001  0.001   
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)   
EU  0.176  0.637  0.532 * 1.193 ***  
  (0.274)  (0.383)  (0.275)  (0.370)   
Constant  -10.496 *** -7.838 *** -12.692 *** -11.296 ***  
  (1.777)  (2.646)  (1.620)  (2.643)   
            
Countries  82  72  86  75   
R
2
   0.695   0.686   0.720   0.711    
Notes:  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***significant at 1%; ** at 5%; * at 10%. The dependent variable is the weighted 
coverage ratio of the respective mode.  
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or those included business sectors are unbound, we would lose on average 25 observations for 
Mode 1 and 18 observations for Mode 3. Hence, we chose different boundary values for the 
logarithmic transformation of the weighted coverage of business services.
20
  
Table 1.6: Determinants of weighted GATS commitment coverage for business services  
 
Results for the determinants of the weighted coverage of business services in Table 1.6 mainly 
confirm our previous findings, with the exception that real GDP is not significant anymore in 
specification (5) for Mode 1. It is notable that the variable indicating the number of filed 
antidumping cases between 1970 and 1990 (AD) enters negatively and is highly significant in 
both models for Mode 3 and in one model for Mode 1. 
1.4.6.2 Political Determinants of Commitments 
Besides the general equilibrium models of trade and multinational enterprises other strands of 
economic theory may be useful to explain GATS commitments. For instance, political economy 
models of trade policy illustrate how interest groups try to influence politicians to influence trade 
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 Following Wooldridge (2002), we use the transformation TWCov = (WCov + 0.001)/(1 + 0.001), where 
the WCov lies between 0 and 1. Then, the standard logarithmic transformation as in (1) isapplied to 
TWCov. 
 Mode 1 Mode 3  
 Explanatory variables   (3)   (5)   (3)   (5)    
Log GDP (1993) 0.397 ** 0.325  0.692 *** 0.765 ***  
  (0.182)  (0.266)  (0.141)  (0.211)   
Log capital per capita (1993) 0.747 ***   0.712 ***    
  (0.234)    (0.157)     
Higher school attained (%)   12.062 ***    10.055 ***  
    (3.333)     (2.864)   
FTA  27.721 ** 44.601 *** 10.930  26.623 ***  
  (12.796)  (10.308)  (8.477)  (9.411)   
PTA  -15.114  -21.192 * -14.224  -19.484 **  
  (11.170)  (12.006)  (8.799)  (9.500)   
AD  0.000  -0.005 ** -0.003 *** -0.008 ***  
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)   
AD*  0.002  0.004  -0.001  0.001   
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.004)   
EU  -0.133  1.006  0.954 * 1.801 **  
  (0.559)  (0.752)  (0.497)  (0.712)   
Constant  -18.778 *** -12.072 ** -24.532 *** -21.472 ***  
  (4.307)  (5.952)  (3.209)  (4.889)   
            
Countries  88  78  88  78   
R
2
   0.562   0.547   0.672   0.627    
Notes:  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***significant at 1%; ** at 5%; * at 10%. The dependent variable is the weighted 
coverage ratio of the respective mode. 
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policy (participation in FTAs or tariff setting) in their favour (for instance, see Grossman and 
Helpman, 1995). In particular, that literature shows how opposing interests in and the relative 
strength of export an import competing sectors play an important role for the outcome of 
negotiations.  
While the required sector-level data are not available for a large cross-section of economies as 
ours, we may still infer the influence of variables that are likely reflective of the importance of 
interest groups at the aggregate level. These variables are gathered from two sources, the Polity 
IV Project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002) and a dataset on comparative economics from the World 
Bank (Beck, Clarke, Groffe, Keefer, and Walsh, 2001). The political economy literature suggests 
a set of different variables to be indicative of lobbying activities. 
Biglaiser and Brown (2001) argue that lobbying is more difficult, if a country‟s legislature is very 
fractionalised. We would then expect countries with a more fractionalised political systems 
(captured by a variable which we will refer to as Frac) should have a higher weighted coverage 
ratio. Persson (1998) argues that a higher quality of a country‟s checks and balances (captured by 
a variable Checks) should hinder lobbying efforts. Another factor which might constrain the 
effectiveness of lobbying is the degree of polarisation in the political system (Polariz). The more 
parties are polarised the more they suffer from not being in government and by not having their 
preferred policy implemented. Therefore, the effectiveness of interest groups is suspected to 
decline in party polarisation (Testa 2003). Biglaiser and Brown (2001) provide evidence that 
polarised legislatures render an agreement on policy reforms more difficult to achieve. 
Furthermore, we use a durability indicator (Durable) reflecting the number of years since the last 
greater regime change had happened and a variable indicating the number of years the chief 
executive has been in office (Yrsoffc). The political economy literature suggests that a regime 
change fosters the formation of political institutions and the implementation of reforms.  
Furthermore, we test the results put forward by Harms, Mattoo, and Schuknecht (2003), namely 
that a country‟s affiliation with a coalition group influences the coverage ratio of commitments. 
For this, we include a dummy variable indicating the membership in the Cairns group of 
agricultural exporting nations (apart from the dummy variable capturing EU membership).
21
  
In Table 1.7 we present results for both Mode 1 and 3 (i.e., cross-border trade and commercial 
presence), estimating four specifications. Specifications (1) and (2) use capital per capita and 
extend the most as well as the least parsimonious models estimated before by the aforementioned 
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 Cairns Group: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Paraguay, 
Peru, Philippines, South Africa, New Zealand, Thailand, Uruguay. Not included due to after-1995 joining: 
Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Pakistan. 
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political variables. Models (3) and (4) do the same but with the skilled labour variable used 
instead of the capital-labour ratio. Unfortunately, the use of data on political variables leads to a 
loss of observations so that the sample size now only ranges from 62 to 68 observations, 
depending on the specification. Surprisingly, almost all political variables are insignificant for all 
estimated models. Only the variable indicating the quality of checks and balances of the political 
system is significant at 10 percent in model (1) for either mode. 
Table 1.7: Extended regression results including political variables 
 
The dummy indicating the membership in the agricultural coalition (Cairns) is significant at 10 
percent level in two models. However, the sign of the coefficient is unstable. In model (3) for 
Mode 1, the coefficient of Cairns is negative, while it is positive in model (2) for Mode 3. Results 
for the other variables turn out to be quite stable. The capital per capita variable exerts a 
significant positive influence on the weighted coverage ratio in all models for either mode. Real 
GDP is positive and significant in all specifications for Mode 3, but insignificant in three out of 
four specifications for Mode 1.  
 Mode 1 Mode 3 
Explanatory variables    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   
Log GDP (1993) 0.100  0.078  0.254 *** 0.129  0.241 *** 0.206 ** 0.363 *** 0.273 ** 
  (0.062)  (0.082)  (0.093)  (0.128)  (0.067)  (0.083)  (0.083)  (0.109)  
Log capital per capita (1993) 0.698 *** 0.581 ***     0.520 *** 0.373 ***     
  (0.114)  (0.128)      (0.128)  (0.129)      
Higher school attained (%)     5.228 * 10.004 ***      3.176  7.599 *** 
      (2.619)  (2.593)       (2.295)  (2.059)  
FTA    9.694    26.654 ***    12.507    23.010 *** 
    (7.847)    (7.795)     (8.294)    (8.247)  
PTA    -8.924 *   -9.073     -7.375 *   -9.503 ** 
    (5.248)    (5.575)     (3.955)    (4.036)  
AD    0.001    -0.002 **    0.000    -0.002 ** 
    (0.001)    (0.001)     (0.001)    (0.001)  
AD*    0.001    0.002     0.001    0.001  
    (0.002)    (0.002)     (0.001)    (0.001)  
EU    0.021    0.630     0.370    0.717 ** 
    (0.378)    (0.426)     (0.438)    (0.405)  
Checks  0.217 * 0.151  0.124  0.069  0.146 * 0.087  0.047  -0.005  
  (0.114)  (0.127)  (0.130)  (0.125)  (0.084)  (0.104)  (0.095)  (0.090)  
Polariz  -0.097  -0.111  0.169  -0.094  0.004  -0.060  0.204  -0.019  
  (0.192)  (0.218)  (0.234)  (0.206)  (0.145)  (0.151)  (0.191)  (0.128)  
Frac  -0.683  -0.433  0.238  0.093  0.468  0.656  1.295  1.079  
  (0.819)  (0.800)  (0.876)  (0.886)  (0.792)  (0.825)  (0.833)  (0.818)  
Durable  0.000  -0.007  0.004  -0.013  0.000  -0.006  0.002  -0.015  
  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009)  
Yrsoffc  0.021  0.011  0.029  0.029  0.013  0.002  0.011  0.004  
  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.019)  (0.020)  (0.023)  (0.023)  
Cairns  -0.296  0.151  -0.776 * -0.214  0.029  0.570 * -0.346  0.190  
  (0.301)  (0.444)  (0.432)  (0.475)  (0.207)  (0.319)  (0.293)  (0.263)  
Constant  -10.371 *** -8.664 *** -9.254 *** -6.069 ** -12.745 *** -10.600 *** -11.909 *** -9.457 *** 
  (1.421)  (2.256)  (2.111)  (2.808)  (1.676)  (2.185)  (1.989)  (2.413)  
                   
Countries  68  67  62  62  68  67  62  62  
R
2
   0.682   0.723   0.518   0.705   0.700   0.754   0.593   0.757   
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis; ***significant at 1%; ** at 5%; * at 10%. The dependent variable is the weighted coverage ratio of the respective 
mode. Variables FTA, PTA, AD, and AD* are averages for the period 1970-1990. Values of all other variables are for 1993. 
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Overall, the results bear a clear message: once country size and factor endowments (capital-labour 
ratio, skilled-unskilled-labour ratio) are controlled for, it is hard to identify any robust and 
significant impact of political variables on the weighted coverage of commitments. 
1.4.6.3 Cross-country interdependence in listing specific commitments  
One basic assumption the previous results rely upon is that countries act fully independently of 
each other in their listing of GATS commitments. However, this assumption is likely to be 
inadequate. Since GATS is based on multilateral negotiations, countries will condition their 
commitments on those made by other countries. Whose example will they follow and whose 
liberalisation strategies will they condition their own upon? We hypothesise that a country will 
commit to more liberal policies if other economies that are highly relevant to the country of 
interest will do so as well. As for the latter, we hypothesise that geographical neighbours will 
adopt a similar extent of liberalisation through GATS commitments.  
In order to take account of this interdependence between economies we extend our analysis by 
using spatial econometric methods. In particular, we aim at conditioning on a country‟s 
neighbours‟ weighted coverage ratio for its own commitment ratio. For each country in the 
sample, we do so by calculating the inverse-distance weighted average of the coverage ratios of 
all other economies. Let us denote the 1n  vector of logistically transformed, weighted coverage 
ratios of all economies by y . Then, we may write the „spatial‟ counterpart of equation (1) in 
vector form as: 



K
k
mkkmmmmm muXWyy
1
,,0,0, ,3,1for     
             
(2) 
Where W is an nn   matrix of normalised inverse-distance weights, with n denoting the number 
of observations.
22
 For convenience, we normalise all entries in a particular row of that matrix by 
the sum of all entries in the same row. One of the necessary assumptions the is that 1|| 0, m . 
Furthermore, we allow for interdependence among the disturbances by assuming 
mmmm Muu   0, , where M is an nn   weights matrix similar to W.
23
  
                                                     
22
 The importance of distance for trade connectivity is supported theoretically and empirically by the 
gravity model (see among others Anderson and Wincoop 2003). Furthermore, Baier and Bergstrand (2004) 
determine natural trading partners by the value of inverse distance between two countries The elements of 
W, wij, are computed as 
iijewij

 , where ij is the scaled distance between the most important cities (in 
terms of population) of two countries. Hence, a higher level of distance of a partner country assigns a 
smaller weight to this country‟s weighted coverage ratio. 
23
 With a row-normalized M, |m,0|<1, similar to m,0. 
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The matrices W and M reflect different degrees of interdependence among economies in their 
listing of commitments. mWy  is a vector of weighted averages in the other countries‟ weighted 
coverage ratios, and mMu  captures interdependence regarding the stochastic part of the weighted 
coverage ratios. The parameters 0  and 0  indicate the relative importance of interdependence. 
The reduced-form version of (2) then reads: 
 
  mmm
m
K
k
kkmmmm
MIu
uXWIy


1
0,
,
1
,0,
1
0,










 
                       (3) 
The variance-covariance matrix (VC) of um is 
  10,
1
0,
2
,, )'()('
  MMuuE mmmummm    .  
It is now well-known that Wym is correlated with the error term and, hence, endogenous (see 
Kelejian and Prucha, 1998). The associated bias can be overcome by two-stage-least squares 
(2SLS) using WXm, W
2
Xm, W
3
Xm, etc., as instruments for Wym.
24
 To guard against inefficient 
standard errors due to omitted interdependence of the error term as in equation (3), we use the 
non-parametric spatial heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) estimator by 
Kelejian and Prucha (2007) to estimate the VC matrix.
25
 
  
                                                     
24
 Our results are fairly robust to the choice among those instruments.  
25
 See Appendix 1.B for the formulation of the 2SLS and the HAC estimator. 
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Table 1.8: Regression results for spatial IV-HAC estimation using geographic distance weights  
 
Results for the spatial 2SLS estimation are reported in Table 1.8: We use the weighted coverage 
across all sectors as the dependent variable and the least parsimonious model specification (3) 
using capital-labour ratios instead of the schooling variable to cover the largest possible sample of 
countries. For both Mode 1 and Mode 3 the other countries (inverse-distance-weighted) weighted 
coverage ratio exhibits a positive coefficient as expected. Hence, there is support for herding 
behaviour in trade liberalisation: countries are more likely to liberalise service trade and FDI, if 
their major trading partners (or their neighbours) do so as well.  
1.5 Conclusions 
Previous studies on the determinants of specific commitments in GATS have been purely 
descriptive or confined to the financial sector. In this paper, we provide a first assessment of the 
economic fundamentals determining GATS commitments for cross-border trade and commercial 
presence in services across all service sectors.  
Explanatory variables Mode 1     Mode 3    
Wy 0.354 **  0.273 **  
 (0.172)   (0.138)   
Log GDP (1993) 0.152 **  0.259 ***  
 (0.069)   (0.063)   
Log capital per capita (1993) 0.313 ***  0.286 ***  
 (0.099)   (0.093)   
FTA 4.783   5.222   
 (4.845)   (4.262)   
PTA -8.680 **  -5.582   
 (4.396)   (3.562)   
AD 0.000   -0.001 *  
 (0.001)   (0.000)   
AD* 0.001   0.000   
 (0.001)   (0.001)   
EU 0.261   0.592 ***  
 (0.223)   (0.194)   
Constant -7.457 ***  -10.013 ***  
 (2.146)   (1.903)   
       
Countries 84   87   
Centered R
2
 0.694   0.714   
Shea Partial R
2
 0.737     0.744    
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, based on non-parametric HAC estimation of sample moments. 
***significant at 1%, ** at 5%, * at 10%. The dependent variable is the weighted coverage ratio of the 
respective mode. Sargan overidentification test: H0 that instruments are valid is not rejected 
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Quite in contrast with the expectations from the perspective of general equilibrium models of 
trade and multinational enterprises, large and rich countries seem to be more keen on liberalising 
their barriers to trade and foreign commercial presence in the service sector. From a theoretical 
perspective, the expected welfare gains would be larger for small and poor economies. The 
negotiation process and, especially, issues related to the lack of comprehensive domestic 
regulation in service sectors of poor countries are possible explanations for this result.  
Furthermore, we find that countries that were active in liberalising trade in the past (through 
participation in regional trade agreements) tend to commit to more extensive service liberalisation 
than others. Finally, there is significant herding behaviour in liberalising service transactions: 
countries are more likely to commit to more extensive liberalisations, if their natural trading 
partners/neighbours do so as well.  
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APPENDIX 1.A: Country Coverage 
Table 1.9: 106 Countries by income group according to World Bank 1995 
Weighted coverage of Mode 3 in percent 
 
Low income (25) Middle Income (47)   High Income (34)   
Bangladesh 0.5 Antigua and Barbuda 8.2 Aruba 11.7  
Benin 5.0 Argentina 31.2 Australia 48.0  
Burkina Faso 1.1 Bahrain 2.6 Austria 48.1  
Cameroon 1.9 Barbados 3.5 Belgium 61.3  
China 10.6 Belize 1.3 Brunei 4.4  
Congo, Rep. 0.6 Bolivia 3.9 Canada 45.0  
Cote d'Ivoire 4.5 Brazil 13.5 Cyprus 3.9  
Ghana 14.2 Chile 11.5 Denmark 60.6  
Guyana 10.2 Colombia 13.1 Finland 47.0  
Honduras 6.0 Costa Rica 0.6 France 56.4  
India 10.6 Cuba 14.7 Germany 61.7  
Kenya 5.3 Czech Republic 23.9 Hong Kong, China 30.4  
Madagascar 0.8 Dominica 2.1 Iceland 48.5  
Mozambique 5.8 Dominican Republic 20.6 Ireland 60.0  
Myanmar 0.0 Egypt, Arab Rep. 6.9 Israel 24.8  
Nicaragua 23.9 El Salvador 10.3 Italy 52.3  
Niger 1.0 Fiji 0.2 Japan 53.1  
Nigeria 13.3 Gabon 2.3 Korea, Rep. 36.4  
Pakistan 9.3 Greece 55.5 Kuwait 27.9  
Senegal 7.3 Grenada 2.1 Liechtenstein 40.6  
Sri Lanka 0.3 Guatemala 4.5 Luxembourg 62.9  
Tanzania 0.0 Hungary 45.2 Macao, China 12.1  
Uganda 0.5 Indonesia 10.3 Netherlands 62.6  
Zambia 10.3 Jamaica 7.0 Netherlands Antilles 14.3  
Zimbabwe 9.8 Malaysia 16.7 New Caledonia 1.5  
  Malta 0.9 New Zealand 39.2  
  Mauritius 3.2 Norway 46.3  
  Mexico 17.5 Portugal 49.5  
  Morocco 20.0 Singapore 22.5  
  Namibia 1.9 Spain 56.7  
  Paraguay 5.2 Sweden 43.8  
  Peru 9.6 Switzerland 51.8  
  Philippines 13.3 United Kingdom 62.5  
  Poland 24.5 United States 49.0  
  Romania 23.9    
  Slovak Republic 24.6    
  South Africa 38.5    
  St. Lucia 4.2    
  St. Vincent and the Grenadines 3.4    
  Suriname 2.6    
  Swaziland 5.8    
  Thailand 15.8    
  Trinidad and Tobago 6.8    
  Tunisia 1.5    
  Turkey 20.4    
  Uruguay 13.8    
  Venezuela, RB 15.8    
 
 
 THE DETERMINANTS OF GATS COMMITMENT COVERAGE 
37 
 
APPENDIX 1.B: Spatial HAC Estimator 
Following Kelejian and Prucha (2007), we write the model more compactly in matrix form as 
),( WyXZ , ),( 0
''
0    and define H  as an pn  non-stochastic matrix of instruments. If we 
furthermore write ZHHHHZ ')'(ˆ 1 , then, we obtain the following expression for the spatial 
instrumental variable two-stage least-squares (IV-2SLS) estimator: 
yZZZ '̂)'̂(ˆ 1 . 
Kelejian and Prucha (2007) show that a consistent estimator of the variance-covariance (VC) 
matrix of the parameter vector '0  is: 
1111 )ˆ'̂(')'(ˆ)'(')ˆ'̂(ˆ   ZZZHHHHHHZZZn . 
̂  is the estimated VC matrix for the sample moment HHn u
 '1 . The spatial HAC 
estimator for element (r,s) of the true VC matrix   is then: 
)(ˆˆˆ
1 1
1
, ij
N
i
N
j
jijsirsr wKuuhhn 
 
 . 
)( ijwK  is the Kernel weight ijw , computed as 
ijewij

 , where 
ij  is the scaled distance 
between the most populated cities of countries in our case. We choose a Bartlett Kernel where 
ijw  is set to zero if the bilateral distance is smaller than the average distance in our sample. 
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2 Estimating trade in intermediate goods and 
services and understanding its determinants
*
 
2.1 Introduction 
Trade in intermediate inputs has been steadily growing over the last decade. However, despite the 
internationalisation of production and the increasing importance of outsourcing and foreign 
investment, some studies have found little rise in intermediate goods trade as a share of total trade 
(Chen et al., 2005). A recent contribution by Bergstrand and Egger (2010) indicates that “because 
of a well-known absence of any comprehensive data set decomposing world trade flows by end-
use –that is, final versus intermediate goods– economists have little systematic knowledge about 
the actual pattern of flows of final versus intermediate goods around the world”. The authors also 
note that no previous studies have used the gravity model for intermediate inputs. In this paper, 
we build a dataset of trade in intermediate goods and services for 42 countries over the period 
1995-2005. The two novelties of the dataset are i) the estimation of bilateral trade in intermediate 
services and ii) the addition of the using industry dimension, that allows estimating inter- and 
intra-industry gravity regressions. 
In this paper, we assess the determinants of both trade in intermediate goods and trade in 
intermediate services. To measure trade in intermediate goods, we use the UN Broad Economic 
Categories (BEC) classification that distinguishes intermediates, consumption and capital goods 
at the SITC 5-digit level. To estimate bilateral trade in intermediate services, we combine services 
trade data with OECD input-output tables. To our knowledge, this is the first study providing 
estimates for bilateral trade in intermediate services. A second main contribution of this paper is 
the decomposition of trade flows by using industry. We use input-output tables to distribute 
bilateral trade in intermediates over using industries. This allows estimating gravity models for 
intra-industry trade in intermediates and for inter-industry trade in intermediates. The dataset 
obtained covers the period 1995-2005 for 42 countries and is organised around five dimensions: 
(i) reporter; (ii) partner; (iii) year; (iv) industry of origin; and (v) using industry. 
In pooled gravity regressions, we find that trade costs matter more for intermediate goods than for 
consumption goods. However, in regressions by industry the opposite pattern is found for some 
industries pointing to the importance of industry and product characteristics in explaining trade 
                                                     
*
 This chapter is joint work with Sébastien Miroudot, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD). 
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patterns. Regarding the importance of market size, results show that the size of the importing 
country has a larger effect on imports of consumption goods than of intermediate goods. Finally, 
including foreign direct investment stocks as explanatory variables in regressions, we find a 
complementarity relationship between bilateral inward FDI and bilateral imports, with the 
relationship being stronger for intra-industry imports.  
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the methodology used to obtain a 
comprehensive dataset of bilateral trade flows of intermediate goods and services by product and 
by using industry. Section 2.3 describes the data and Section 2.4 provides stylised facts of trade in 
intermediate inputs. Section 2.5 presents an analysis of the determinants of trade in intermediate 
inputs using gravity regressions. Section 2.6 further investigates the relationship between trade in 
intermediates and activities of MNEs. Section 2.7 concludes. 
2.2 Methodology used to construct the Dataset 
2.2.1 Trade in Intermediate Goods: BEC Classification 
Regarding trade in goods, we identify bilateral trade flows of intermediates at the SITC 5-digit 
level by using the UN Broad Economic Categories classification (BEC). The BEC classification 
assigns SITC Rev. 3 commodities to 19 basic categories of goods, 8 of which are categories of 
intermediate goods (see Table 2.1 in Appendix 2.B). Table 2.2 furthermore shows that at the 
SITC 5-digit level, out of 3,035 lines, 1,854 are intermediate goods, 696 are consumption goods 
and 471 capital goods. There are also 14 lines not classified for products that cannot be defined as 
mainly intermediate or mainly final, such as motor spirit or passenger motor cars.
26
 For instance, 
passenger motor cars are consumption goods if they are used by private households and capital 
goods if they are used by firms.  
An unavoidable drawback of BEC is that the allocation of commodities is based on “expert 
judgment”, which is by nature subjective. Many goods might be both final and intermediate 
depending on the context. For instance, wheat flour belongs to BEC 121 –Processed food and 
beverages mainly for industry– and is hence classified as intermediate. Despite being an 
important input for the food industry, flour is also a consumption good for many households. The 
advantage of using the BEC classification is that bilateral trade in intermediates can be directly 
calculated from trade statistics that are readily available. Moreover, the data obtained are 
disaggregated (3,035 SITC lines). Bergstrand and Egger (2010) use the BEC classification to 
                                                     
26
 Table 8 in the Appendix provides the distribution of SITC lines in 17 industries. 
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capture trade in intermediate goods and to analyse the growth of FDI relative to trade. A similar 
approach has been taken by Yeats (2001). He provides his own breakdown of the SITC 
classification into final and intermediate goods in order to assess trade in parts and components. 
2.2.2 Trade in Intermediate Services: Combining Trade Data with Input-Output 
Tables 
While the BEC classification enables the identification of intermediate goods, no similar 
classification is available for trade in services. The reason for this is the high level of aggregation 
in services trade data. While goods trade data are based on customs declarations allowing the 
identification of goods at a highly disaggregated level, services trade statistics are based on 
balance of payments data which do not provide such a detailed breakdown. For instance, the 
Extended Balance of Payments Services (EBOPS) classification category for telecommunication 
services does not distinguish between private and business calls. 
To estimate trade in intermediate services we rely on input-output tables which have the 
advantage of providing a breakdown of services into intermediate services and services used for 
final consumption. More precisely, we multiply bilateral imports of services       in industry   
with the input-output coefficient      indicating the share of intermediate inputs in imported 
services from industry  : 
                
This formula assumes that the share of intermediate services in overall bilateral services imports 
of country   is the same across all exporting countries  . For instance, imagine that the transport 
industry consists of final passenger services and freight transport services that can be regarded as 
intermediates. If France has a share of imported inputs in overall transport imports of 79 percent, 
then it is assumed that this share applies to all partner countries. Hence, France‟s transport 
imports from both the United States and Japan are assumed to consist to 79 percent of freight 
services. 
2.2.3 Trade in Intermediates by Using Industry 
Besides not identifying trade in intermediate services, trade statistics have a further shortcoming 
compared to input-output tables. Trade data are collected according to the industry of origin and 
give therefore no indication on the using industry, i.e. the industry that is actually using the 
intermediate input in its production process. Intermediate goods and services are to a large extent 
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not only used within the same industry at higher stages in the production chain, but also by other 
industries. We use input-output tables to identify the using industry for both goods and services. 
Country input-output tables are presented in matrix format and show how much of the output of 
industry   is used as an input by industry  . Hence, the strength of input-output tables, as 
compared to trade data, is that they allow the identification of both the industry of origin and the 
using industry. Furthermore, input-output tables generally consist of a domestic and an import 
table indicating the use of domestic and imported inputs respectively. Hence, input-output tables 
contain information on the share of imports from industry p used as input in industry  . However, 
input-output tables are not bilateral, that is they do not reveal any information regarding trade 
partners.
27
 
We add this dimension by combining bilateral imports of intermediates from trade data with the 
information on the usage of intermediate imports found in input-output tables. Hence, obtained 
import flows have five dimensions: importer  , exporter  , industry of origin (intermediate input) 
 , using industry   and year  . The imports of intermediate input   from country   by using 
industry   in country   can be expressed formally as: 
                  
where       is the share of imported inputs   by using industry   in overall imported inputs   of 
country   (as calculated from input-output tables) and      are the imports of input   of country 
  from country    (as identified in goods trade data using the BEC classification and in services 
trade data by combining it with input-output tables). 
This allocation of bilateral intermediate imports across using industries assumes that import 
coefficients are the same for all trade partners. For instance, the research and development 
industry of Spain has a share of 0.03 percent in overall intermediate paper imports in 2004. This 
coefficient is then applied to intermediate paper imports from both Finland and Poland. Hence, 
the bilateral pattern of imported intermediates from industry   is the same across all using 
industries  . However, in the case of goods it is different from the bilateral pattern of total 
imports from industry   because the BEC classification allows distinguishing bilateral imports of 
intermediates from bilateral final good imports in industry  . Differently, since for services we 
have to assume that the share of intermediate services is the same across partner countries, this 
implies that the bilateral variation is the same for trade in intermediate and in final services. 
                                                     
27
 Notable exceptions are the US-Japan bilateral Input-Output tables from the Japanese Ministry of Economy and Trade 
and Industry and the database from the Japanese Institute of Developing Economies (IDE-Jetro), which has constructed 
international input-output tables for USA and Asian countries incorporating bilateral trade flows.  
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Input-output tables are multilateral, which means that they do not alter the geographic pattern 
when combined with bilateral trade data.  
2.3 Data 
Sources for trade data are the OECD International Trade by Commodity Statistics (ITCS) 
database for goods and the OECD Trade in Services by Partner Country database as well as the 
United Nations Service Trade Statistics Database for services. Lanz and Miroudot (2008) discuss 
characteristics and problems related to services trade data. A main shortcoming is that a large 
share of aggregate services trade cannot be allocated to specific partner countries and industries. 
Furthermore, often disaggregated data are not published due to confidentiality reasons. Hence, in 
many cases there is a large discrepancy between the sum of disaggregated trade flows and the 
aggregate value. While we cannot directly address any of these issues, we occasionally use mirror 
flows to increase the coverage of bilateral services flows at the sector level.  
Input-output tables are taken from the 2009 edition of the OECD input-output database. They 
cover 42 countries representing more than 85 percent of world trade and are in most cases 
available for the years 1995, 2000 and 2005 (see Table 2.3 in the Appendix 2.B). Because input-
output tables are not available yearly, we use interpolated values to produce time-series.
28
 The 
advantage of the OECD input-output tables is that for most countries we have three tables and we 
can match precisely the input-output coefficients with trade flows from the same year.
29
 While 
OECD input-output tables cover 48 industries in their original format, many countries actually 
report fewer industries.
30
 To ensure the comparability of countries in the analysis, some industries 
are aggregated.
31
 Table 2.4 in Appendix 2.B shows the 29 goods and services industries used in 
this study, including their correspondences in terms of original input-output industries and 
underlying ISIC Rev.3 categories. In Appendix 2.A, we furthermore explain how we have 
converted trade data from product classifications (EBOPS for services, SITC Rev.3 for goods) to 
the ISIC Rev.3 based industry classification used in input-output tables. 
The dataset on trade in intermediate goods and services used in this paper is available on the 
OECD statistical portal (stats.oecd.org). For the gravity regressions, we use distance and bilateral 
dummy variables from CEPII and GDP from the World Development Indicators. Furthermore, we 
                                                     
28 We generally have tables for 1995 and 2005. If this is not the case, we do not extrapolate but keep the respective 
coefficient constant for  a maximum of three years after the respective table.  For instance, if a table is available for 
2001 but not for 2005, we apply the 2001 coefficients to the years 2002-2004.  
29 An alternative input-output database is the GTAP database. However, in GTAP the input-output coefficients are 
often for distant years and are not systematically updated between versions (Daudin et al., 2009). 
30 See Yamano and Ahmad (2006) for a detailed description of the OECD input-output database. 
31 Even at this higher level of aggregation, countries are not fully harmonious in industry coverage.  
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add to the dataset bilateral FDI stocks at the industry level. These data are derived from OECD 
FDI statistics. More information on the sources and on the data estimated to obtain a consistent 
dataset can be found in Lanz and Miroudot (2008). 
2.4 The Stylised Facts of Trade in Intermediate Goods and 
Services 
In this section, we briefly describe some stylised facts on the patterns of trade in intermediate 
goods and services. Detailed tables at the region, country and industry level are available in 
Miroudot et al. (2009) and are not reproduced here. 
The first stylised fact is that trade in intermediates has increased but that its share in total trade 
has remained constant. Trade in intermediates represents 56.2 percent of trade in goods and 73.2 
percent of trade in services in our dataset. Hence, world trade flows are mainly comprised of 
inputs rather than final consumption goods or services. The growth rate of trade in intermediates 
has been significant over the last decade. For goods, the average annual growth rate in OECD 
countries between 1995 and 2005 has been 6.2 percent (in volume), a rate higher than output 
growth. For cross-border trade in services, a slightly higher average growth rate (7 percent) is 
observed. There is no marked difference in the growth rates of the different categories of goods 
(intermediate, consumption, capital goods). They have been following the general increase in 
total trade. As a consequence, the share of trade in intermediates in total trade has remained 
largely unchanged (see Figure 1.1). An apparent explanation to this paradox is that trade in both 
final and intermediate goods have been boosted by the internationalisation of production. In the 
case of services sectors, there is a slight difference between the growth rate of total trade and 
trade in intermediates leading to an increase of the share of intermediate services traded. This 
might suggest that outsourcing in services has indeed increased, but it remains to be seen if this 
trend holds into the future. 
The second stylised fact is that trade in intermediate inputs is mainly intra-regional. The largest 
value of transactions is recorded within three regions: Europe, North America and Asia. Intra-
regional imports are generally higher than inter-regional imports. This is especially the case in 
Europe with European intra-regional imports of intermediates being close to four time those of 
North America. It should be noted however that we have included intra-EU trade.  
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Figure 1.1: Share of intermediate trade in total trade (1995-2005) 
 
 
Regarding inter-regional trade, we observe the following patterns. Asia is a net exporter of 
intermediate goods to Europe and to North America. Between Europe and North America, the 
pattern is the opposite for goods and services. Europe imports more intermediate services from 
North America but exports more intermediate goods. As some of the flows are related to 
exchanges of primary resources, such as oil or gas, the largest inter-regional flow for intermediate 
goods trade is exports from the Middle East and North Africa to Asia. But overall trade in 
intermediate inputs is mostly between developed countries and flows with developing economies 
are very small. 
The third stylised fact is that the distribution of trade in intermediates across industries differs if 
we look at the industry of origin or the using industry. Table 2.5 gives the shares of industries in 
total intermediate imports (5,309 Billion USD) as calculated for 34 countries. The „Mining and 
quarrying industry‟ has the highest trade share as industry of origin (18.6 percent), while the 
„Refined petroleum and other treatments industry‟ has the highest one as using industry (11.7 
percent). This result is not surprising since the „Mining and quarrying industry‟ produces crude 
oil which is then used as intermediate input by the „Refined petroleum and other treatments 
industry‟. In general, goods industries have a higher trade share as industry of origin as compared 
to services industries. On the other hand, some services industries such as „Other services‟ (7.8 
percent), Construction (5.1 percent), Transport (5.4 percent) or „Trade and repairs‟ (4.7 percent) 
have rather high shares in overall trade as using industries. This pattern can be explained by the 
fact that cross-border trade is still dominated by goods. It does however not imply that services 
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industries use more goods inputs as goods industries use services inputs. Goods industries may 
often source services inputs locally from either domestic or foreign companies. Hence, foreign 
services inputs are often supplied not via cross-border trade (mode 1 in GATS terminology) but 
through a commercial presence in the host economy (i.e. through mode 3). 
Table 2.5: Share of industries in total imports of intermediates 
 
 
A last comment is that often foreign inputs are mainly used within the same industry (i.e., the 
foreign industry which produces the intermediate input is the same as the one using it in the 
importing economy). In 17 of the 29 industries covered in our dataset, more than one third of total 
Industry Ind. of origin Using industry
Agriculture and fishing 2.2% 1.4%
Mining and quarrying 18.6% 1.3%
Food products 1.3% 3.3%
Textiles and wearing apparel 2.0% 2.3%
Wood,publishing and printing 3.4% 3.1%
Refined petroleum 1.0% 11.7%
Chemical products 12.5% 7.1%
Rubber and plastic products 2.6% 2.4%
Metal products 9.5% 7.4%
Mechanical products 4.4% 4.0%
Office machinery and computers 2.5% 2.2%
Radio,TV,communication 3.4% 2.5%
Medical, precision, optical instr. 0.7% 0.7%
Motor vehicles 5.6% 7.7%
Other transport equipments 1.5% 1.6%
Other manufacturing 6.5% 4.7%
Electricity, gas and water 0.4% 4.1%
Construction 0.2% 5.1%
Trade and repairs 0.9% 4.7%
Hotels and restaurants 5.3% 1.0%
Transport, storage & aux. 5.9% 5.4%
Post and telecommunications 0.5% 1.4%
Finance 2.2% 2.3%
Real estate n.a. 0.9%
Renting of machinery and equip. 0.3% 0.3%
Computer activities 0.4% 0.8%
Research and development 0.6% 0.5%
Other business activities 4.6% 2.4%
Other services 0.9% 7.8%
Share in total intermediate trade
Note: For some countries trade flows are missing for certain industries 
and the shares as origin industry are underestimated. 
 
 ESTIMATING TRADE IN INTERMEDIATE GOODS AND SERVICES 
49 
 
imports of inputs are used within the same sector. We will look in the quantitative analysis at 
„intra-industry intermediate trade‟. 
2.5 The Determinants of Trade in Intermediate Goods and 
Services 
The descriptive statistics presented in Section 2.4 are useful to understand the nature of trade 
flows in intermediates but they do not provide information on the motivations for firms to trade or 
establish abroad. To provide some insights on the determinants of trade in intermediate goods and 
services, we estimate gravity regressions that can be derived from various trade models. In 
particular, Bergstrand and Egger (2007) derive both trade and FDI gravity equations from the 
“knowledge-and-physical-capital model” and justify their simultaneous estimation. In Bergstrand 
and Egger (2010) they furthermore incorporate intermediate goods into their model. Along the 
same lines, we estimate the gravity model by goods type. 
2.5.1 Gravity Regressions at the Industry Level 
In order to identify differences in trade in intermediates and trade in final goods and services, we 
estimate the following gravity model with fixed effects at the industry level: 
                                         
 
   
                            
                
where       are bilateral imports of total, intermediate or consumption goods/services (or capital 
goods),            is the geographical distance between bilateral partners (a proxy for trade 
costs),         refers to a set of bilateral dummy variables accounting for common language, 
common border and past colonial relationship (the source is CEPII), importer (       and the 
exporter (     ) Gross Domestic Product proxy for market size and    ,   ,    and    are 
respectively the importer, exporter, industry and year fixed effects. 
Table 2.6 presents the results from regressions on goods imports while Table 7 shows respective 
results for services imports. Flows of intermediate and final products are on average affected by 
the same type of frictions and respond positively to the same determinants. The gravity model 
explains successfully both types of trade flows. However, the impact of trade costs and market 
size differs for intermediate imports as well as between goods and services industries. 
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Table 2.6: Gravity regressions at the industry level - Imports of goods 
 
Table 2.7: Gravity regressions at the industry level - Imports of services 
 
A notable difference between trade in intermediates and trade in consumption goods can be seen 
when looking at the impact of market size (the GDP importer coefficient). Consumption goods 
are traded more according to the size of the import market than intermediate goods. This is not a 
surprising result as companies export to sell to a large number of final consumers while inputs can 
Total Intermediate Consumption Capital Intra-industry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Distance -0.826**** -0.909**** -0.831**** -0.653**** -0.928****
(0.029) (0.029) (0.042) (0.036) (0.027)
Common border 0.478**** 0.456**** 0.416**** 0.494**** 0.439****
(0.072) (0.069) (0.087) (0.100) (0.073)
Common language 0.119 0.170** 0.192* 0.047 0.124*
(0.075) (0.073) (0.100) (0.092) (0.073)
Past colonial rel. -0.197 -0.390* 0.484**** 0.024 -0.308
(0.209) (0.219) (0.176) (0.195) (0.188)
GDP importer 0.669**** 0.547**** 0.893**** 0.711**** 0.562****
(0.073) (0.078) (0.067) (0.132) (0.097)
GDP exporter 0.588**** 0.563**** 0.537**** 0.917**** 0.445****
(0.067) (0.060) (0.079) (0.156) (0.071)
Pseudo R-squared 0.743 0.727 0.798 0.82 0.77
Observations 625,967 625,967 578,677 367,752 625,967
Notes:  Poisson maximum likelihood regressions including country, time and industry fixed effects. Standard 
errors clustered for country pairs are reported parentheses.  *significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%, **** at 
0.1%.
Total Intermediate Final Intra-industry
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Distance -0.756**** -0.766**** -0.910**** -0.716****
(0.040) (0.041) (0.056) (0.038)
Common border 0.161 0.155 -0.119 0.004
(0.102) (0.101) (0.137) (0.109)
Common language 0.337**** 0.381**** 0.208* 0.392****
(0.102) (0.104) (0.112) (0.108)
Past colonial rel. -0.024 0.011 -0.234 -0.259*
(0.202) (0.221) (0.221) (0.152)
GDP importer 0.835**** 0.793**** 0.347 0.813****
(0.118) (0.141) (2.561) (0.214)
GDP exporter 0.358**** 0.441**** -0.487 0.483****
(0.078) (0.119) (1.842) (0.117)
Pseudo R-squared 0.83 0.815 0.766 0.785
Observations 84,437 84,437 84,437 84,406
Notes: Poisson maximum likelihood regressions including country, time and 
industry fixed effects. Standard errors clustered for country pairs are reported 
parentheses.  *significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%, **** at 0.1%.
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be very specialised and profitable to export to smaller markets from where final products may 
then be shipped to third countries. 
Distance is a proxy for trade costs between two countries. These trade costs consist to a large part 
of transport costs for goods but also of other distance-related costs. Miroudot and Ragoussis 
(2009) point out that distance can also capture regulatory differences (e.g., trade policies, market 
regulations, national business laws) as well as cultural differences between countries. The 
importance of distance-related trade costs other than transport costs can be seen by the impact of 
distance on services imports, which is often larger than for goods imports despite the lack of a 
„transport‟ cost. 
Distance has a negative and significant impact on both goods and services imports of total, 
intermediate and final products. There are however differences in the size of coefficients. As can 
be seen in Table 2.6, trade in intermediate goods (col. 2) is more sensitive to trade costs as 
compared to consumption goods (col. 3). A 10 percent increase in distance between two countries 
decreases intermediate goods imports by 9.1 percent as compared to 8.3 percent and 6.5 percent 
for consumption and capital goods imports respectively. This result is not confirmed for services 
where on the contrary we observe a higher distance coefficient in the case of final services.  
In order to disentangle the effect of transport costs and trade policy barriers, two alternative 
variables are used instead of distance in the gravity regression of goods imports: the ratio of the 
cif to fob trade values as a proxy for transport costs, and simple averages of applied bilateral 
tariffs as a proxy for trade barriers. The results are presented in Table 2.8. It should be noted that 
the sample size in Table 2.8 is smaller than the one in Table 2.6 due to the limited availability of 
cif-fob factors and bilateral tariffs. The coefficient of the cif-fob variable is negative and highly 
significant for all variables except for consumption imports. The negative impact of transport 
costs as measured by the cif-fob ratio on imports is larger for intermediate goods (as opposed to 
consumption and capital goods). Bilateral tariffs have a negative impact on all type of imports and 
particularly on capital goods. The effect of tariffs is larger on trade in intermediates than on trade 
in consumption goods. Hence, Table 2.8 supports the result that trade in intermediate goods is 
relatively more sensitive to trade costs than consumption goods. 
This higher sensitivity of intermediates imports to trade costs, including both transport costs and 
trade barriers, can be interpreted in several ways. First, production networks are subject to 
geographic and time constraints so that distance can have a more detrimental impact on the 
decision to trade for intermediate goods compared to final goods. When assembling complex 
goods, being remote is a larger handicap than when supplying consumers with a given good as 
more interactions are observed between companies and their suppliers than with final consumers. 
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“Just in time” production and other “lean” production processes are less able to accommodate 
hazards introduced by distance. In the context of production networks, this result confirms 
Grossman, Helpman and Szeidl (2006). They analyse the integration strategies of heterogeneous 
firms in a three country model where goods are produced in two stages, i.e. in an intermediate 
stage and a final assembly stage. They point to the importance of what they call agglomeration 
complementarity: if intermediate goods are costly to transport, then firms will tend to locate the 
production of intermediates nearby the location of the assembly of the final good. Similarly, 
Hilberry and Hummels (2002) extend a new economic geography model of Krugman and 
Venables (1996) in which trade frictions lead to co-location between final good producers and 
suppliers and show that intermediate goods are traded more locally than consumption goods. 
Finally, we find that for capital goods the elasticity of distance to trade is lowest. Possible 
explanations might be that capital goods are of a durable nature and maybe less prone to short 
term costs. 
Table 2.8: Gravity regressions using trade costs and tariffs instead of distance 
 
To test whether results from pooled regressions are confirmed at a more disaggregate level, we 
report results for regressions by industry in Table 2.9 using either intermediate or consumption 
imports as the dependent variable. The following main observations can be made. First, rather 
large differences in coefficients across industries point to industry heterogeneity regarding trade 
costs and market size. For instance, in the case of intermediate imports, „Wood, publishing and 
Total Intermediate Consumption Capital
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CIF-FOB -0.114**** -0.136**** -0.049* -0.067****
(0.022) (0.017) (0.029) (0.020)
Tariff -0.243**** -0.262**** -0.192**** -0.431****
(0.054) (0.060) (0.053) (0.083)
Common border 1.431**** 1.412**** 1.480**** 1.444****
(0.130) (0.124) (0.163) (0.158)
Common language 0.104 0.223** 0.071 0.029
(0.096) (0.103) (0.137) (0.113)
Past colonial rel. 0.431**** 0.243 0.835**** 0.348*
(0.140) (0.174) (0.159) (0.189)
GDP importer 0.511**** 0.423**** 0.789**** 0.644****
(0.111) (0.114) (0.109) (0.211)
GDP exporter 0.668**** 0.564**** 0.473**** 1.152****
(0.109) (0.095) (0.095) (0.191)
Pseudo R-squared 0.698 0.657 0.736 0.776
Observations 212,383 179,862 134,768 66,213
Notes: Poisson maximum likelihood regressions including country, time and industry fixed 
effects. CIF-FOB ratios and tariffs are specific to each good type and are measured as: CIF-
FOB= ln[(cif-fob)/fob]; Tariffs=ln(1+tariff rate). Standard errors clustered for country pairs are 
reported parentheses.  *significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%, **** at 0.1%.
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printing‟ has a much higher distance coefficient than „Other transport equipment‟, i.e. -1.2 versus 
-0.3 respectively. Second, while in pooled regressions we find a larger impact of distance on trade 
in intermediates as compared to consumption goods, this is not generally the case in regressions 
by industry. Hence, in some industries imports of final consumption goods tend to be more 
sensitive to distance than imports of intermediate goods. Industry specific factors might explain 
these results. For instance, time may not only be a crucial factor within a production network but 
also between a firm and consumers. For instance, fresh food and trendy clothes are very sensitive 
to time and hence distance. Furthermore, in some industries such as „Mechanical products‟, the 
final good might be heavy and hence difficult to transport (and will be assembled close to 
consumer markets). Third, Table 2.9 confirms that both importer and exporter market sizes 
typically have a higher impact on consumption imports than on intermediate imports. Fourth, for 
all industries but „Mechanical products‟, the GDP of the importing country has a larger impact on 
intermediate imports than the exporter GDP. In the case of consumption imports, there is no 
homogeneous pattern for the relative importance of importer and exporter GDP across 
industries.
32
 
 
                                                     
32
 Results should be treated with caution since the theoretical gravity model actually asks for the use of industry 
demand and output data instead of GDPs.  
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Table 2.9: Gravity regressions by industry - Intermediate versus consumption imports 
 
1. Agriculture 
and fishing
3. Food 
products
4. Textiles and 
wearing 
apparel
5. Wood, 
publishing and 
printing
7. Chemical 
products
8. Rubber and 
plastic 
products
9. Metal 
products
10. 
Mechanical 
products
12. 
Radio,TV,com
munication 
equipments
13. Medical, 
precision and 
optical 
instruments
15. Other 
transport 
equipments
16. Other 
manufacturing
Distance -0.909*** -0.894*** -1.051*** -1.212*** -0.928*** -1.168*** -0.998*** -0.810*** -0.638*** -0.712*** -0.316*** -0.990***
(0.059) (0.055) (0.045) (0.047) (0.044) (0.040) (0.039) (0.037) (0.043) (0.040) (0.075) (0.042)
Common border 0.726*** 0.585*** 0.370*** 0.539*** 0.109 0.474*** 0.619*** 0.360*** 0.452*** 0.246* 0.678*** 0.361***
(0.122) (0.101) (0.100) (0.085) (0.104) (0.080) (0.080) (0.075) (0.133) (0.110) (0.201) (0.106)
Common language -0.149 0.269* 0.245* -0.033 0.09 0.134 0.078 0.266*** 0.13 0.273* 0.152 0.092
(0.124) (0.121) (0.112) (0.092) (0.113) (0.085) (0.120) (0.080) (0.093) (0.109) (0.124) (0.160)
Past colonial rel. 1.149*** 1.524*** -0.529 -0.302 -0.038 -0.22 -0.14 -0.002 -0.146 0.212 0.382 0.148
(0.201) (0.203) (0.345) (0.396) (0.294) (0.318) (0.271) (0.202) (0.133) (0.209) (0.316) (0.229)
GDP importer 0.809*** 0.369** 0.585*** 0.683*** 0.535*** 0.622*** 0.732*** 0.428*** 0.709** 0.394 -0.102 0.777***
(0.143) (0.119) (0.085) (0.109) (0.101) (0.111) (0.083) (0.108) (0.230) (0.202) (0.206) (0.120)
GDP exporter -0.02 -0.138 0.472*** 0.053 0.531*** 0.499*** 0.237** 0.669*** 0.585** 0.457* 0.309* 0.683***
(0.109) (0.090) (0.067) (0.113) (0.119) (0.126) (0.088) (0.091) (0.202) (0.224) (0.135) (0.117)
R-squared 0.837 0.82 0.897 0.938 0.935 0.937 0.892 0.951 0.913 0.925 0.922 0.922
Number of obs. 52,006 46,929 51,401 46,784 43,387 36,729 43,661 43,848 34,362 35,972 27,130 49,897
Distance -1.394*** -1.036*** -1.152*** -0.917*** -0.765*** -1.093*** -0.744*** -1.166*** -1.315*** -0.199* -0.654*** -0.732***
(0.066) (0.051) (0.128) (0.060) (0.061) (0.066) (0.091) (0.085) (0.086) (0.080) (0.071) (0.078)
Common border 0.179 0.404*** 0.175 0.450** 0.112 0.521*** 0.315* 0.219 0.055 0.307 0.694*** 0.715***
(0.117) (0.118) (0.150) (0.142) (0.111) (0.113) (0.137) (0.112) (0.146) (0.171) (0.171) (0.125)
Common language -0.099 0.315** 0.446** 0.596*** 0.167 0.096 0.336* 0.26 -0.168 0.227 0.116 0.246
(0.142) (0.104) (0.136) (0.138) (0.199) (0.109) (0.166) (0.138) (0.184) (0.164) (0.168) (0.141)
Past colonial rel. 1.555*** 0.986*** 0.418* 0.489* -0.23 0.342 0.284 -0.462 -0.779* 0.381* -0.564* 0.595**
(0.196) (0.221) (0.188) (0.220) (0.220) (0.253) (0.247) (0.575) (0.341) (0.193) (0.223) (0.192)
GDP importer 0.980*** 0.875*** 0.955*** 0.750*** 0.420*** 0.509** 0.935*** 0.732*** 1.071*** 0.940*** 1.041*** 0.985***
(0.075) (0.093) (0.127) (0.131) (0.113) (0.165) (0.134) (0.165) (0.238) (0.275) (0.285) (0.097)
GDP exporter 0.032 0.202** 0.699*** 0.329* 0.886* 0.645*** 1.285*** 1.130*** 0.523** 0.694** 0.615** 1.023***
(0.052) (0.074) (0.061) (0.156) (0.388) (0.113) (0.207) (0.167) (0.168) (0.231) (0.237) (0.108)
R-squared 0.871 0.907 0.923 0.902 0.912 0.911 0.894 0.915 0.861 0.897 0.879 0.944
Number of obs. 52,006 46,929 51,401 46,784 43,387 36,729 43,661 43,848 34,362 35,972 27,130 49,897
Dependent variable: Intermediate imports 
Dependent variable: Consumption imports 
Notes: Dependent variables are either intermediate or consumption imports as identified by the UN BEC classification. Poisson maximum likelihood regressions include country and year fixed 
effects. Clustered standard errors inside parentheses allow interdependence of observations within country pairs.  *significant at 5%, **significant at 1%, ***significant at 0.1%
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2.5.2 Trade in Intermediates and the Activities of Multinational Enterprises 
The economic literature distinguishes two basic forms of multinational enterprise (MNEs) 
activity, i.e. vertical and horizontal FDI. Vertical MNEs exploit differences in factor prices across 
countries while horizontal MNEs are attracted by the market and emerge as a consequence of 
trade costs. Vertical MNEs (see Helpman, 1984, and Helpman and Krugman, 1985, for seminal 
contributions) split up the production process into two or more production stages across countries 
so that trade in intermediate inputs is a direct consequence. Horizontal MNEs replicate the 
production process in different countries in order to save on trade costs. Hence, in horizontal 
models (see Markusen, 1984, Brainard, 1997 and Markusen and Venables, 2000) MNEs have 
their headquarter in the home country and a plant in both the home and the host country where 
the final goods are produced and then sold to local consumers. 
How may bilateral FDI affect bilateral imports of intermediate goods and services? In the case of 
vertical inward FDI, a foreign MNE decides to locate a stage of its production process in the 
importing country. If the affiliate relies on inputs from its parent company, then imports in form 
of bilateral intra-firm trade will increase. Furthermore, vertical inward FDI might also increase 
bilateral inter-firm, i.e. arm‟s length trade, if the affiliate sources intermediates from an 
independent supplier of the foreign country. For instance, if a firm moves parts of its production 
abroad, existing local suppliers will have to export their inputs to the respective country. When 
considering outward FDI, the perspective of the importing country changes: a domestic MNE 
locates a stage of production abroad to reduce costs. In this case, the effect on bilateral imports is 
less clear. Bilateral imports will increase if the intermediate output of the foreign affiliate is 
shipped back home. However, if the output of the foreign affiliate is shipped to a third country, 
the imports of the home country will remain unaffected. Moreover, if outward FDI is seeking 
proximity to foreign suppliers, bilateral imports of intermediates might even decrease, because 
foreign suppliers will stop shipping their products to the home country. According to this 
reasoning, inward FDI should lead to an increase in imported inputs, while the impact of outward 
FDI is less clear. Apart from vertical, the motive for FDI might also be mainly horizontal, i.e. 
market seeking. Under such circumstances, only inward FDI may result in an increase in 
imported inputs but not outward FDI. Since the output of a horizontal affiliate is sold in the 
foreign or to third markets, no intermediate goods will be shipped back to the home country. 
The economic literature has generally found a positive relationship between MNE activity and 
trade in intermediates. Head and Ries (2001) look at 932 Japanese manufacturing firms for the 
period 1966-1990. They find that FDI of vertically integrated firms tend to increase more firms‟ 
exports than FDI of firms that are not vertically integrated. Blonigen (2001) uses product level 
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data to show that Japanese-owned automobile production in the United States is positively related 
to U.S. imports of automobile parts from Japan. However, he also finds that Japanese owned-
production of automobiles parts in the U.S. replaces imports of Japanese parts. To analyse the 
relationship between the operations of MNEs and trade in intermediates, we follow the approach 
taken by Kleinert (2003). He tests for sourcing strategies of MNEs by including inward and 
outward FDI stocks as explanatory variables in a regression explaining trade in intermediates. By 
relying on aggregate trade and FDI data of six OECD countries, Kleinert finds some evidence 
that inward FDI stocks have a significant positive impact on trade in intermediates as measured 
by input-output tables. In contrast, he finds no robust effect of outward FDI on intermediate 
imports of goods industries.  
However, as rightly pointed out by Bergstrand and Egger (2010), FDI and trade in intermediates 
are simultaneously determined by decisions of MNEs based on factor endowments, trade costs 
and investment costs. This means that estimated coefficients of simple OLS regressions will be 
biased. In order to address this endogeneity problem, we rely on two-stage least-squares (2SLS) 
instrumental variable regressions. Thereby, we use lagged changes in FDI stocks as instruments. 
Changes in FDI stocks in the past should have no direct impact on today‟s trade in intermediates 
but only an indirect one through its impact on today‟s FDI stocks. In regressions, we test the 
validity of our instruments using overidentification tests. The new data used in this paper allow 
an analysis of how bilateral FDI impacts bilateral trade in intermediates at the industry level. 
Moreover, it allows distinguishing the impact of bilateral FDI on intra-industry (   ) and inter-
industry imports (   ) of industry  . The regression estimated is: 
                                                                           
           
 
   
                                             
Table 2.10 provides results for gravity models including bilateral inward and outward FDI stocks 
as additional explanatory variables. The first two columns show OLS and 2SLS regression results 
when bilateral intra-industry imports of industry   are used as dependent variable. In contrast, 
2SLS models estimated in columns three to five have inter-industry imports as dependent 
variables, i.e. imports of inputs that have been produced by industries other than  . These are all 
inter-industry imported inputs (3), only manufacturing inputs (4) and only services inputs (5). 
Bilateral inward FDI is found to have a positive effect on bilateral intermediate imports. The 
coefficient is significant in all models. Not surprisingly, the magnitude of the coefficient for 
inward FDI is rather small as compared to standard gravity variables, whose coefficients have the 
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expected sign and magnitude. According to model (2), a 1 percent increase in inward FDI 
increases imported inputs by 0.012 percent, while a 1 percent increase in distance leads to a 1.1 
percent decrease in intra-industry imports. Conclusions regarding the impact of outward FDI are 
less clear. While its coefficient is significant and positive for intra-industry imports (col. 1 and 
col. 2), it is not significant for inter-industry imports except for services inputs. Hence, results 
seem to confirm our theoretical expectations that while inward FDI should have a robust positive 
impact on imported intermediates, the impact of outward FDI should be weaker and less clear. 
Another interesting finding is that the effect of inward FDI is larger for intra-industry as 
compared to inter-industry imports. This indicates that MNEs are more disposed to vertically 
integrate within the same industry than across industries. This result is in line with Alfaro and 
Charlton (2009), who find that most intra-industry FDI is vertical, even among developed 
countries and that firms are more likely to own production stages close to their own activity. 
Table 2.10: Regression results for FDI and inter- and intra-industry trade 
 
 
  
OLS 2SLS All Manufacturing Services
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Inward FDI 0.070**** 0.012* 0.009** 0.008** 0.026****
(0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Outward FDI 0.045**** 0.013** -0.002 -0.004 0.018****
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Distance -1.118**** -1.112**** -0.971**** -1.031**** -0.641****
(0.012) (0.016) (0.010) (0.009) (0.014)
Common border 0.438**** 0.512**** 0.469**** 0.406**** 0.618****
(0.027) (0.035) (0.021) (0.021) (0.031)
Common language 0.330**** 0.407**** 0.340**** 0.373**** 0.495****
(0.026) (0.035) (0.021) (0.020) (0.031)
Past colonial rel. -0.084 0.064 0.044 -0.138** 0.542****
(0.077) (0.107) (0.068) (0.062) (0.056)
GDP importer 0.635**** 0.823**** 0.510**** 0.524**** 1.236****
(0.072) (0.121) (0.067) (0.065) (0.113)
GDP exporter 0.489**** 0.326**** 0.267**** 0.345**** 0.272**
(0.069) (0.121) (0.065) (0.060) (0.135)
R-squared 0.671 0.67 0.749 0.781 0.675
Observations 80,523 37,627 38,371 38,388 35,509
Intra-industry imports Inter-industry imports
Notes: Robust standard errors inside parentheses. *significant at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%, **** at 0.1%. All 
models have been estimated using reporter, partner, year and industry fixed effects. While model (1) is a 
simple OLS regression, models (2) to (5) are estimated by 2SLS using changes in FDI stocks of the previous 
three years as instruments. This also explains the smaller number of observations in 2SLS regressions as 
compared to the OLS regression. Overidentification tests did not reject the hypothesis of the validity of 
instruments in any specification.  
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2.6 Conclusions 
In this paper, we have presented a comprehensive dataset of trade in intermediate goods and 
services for 42 countries over the period 1995-2005. The two novelties of the dataset are i) the 
estimation of bilateral trade in intermediate services and ii) the addition of the using industry 
dimension, that allows estimating inter- and intra-industry gravity regressions. Intermediate 
goods and services dominate world trade, accounting for 56.2 percent of trade in goods and 73.2 
percent of trade in services in our dataset. However, despite the increasing international 
fragmentation of production the share of intermediates in total trade has remained almost 
constant since 1995. 
Using gravity regressions, we find the following main results. In pooled regressions, trade costs 
have a larger negative impact on trade in intermediates as compared to trade in final consumption 
goods indicating the importance of trade costs for production networks. However, this is not 
generally the case in regressions by industry, which indicates that industries and products are 
heterogeneous regarding their sensitivity to time and trade costs. Furthermore, we find that the 
size of the importing country has a larger effect on imports of consumption goods than on 
intermediate goods. Finally, we find a complementarity relationship between bilateral inward 
FDI and bilateral imports, with the relationship being stronger for intra-industry imports.  
Accounting correctly for trade in intermediates has an important impact on several research 
strands in international trade. One of the results of the gravity analysis regarding the relatively 
higher impact of trade costs on trade in intermediate goods has implications for the modelling of 
gains from trade (see for example Feltenstein and Plassmann, 2008). Another example of how 
measures of trade in intermediates can be helpful in the analysis is given by Johnson (2008) who 
argues that it could improve estimates of the factor content of trade. Finally, the main use of a 
comprehensive dataset on trade in intermediate goods and services should be the calculation of 
trade flows in value-added as carried out by recent research (Johnson and Noguera, 2009, and 
Daudin et al., 2009). A useful next step in the collection of empirical data on trade could also be 
an estimation of the share of intermediate inputs that are traded intra-firm. A ratio relating arm‟s-
length trade in intermediates to intra-firm trade could be a key variable in the empirical analysis 
of MNE strategies. 
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Appendix 2.A: Correspondences 
A major challenge in combining trade statistics with input-output tables is that imports have to be 
converted into the industry classification used in input-output tables. While input-output tables 
are classified according to industrial activity in terms of ISIC Rev. 3, trade data are compiled 
according to product classifications, i.e. SITC Rev.3 for goods and EBOPS for services. The 
quality of the correspondence is responsible for how well bilateral imports match the industry of 
origin in input-output tables. The more blurred the correspondence is, the more trade will be 
misallocated across industries, and hence the less adequate will be the import values assigned to 
using industries. Table 2.11 in Appendix 2.B reports the correspondences used to convert trade 
data that are recorded according to product classifications (EBOPS for services, SITC Rev.3 for 
goods) to the ISIC Rev.3 based industry classification used in input-output tables. 
For goods, the correspondence between SITC Rev. 3 and BEC Rev. 3 allows identifying bilateral 
flows of intermediate products at the SITC 5-digit level. Then, the SITC-ISIC correspondence 
from the United Nations is used to identify trade in intermediate goods by industry. Since the 
latter correspondence is based on much disaggregated commodities, i.e. 5-and 4-digit SITC lines, 
we expect goods to match industries rather well. Industries are further aggregated into the ISIC 
based industry classification used in input-output tables. Table 2.2 in Appendix 2.B shows the 
number of SITC commodities corresponding to our industry classification. The table illustrates 
well that the number of traded intermediate goods is far higher as compared to consumption or 
capital goods. 
In the case of services, bilateral imports are converted from EBOPS to the industry input-output 
classification. The EBOPS-ISIC correspondence has been adopted from the Manual on statistics 
of international trade in services (2002). The aggregate level of services trade data causes some 
difficulties for finding a suitable correspondence. For instance, some EBOPS codes correspond to 
more industries as defined by ISIC. Therefore, some input-output industries needed to be 
aggregated, e.g. 44 to 48 (containing health and education services among others). For the 
industry „Other business activities‟ more than one suitable correspondence is possible and we 
used these different possibilities in order to increase the number of observations for which data 
are available. 
However, we do not expect trade data to fully match imports as reported in input-output tables. 
One main reason is that while trade data are recorded at purchasing prices, imported 
intermediates in input-output tables are evaluated at basic prices. There are also other differences 
such as the treatment of re-exports, scrap metal, waste products and second hand goods or 
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unallocated trade data (see Guo et al., 2009, on these different issues). However, differences in 
trade values in input-output tables and trade data are not important for the methodology. More 
important is that the correspondence between the input-output coefficients and trade data is 
precise.  
Appendix 2.B: Tables 
Table 2.1: Broad Economic Categories classification of goods according to their main use 
 
 
  
Classification by Broad Economic Categories (BEC)
1 Food and beverages
11 Primary
111 Mainly for industry
112 Mainly for household consumption
12 Processed
121 Mainly for industry
122 Mainly for household consumption
2 Industrial supplies not elsewhere specified
21 Primary
22 Processed
3 Fuels and lubricants
31 Primary
32 Processed
321 Motor spirit
322 Other
41 Capital goods (except transport equipment)
42 Parts and accessories
5 Transport equipment, and parts and accessories thereof
51 Passenger motor cars
52 Other
521 Industrial
522 Non-industrial
53 Parts and accessories
6 Consumer goods not elsewhere specified
61 Durable
62 Semi-durable
63 Non-durable
7 Goods not elsewhere specified
4 Capital goods (except transport equipment), 
and parts and accessories thereof
Basic classes of goods in the System 
of National Accounts (SNA)
Intermediate
Consumption
Intermediates
Consumption
Intermediate
Intermediate
Capital
Intermediate
Not classified
Intermediate
Capital
Intermediate
Not classified
Not classified
Consumption
Intermediate
Consumption
Consumption
Consumption
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Table 2.2: Number of SITC commodities lines according to their main use 
 
 
Industry  Overall Intermediates Consumption Capital Other
1. Agriculture and fishing 193 112 79 2 0
2. Mining and quarrying 75 75 0 0 0
3. Food products 299 113 186 0 0
4. Textiles and wearing apparel 375 205 169 0 1
5. Wood,publishing and printing 152 117 35 0 0
6. Refined petroleum & other treatments 17 15 0 1 1
7. Chemical products 483 446 37 0 0
8. Rubber and plastic products 70 58 12 0 0
9. Metal products 373 323 21 28 1
10. Mechanical products 395 108 28 252 7
11. Office machinery and computers 30 4 1 25 0
12. Radio,TV,communication equipments 70 33 6 31 0
13. Medical, precision and optical 
instruments, watches and clocks 130 42 26 62 0
14. Motor vehicles 33 16 2 14 1
15. Other transport equipments 56 14 14 26 2
16. Other manufacturing 281 170 80 30 1
17. Electricity, gas and water 3 3 0 0 0
All industries 3,035 1,854 696 471 14
Number of SITC commodities lines (classified according to main use)
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Table 2.3: Country and year coverage of OECD input-output tables 
 
  
Country Years with I-O tables
Argentina 1997
Australia 1998/99, 2004/05
Austria 1995, 2000, 2004
Belgium 1995, 2000, 2004
Brazil 1995, 2000
Canada 1995, 2000
Switzerland 2001
China 1995, 2000, 2002, 2005
Czech Republic 2000, 2005
Germany 1995, 2000, 2005
Denmark 1995, 2000, 2004
Spain 1995, 2000, 2004
Estonia 1997, 2000, 2005
Finland 1995, 2000, 2005
France 1995, 2000, 2005
United Kingdom 1995, 2000, 2003
Greece 1995, 1999, 2005
Hungary 1998, 2000, 2005
Indonesia 1995, 2000, 2005
India 1993/94, 1998/99
Ireland 1998, 2000
Israel 1995
Italy 1995, 2000, 2004
Japan 1995, 2000, 2005
Korea 2000
Luxembourg 1995, 2000, 2005
Mexico 2003
Netherlands 1995, 2000, 2004, 2005
Norway 1995, 2000, 2001
New Zealand 1995/96, 2002/03
Poland 1995, 2000, 2004
Portugal 1995, 1999, 2000, 2005
Russia 1995, 2000
Slovak Republic 1995, 2000
Slovenia 2005
Sweden 1995, 2000, 2005
Turkey 1996, 1998, 2002
Chinese Taipei 1996, 2001
United States 1995, 2000, 2005
South Africa 1993, 2000
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Table 2.4: Industry classification and correspondences with input-output (I-O) tables and trade 
data 
 
 
Sector Industry I-O industry ISIC Rev.3 EBOPS
1 Agriculture and fishing 1 1, 2, 5
2 Mining and quarrying 2, 3 10, 11, 12, 13, 14
31 PRIMARY SECTOR
3 Food products 4 15, 16
4 Textiles and wearing apparel 5 17, 18, 19
5 Wood,publishing and printing 6, 7 20, 21, 22
6 Refined petroleum & other treatments 8 23
7 Chemical products 9, 10 24
8 Rubber and plastic products 11 25
9 Metal products 13, 14, 15 27, 28
10 Mechanical products 16 29
11 Office machinery and computers 17 30
12 Radio,TV,communication equipments 19 32
13
Medical, precision and optical 
instruments, watches and clocks
20 33
14 Motor vehicles 21 34
15 Other transport equipments 22, 23, 24 35
16 Other manufacturing 12, 18, 25 26, 31, 36, 37
17 Electricity, gas and water 26, 27, 28, 29 40, 41
32 MANUFACTURING
18 Construction 30 45 249
19 Trade and repairs 31 50, 51, 52 269
20 Hotels and restaurants 32 55 236
21 Transport, storage & auxiliary activities 33, 34, 35, 36 60, 61, 62, 63 205
22 Post and telecommunications 37 64 245
23 Finance 38 65, 66, 67 253, 260
24 Real estate 39 70
25 Renting of machinery and equipment 40 71 272
26 Computer activities 41 72 263
27 Research and development 42 73 279
28 Other business activities 43 74 273-279
29 Other services 44, 45, 46, 47, 48 75, 80, 85, 90-93 264, 287, 291
33 SERVICE SECTOR
Notes:  For Computer activities and Other business activities alternative correspondences are used if 
services trade data do not allow above correspondence, i.e.  EBOPS code 262 for Computer activities and   
EBOPS code 273 or 268-269-272 for Other business activities.
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3 Timeliness, product contractibility and 
comparative advantage in trade in intermediate 
goods
*
 
3.1 Introduction 
Trade in intermediate goods dominate trade flows constituting about 57 percent of world exports 
in 2000. This aggregate figure hides, however, significant differences across countries and 
products. While over 80 percent of Chile's exports are in intermediate products, 60 percent of US 
and Australia‟s exports and only just above 35 percent of China's exports are intermediate goods. 
Countries furthermore vary significantly in their share of intermediate exports within a sector. 
For example, in office machinery over 70 percent of Australian exports are intermediate 
products, whereas 40 percent of US exports and only around 10 percent of both Chilean and 
Chinese exports are intermediates.
33
  
These data suggest that country and product characteristics can play a different role in explaining 
trade in final and intermediate goods. Hence, one contribution of this paper is that we assess the 
pattern of trade, i.e. a country's comparative advantage separately for trade in intermediate and 
trade in final goods. To distinguish between final consumption goods and intermediates we use 
the UN Broad Economic Categories (BEC) classification that categorises goods according to 
their main end use.
34
 Then, to test for comparative advantage patterns in trade we apply a factor 
content of trade methodology developed by Romalis (2004) on a sample of 95 countries and their 
exports to the rest of the world disaggregated by 6-digit NAICS sectors. 
Guided by recent economic literature that has emphasised countries‟ ability to enforce contracts 
and their ability to export within short time delays as important determinants of trade
35
, we test 
whether these factors play a different role for trade in intermediates and trade in goods destined 
                                                     
*
 This chapter is joint work with Roberta Piermartini, World Trade Organization (WTO), and Elisa 
Gamberoni, World Bank. 
33
 Figures 3.1 and 3.2 in the Appendix illustrate the mentioned shares for selected sample of countries.  
34
 The BEC classification has also been applied by Bergstrand and Egger (2010) and Miroudot et al. (2009) 
to study trade in intermediates using gravity models. 
35
 For example, Nunn (2007) finds that contract enforcement explains patterns of trade more than physical 
capital and skilled labour combined and Hummels (2001) finds that for developing countries export delays 
are more important than the average tariff faced by exporters. 
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to final consumption. Intuitively, if production occurs as a sequence of tasks and various inputs 
are all essential to the production of the final good, an input that is not of the required quality or 
is missing at the time when it is required will nullify the value of all other inputs/tasks. Therefore, 
no discount can compensate the producer of the final good for the unreliable delivery (Kremer, 
1993). In contrast, when a good is imported for final consumption, it is plausible that the 
consumer may accept to buy it for a reduced price even if it is of a lower quality than required or 
if it is delivered with a delay.  
Our results suggest that the quality of institutions, important for the enforcement of contracts, and 
the quality of transport infrastructure, important for timeliness in exporting, are sources of 
comparative advantage for trade in intermediate goods. Among these factors, the ability to timely 
delivery appears as the most important determinant for the pattern of trade in intermediates. 
Furthermore, we show that, compatible with the assumption of timeliness being most important 
for intermediates, the quality of transport infrastructure and hence time are major factors in 
explaining the differences in trade patterns of trade in intermediates and final goods. These 
results are robust to alternative measures for country and product characteristics. This suggests 
that improving institutions, investing in infrastructure, and fostering trade facilitation would 
significantly boost a country's participation, especially that of a developing country, in 
international production networks.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 3.2, we discuss existing research 
regarding the importance of institutions and infrastructure for trade, and we motivate why these 
factors might affect differently trade patterns of intermediate and final goods. In Section 3.3, we 
present the empirical specification and discuss our methodological approach. In Section 3.4, we 
describe the data and provide summary statistics. In Section 3.5 we present and discuss our main 
results and robustness checks. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes. 
3.2 Literature and Theoretical Motivation 
3.2.1 Comparative Advantage in Institutions 
Recent theoretical models of trade have highlighted the importance of contract enforcement and 
the cost associated with writing a contract for the decision of whether to source specialised inputs 
in-house or at arm‟s length (Antras, 2003; Antras and Helpman, 2004 and 2008; Grossman and 
Helpman, 2005). Besides the importance of the quality of institutions for the share of intra-firm 
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trade
36
, the empirical literature has stressed the role of institutions as a factor of comparative 
advantage in trade in intermediate goods, as well as in trade in the final good using them 
(Levchenko, 2007; Antràs, 2005; Acemoglu et al., 2005; Costinot, 2005). Quality of institutions 
matters for comparative advantage in intermediate goods because it affects the costs of producing 
a customised good. Intuitively, if the production of an intermediate good requires specific 
investments to customise the input to the production of the final good, the value of the input is 
lower outside the supplier-buyer relationship than inside this relationship. Therefore, there is an 
incentive for the supplier to underinvest ex ante and produce lower quality goods.
37
 This 
incentive is lower for suppliers located in countries with better contract enforcement. It follows 
that countries with a higher quality of institutions that provide better contract enforcement will 
have a comparative advantage in producing customised intermediate goods. 
Although this theoretical literature defines the hold-up problem at the level of the intermediate 
input, the related empirical literature has focussed on trade in final goods using intermediates 
rather than on trade in intermediate goods themselves (Nunn, 2007; Levchenko, 2007).
38
 These 
studies find that countries with better quality of institutions and hence better contract 
enforcement export relatively more in institutional-intensive sectors. Institutional-intensive 
sectors are identified as the final good sectors that use intensively inputs requiring relationship-
specific investments (Nunn, 2007) or as final good sectors that are characterised by a high degree 
of complexity, as measured by the inverse of the Herfindhal concentration index of intermediate 
input usage, in the production process (Levchenko, 2007). The magnitude of relationship-specific 
investments matters because in the case of a standardised input the respective market is likely to 
be thick and hence there is limited scope for the hold-up problem to emerge. The degree of 
complexity of the production process matters because there are more relationships that are 
potentially affected by contracting imperfections. 
We complement this literature by testing whether there is evidence that the hold-up problem 
matters for the patterns of trade in intermediate themselves. In particular, we test whether a 
country's ability to enforce a contract is more important as a determinant of comparative 
advantage in intermediate goods than in final goods. The rationale is based on the idea (first 
elaborated by Kremer, 1993) that underinvestment in the production of an intermediate good may 
                                                     
36
 Empirical studies assessing the determinants of the share of intra-firm trade include Bernard et al. 
(2010); Nunn and Trefler (2008); and Corcos et al. (2008).  
37
 The hold up problem has been analysed for example by Williamson (1985), Grossman and Hart (1986) 
and Hart and Moore (1990).  
38
 Institutional differences are found to be an important determinant of trade flows in a number of recent 
studies that use a gravity model of trade. For example, Anderson and Marcouiller (2002) and de Groot et 
al. (2004) show that quality of institutions significantly affects bilateral trade volumes and that better 
institutions are associated with higher volumes of trade. These models however do not look at institutions 
as factors affecting comparative advantage. 
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represent a much higher costs for the buyer when this is a processing firm than when it is a final 
consumer. For example, while a car manufacturer will not be able to accept to fit a cheap radio in 
a luxurious car, a consumer that has ordered an expensive radio may compromise on the quality 
if he gets an adequate discount. 
To identify the degree of institutional intensity of a product, we use the Rauch (1999) 
classification that identifies whether the product, be it final or intermediate, is sold on an 
organised exchange, is reference priced or is not even reference priced. As suggested by Nunn 
(2007), the intuition is that if a product is sold on an organised exchange the market is thick 
consisting of many buyers and sellers so that the hold-up problem will not arise since either party 
has an outside option in the case of contract failure. On the other hand, if a product is not even 
reference priced, then the investments of both the final good producer and the supplier might be 
relationship-specific leading to the hold-up problem and underinvestment if contract enforcement 
is weak.  
3.2.2 Comparative Advantage in Transport Infrastructure 
Recent empirical research has stressed the importance of time as barrier to trade (Hummels, 
2001; Hausman et al., 2005; Evans and Harrigan, 2005; Djankov et al. 2010; Portugal and 
Wilson, 2009; Freund and Rocha, 2010) and find a significant impact of time needed to export on 
trade flows. In these studies time-sensitive products, defined by their probability of being 
transported by air, being perishable or being related to fashion, are found to be more sensitive to 
time delays or distance.  
Guided by this literature, we test whether a country's ability to export without long time delays, 
as captured by the quality of its transport infrastructure, is a significant determinant of 
comparative advantage in exports of intermediates rather than being simply a trade cost. In 
addition, we test whether such timeliness in exporting is a more important source of comparative 
advantage for trade in intermediates than for trade in consumption goods. The importance of 
timeliness of delivery has been particularly stressed in the literature of production networks, 
where production processes are characterised by just-in-time delivery (Nordas et al. 2006; 
Feinberg and Keane, 2007). We claim that timeliness matters for trade in intermediate goods as it 
is essential to manage the production chain. This implies that countries which can guarantee the 
timely delivery of intermediate inputs will have a comparative advantage in the production and 
exports of time-sensitive inputs. Products can be time-sensitive either because they are 
perishable, such as certain agricultural goods, because they are subject to volatility in consumer 
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demand such as fashion products in manufacturing
39
, but also because there are inputs in a 
production chain. We measure the timeliness of a good by the share of U.S. imports that is 
shipped by air for this good. Intuitively, the more important time is for delivery, the more use will 
be made of air transport in trade. 
3.3 Methodological Approach 
In this paper, we test whether the quality of institution and the quality of infrastructure are 
sources of comparative advantage in trade, particularly for intermediate goods. Hence, we are not 
interested in explaining the volume of trade but rather in explaining the pattern of trade across 
industries and countries. To analyse the impact of these factors on trade patterns, we adopt the 
generalised functional form used in the most recent empirical literature. This includes the work of 
Romalis (2004), who assesses the importance of traditional factor endowments (capital and 
labour) as a source of comparative advantage for countries, and the studies of Nunn (2007) and 
Levchenko (2007), who show that countries with better institutions export relatively more in 
institutional-intensive industries. Furthermore, Djankov et al. (2010) adopt a similar specification 
to show that a country with shorter time delays in exporting tends to export relatively more time-
sensitive goods. Following Nunn (2007), we adopt the subsequent empirical specification: 
 ikkiikikikikik TtQqHhKkX   43210   (1) 
where ikX  is the log of exports of country i  to the world in the 6-digit NAICS industry k  in the 
year 2000. All explanatory variables take the form of interactions between industry intensities 
and country endowments which are denoted in lower case and upper case letters, respectively. 
The interaction terms allow testing whether countries export relatively more in industries that 
intensively use their abundant production factors. The right hand side of equation (1) includes our 
variables of main interest, i.e. the quality of institutions ( ikQq ) and the quality of infrastructure (
ikTt ), as well as the traditional comparative advantage variables capital ( ik Kk ) and human capital 
( Hhk ). Fixed effects i  and k  control for country- and industry-specific effects, respectively. 
In addition, we test the hypothesis that the quality of institutions and a country's ability to export 
with short time delays may be more important factors in determining the comparative advantage 
patterns of trade in intermediate than in consumption goods by estimating the following equation:  
                                                     
39
 Evans and Harrigan (2005) use product-level information for an U.S. retailer to show that the retailer 
sources those clothes from nearby countries that are ordered more than once par selling season and hence 
require timely delivery.  
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ikgkigikikgikikikikikg ITtTtIQqQqHhKkX   6543210  (2) 
where 
ikgX are pooled exports with g denoting either exports of intermediates or exports of other 
goods. To test whether comparative advantage patterns are significantly different for 
intermediates, we interact the quality of institutions variable and the export timeliness variable 
with the intermediate goods dummy kI  that equals 1 if ikgX are intermediate exports and 0 if 
ikgX are other exports.  
By using country and industry fixed effects in all regressions, endogeneity concerns are limited. 
Nevertheless, one might argue that for instance trade (specialisation) in institutional-intensive 
sectors could stimulate institutional reform or that trade in time-sensitive sectors could foster 
investments in transport infrastructure. We address potential endogeneity by applying 
instrumental variables (IV) regressions. IV regressions and other robustness checks are presented 
in the second part of Section 3.5.  
3.4 Data 
3.4.1 Trade Data - Distinguishing between Intermediate and Consumption Goods 
In the following we describe main variables and their source. A more detailed description of all 
data and correspondences is given in the data description in Appendix 3.A. Our dependent 
variable distinguishes exports in intermediates and exports in consumption goods. We classify 
the two types of trade using the UN Broad Economic Categories (BEC) classification. The BEC 
classification groups products into three categories of goods according to their main end use, i.e. 
intermediate, consumption and capital goods
40
. 
Exports data at the SITC Rev. 3 5-digit level are from the OECD/UN International Trade 
Commodity Statistics (ITCS) database. We use the UN SITC Rev.3 to BEC correspondence to 
identify intermediate, consumption, capital and not classified goods at the 5-digit SITC Rev. 3 
level. Then we use our SITC Rev.3 to NAICS 1997 correspondence to aggregate exports by BEC 
category to the 6-digit NAICS industry level.  
                                                     
40
 A further residual category is that of not classified goods including for example passenger motor 
vehicles. Passenger motor vehicles are not classified by BEC because they are used as capital goods when 
purchased by a company to run its businesses, whereas they are used as consumption goods when bought 
by private households. 
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Table 3.1 shows that intermediate goods are most important in world trade accounting for 57.6 
percent of exports in 2000. Consumption and capital goods have similar shares in total trade with 
about 18 percent each. Furthermore, intermediates are not only most important in terms of trade 
volume but also regarding the number of traded products. The BEC classification identifies 1,873 
out of 3,053 products as intermediates. Recently, other studies have used the BEC classification 
to study the patterns of trade in intermediate goods (Bergstrand and Egger, 2010; Miroudot et al. 
2009). Our approach, however, is conceptually different from these studies, as they use the 
gravity model to study the volume of trade, while we focus on the pattern of trade. 
Table 3.1: Importance of intermediate, consumption and capital goods in world trade 
 
3.4.2 Industry Intensities and Country Endowments 
Capital intensity kk  and skilled labour intensity kh  of 6-digit NAICS industries for the year 2000 
are taken from the U.S. NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database. Capital intensity kk  is 
measured by the natural log of the total real capital stock per worker in industry k . Skilled labour 
intensity kh  is measured by the share of non-production workers in total employment of industry 
k . In contrast to trade data, it is not possible to differentiate capital and skilled labour intensity 
by intermediates and other types of goods. Institutional intensity kq  of NAICS industry k  is 
measured as the share of not reference priced SITC Rev.3 products in the industry. To construct 
this variable we use the classification of Rauch (1999), which groups goods into goods traded on 
an organised exchange, reference priced goods and not reference priced goods. Our measure 
differs from that of Nunn (2007), who aggregates the classified goods to the industry level using 
input shares from U.S. input output tables. In contrast to Nunn (2007), we are especially 
interested in the differences between intermediate and final goods and employ hence the BEC 
classification to calculate separate institutional intensities for intermediate and final goods of an 
industry. Timeliness kt  of NAICS industry k  is measured by the share of US imports shipped by 
air in the year 2000. As in the case of institutional intensity, our timeliness variable varies within 
a NAICS industry by type of good.  
Number of 
SITC Rev.3 
lines
Exports in Mill. 
USD
Total exports 
(%)
Total 3,053 5,900,952.0 100.0%
Intermediate 1,873 3,397,270.5 57.6%
Consumption 698 1,096,182.5 18.6%
Capital 468 1,082,342.4 18.3%
Not classified 14 325,156.7 5.5%
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Country endowments of capital iK  and human capital iH  are measured by the natural log of 
capital stock per worker and the natural log of human capital per worker for the year 1988 taken 
from Hall and Jones (1999). In our benchmark specification, a country‟s quality of institutions 
iQ  is measured by the rule of law index from the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators 
2009. A country‟s ability to export timely is measured by the quality of transport infrastructure 
iT  as captured by the infrastructure component of the World Bank Logistics Performance Index. 
Quality of infrastructure matters because it is an important determinant of the length of time to 
export and of the certainty of delivery, beyond being an important determinant of the financial 
dimension of trade costs. To test the robustness of results, we also use the time to enforce 
contracts and the cost to enforce contracts from the World Bank Doing Business Indicators as 
alternative measures for the quality of institutions. As an additional measure for a country‟s 
ability to deliver on time, we use the time to export from World Bank Doing Business and, 
following Limão and Venables (2001), we construct an index of the quality of transport 
infrastructure. This is calculated as the average of the deviations from the sample mean of the 
following four variables: (i) the percentage of paved road; (ii) the density of the rail network, 
both taken from the World Development Indicators 2008; (iii) the number of airports with paved 
runways over 3,047 meters – obtained from the CIA Factbook; and (iv) a port efficiency index 
(ranging between 1 and 10) taken from the IMD World Competitiveness year book. 
Summary statistics of factor endowments and factor intensities are provided in Tables 3.2-3.4 in 
Appendix 3.B. Table 3.3 shows that timeliness is on average higher for intermediates than for 
consumption goods with 22 percent of U.S. intermediate imports shipped by air on average. 
Regarding institutional intensity, Table 3.3 indicates that the share of not reference priced 
products in an industry is on average 78 percent in the case of consumption goods and 65 percent 
in the case of intermediate goods. Table 3.4 shows the correlation between factor intensities and 
the share of intermediates in industry exports. This correlation is positive and significant for 
capital intensity, not significant for skilled labour intensity, and negative and significant for both 
institutional intensity and timeliness.  
Tables 3.5-3.8 in Appendix 3.B report the top and bottom 15 industries in terms of capital 
intensity, skilled labour intensity and timeliness as well as the corresponding export shares of 
intermediate goods.
41
 While the most capital intensive industries export mainly intermediates, the 
least capital intensive industries do generally not export intermediates but are rather final goods 
                                                     
41
 For institutional intensity a ranking of industries is not presented since more than 15 industries have an 
intensity of either 0 or 1. For timeliness two tables are presented since it is calculated separately for 
intermediates and other goods. 
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industries. On the other hand, intermediate goods are produced by both skilled labour-scarce and 
skilled labour intensive industries. However, the most skilled labour intensive industries are 
capital goods industries.  
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Comparative Advantage in Intermediate and Final Goods Trade 
Table 3.9 reports the OLS estimations of equation 1 for three sets of regressions. Columns A.1-
A.3 show the results of the regression for total trade, columns B.1-B.3 report the results for trade 
in intermediate goods, and columns C.1-C.3 provide the results for trade in consumption goods. 
All regressions control for the traditional factors of comparative advantage: capital and skilled 
labour. For each dependent variable, we provide in the first column the estimates for traditional 
sources of comparative advantage adding only the interaction term for institutional quality, in the 
second column we add the interaction term for timely delivery and in the third column we 
simultaneously control for all the traditional and new sources of comparative advantage as 
specified in equation 1. All coefficients are beta standardised so that their size can be compared. 
In line with existing literature, we find that the quality of institution is an important determinant 
of total trade patterns (Set A). That is, countries with a good rule of law specialise in 
institutional-intensive industries. Similarly, when we include timely delivery interaction we find 
that countries with high quality of infrastructure have a comparative advantage in time-sensitive 
industries. Comparing the size of coefficients, we see that both the quality of institutions and 
transport infrastructure are more important sources of comparative advantage than human 
capital.
42
 Importantly, we find that the impact of timely delivery on the patterns of trade is larger 
than for institutions suggesting that time management explains a higher share of trade. 
The importance of quality of institutions and timely delivery in explaining trade patterns is also 
confirmed when we run the regression separately for intermediate and consumption goods. 
Interestingly, while the impact of institutional quality is similar on exports of intermediates 
(columns B.1-B.3) and of consumption goods (columns C.1-C.3), timely delivery is found to be 
particularly important for exports of intermediate goods confirming theoretical expectations. 
Another result worth mentioning is that our findings suggest that the standard result in the 
literature (see Nunn, 2007 and Levchenko, 2007) that the traditional sources of comparative 
advantage do not explain much of trade is driven by trade in final consumption. In fact, skilled 
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 This confirms Nunn (2007), who finds that institutions are more important for comparative advantage 
than traditional sources. 
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labour appears to be a very important factor in intermediate goods exports, while it does not show 
to be significant in final goods trade.  
 
 
76 
 
Table 3.9: The determinants of comparative advantage in intermediates and final goods trade 
  
 
Total trade Total trade Total trade Intermediate Intermediate Intermediate Consumption Consumption Consumption
A.1 A.2 A.3 B.1 B.2 B.3 C.1 C.2 C.3
qxQ  (institutions) 0.187*** 0.163*** 0.247*** 0.207*** 0.226*** 0.236***
(14.318) (12.081) (15.820) (12.621) (9.878) (10.036)
txT  (infrastructure) 0.225*** 0.184*** 0.303*** 0.244*** 0.077*** 0.047**
(16.186) (12.910) (16.947) (12.443) (3.274) (1.998)
kxK (capital) 0.247*** 0.102* 0.372*** 0.245*** -0.002 0.371*** 0.180* -0.106 0.223**
(4.136) (1.842) (5.984) (3.341) (-0.033) (4.887) (1.871) (-1.156) (2.161)
hxH (human capital) 0.096*** 0.057*** 0.048*** 0.144*** 0.089*** 0.077*** 0.016 0.041* 0.017
(9.036) (4.819) (4.052) (10.120) (5.904) (4.853) (0.770) (1.888) (0.753)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.752 0.752 0.754 0.748 0.75 0.75 0.722 0.716 0.72
Numb. of observations 29,126 28,343 27,153 18,993 19,600 17,838 11,252 10,971 10,414
Numb. of countries 103 95 95 103 95 95 103 95 95
Numb. of industries 343 359 342 241 265 241 136 142 135
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of exports in industry k by country i to the World. Coefficients are beta standardized and t-values for robust 
standard errors are reported in brackets.  * Significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
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3.5.2 Differences in Comparative Advantage between Intermediate and Final Goods 
Next, we test whether there are significant differences in the sources of comparative advantage 
between intermediate and final goods by estimating equation (2). Table 3.10 reports the results of 
the respective OLS regressions. This time, we pool export flows of intermediates and other types 
of goods and test the significance of the variables interacted with the intermediate good trade 
dummy: a dummy that is one for exports of intermediates in industry k  and zero for exports of 
other goods types in industry k . In creating these interaction terms we center variables at the 
sample mean in order to facilitate the interpretation of results
43
. By doing so, the coefficient of 
the intermediate dummy is estimated at the mean of the continuous interaction terms rather than 
at the hypothetical value of zero.  
Columns A.1-A.3 report results when intermediate exports and all other exports
44
 are pooled, 
while columns B.1-B.3 show results when intermediate exports are pooled with consumption 
exports only. Contrary to expectations, the interaction of intermediates and institutions is not 
significant indicating that institutions matter to a similar extent for exports of intermediates and 
other types of goods. This result is a bit surprising since we expected the hold-up problem to be 
stronger in the case of intermediates than in the case of consumption goods so that a country‟s 
rule of law would be a more important source of comparative advantage for exports of 
intermediates.  
As expected, instead, the coefficient of the interaction between the dummy denoting 
intermediates and the comparative advantage variable for timeliness is significant and positive. 
Hence, countries with a good quality of infrastructure specialise in exports of time-sensitive 
goods, particularly in time-sensitive intermediate goods. This confirms our theoretical prediction 
that timeliness is more crucial to the success of countries to integrate into intermediate stages of 
global production networks than to serve final consumers.  
Columns A.3 and B.3 include additionally interaction terms of the intermediate dummy with 
capital and human capital interactions. The positive sign of interactions terms in column (6) 
indicate that comparative advantage in capital and human capital might be more pronounced for 
intermediate exports than for consumption exports. However, both coefficients are not 
statistically significant. One possible explanation is that the industry intensities of capital and 
skilled labour do not vary for intermediates and consumption goods. Hence, for industries 
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 We first center industry intensities and country endowments before interacting them. Then, we center the 
resulting interaction terms at their means before interacting them with the intermediate goods dummies. 
44
 This is the sum of consumption goods exports, capital goods exports and exports of goods which are not 
classified by BEC.  
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exporting both intermediates and consumption goods, we have to assume that the same capital 
and skilled labour intensity are used in the production process of both good types. 
Table 3.10: Testing for differences in the determinants of comparative advantage for intermediate 
goods 
 
3.5.3 Robustness: Alternative Measures for Institutions and Transport Infrastructure 
To test the robustness of our results, we estimate equation (2) using alternative measures of 
country endowments regarding institutional quality and timely delivery. Table 3.11 provides the 
results of these estimates and shows that our previous findings are robust to the use of alternative 
measures. In particular, we find that coefficient for the quality of institution is significant and of 
the expected sign also when the quality of institutions is proxied by the time (columns A.3 and 
B.3) or the cost required to enforce a contract (columns A.4 and B.4). In addition, timely delivery 
is an significant determinant of comparative advantage also when it is measured by the days 
required to export (columns A.1 and B.1) or by an index of transport infrastructure – calculated 
as an average of the quality of rail, road, air and port infrastructure (columns A.2 and B.2).  
A.1 A.2 A.3 B.1 B.2 B.3
qxQ  (institutions) 0.060*** 0.063*** 0.055*** 0.064*** 0.069*** 0.065***
(15.465) (10.175) (8.683) (15.098) (9.710) (8.765)
qxQxI -0.005 0.005 -0.008 -0.003
(-0.902) (0.790) (-1.198) (-0.422)
txT  (infrastructure) 0.043*** 0.034*** 0.030*** 0.045*** 0.017*** 0.017***
(12.480) (7.028) (5.987) (11.706) (2.791) (2.738)
txTxI 0.013*** 0.017*** 0.037*** 0.036***
(2.756) (3.402) (6.018) (5.518)
kxK (capital) 0.019*** 0.018*** -0.001 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.018**
(4.726) (4.652) (-0.114) (5.972) (5.953) (2.445)
kxKxI 0.026*** 0.011
(4.233) (1.604)
hxH (human capital) 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.022*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.009
(5.194) (5.255) (4.941) (4.724) (4.299) (1.383)
hxHxI -0.005 0.009
(-1.238) (1.369)
I (intermediate dummy) -0.076*** -0.077*** -0.076*** -0.01 -0.011* -0.011*
(-15.832) (-15.875) (-15.855) (-1.627) (-1.659) (-1.663)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.709 0.709 0.709 0.691 0.691 0.691
Numb. of observations 33,743 33,743 33,743 28,252 28,252 28,252
Numb. of countries 95 95 95 95 95 95
Numb. of industries 342 342 342 309 309 309
Intermediate versus all other exports Intermediate versus consumption exports
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of intermediate or all other (consumption) exports in industry k by 
country i to the World. Coefficients are beta standardized and t-values for robust standard errors are reported in 
brackets.  * Significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
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Furthermore, these regressions confirm the greater importance of timeliness for exports of 
intermediates than for exports of final and other goods. In fact, while the interaction term 
including the intermediate good dummy is in general not significant for the variables that denote 
the quality of institutions, it is significant and of the same sign as the non-interacted term for the 
variables that denote a country‟s ability to meet requests for timely delivery. 
Table 3.11: Using alternative measures of country endowments 
 
3.5.4 Robustness: Homogeneous Industries 
As a further robustness check, we run the regressions for the subsample of “homogeneous” 
industries, i.e. industries which produce either only intermediates or only consumption goods. 
The reason for this further test is to make sure that our results are not biased by the fact that the 
variables for an industry‟s capital and skill labour intensity are the same across types of goods. 
While our measures of timeliness and institutional intensity vary for intermediates and 
consumption goods within the same industry, capital and skilled labour intensity cannot be 
differentiated by type of good since they are measured directly at the industry level. By looking 
A.1 A.2 A.3 A.4 B.1 B.2 B.3 B.4
qxQ  (institutions) 0.061*** 0.058*** 0.066*** 0.061***
(10.131) (9.842) (9.500) (9.059)
qxQxI -0.005 -0.002 -0.005 -0.001
(-0.780) (-0.354) (-0.831) (-0.170)
qxQ  (time to enforce contract) -0.025*** -0.021***
(-4.397) (-3.297)
d_int_q_rauch_time 0.005 0.001
(0.838) (0.122)
qxQ2 (cost to enforce contract) -0.039*** -0.051***
(-6.270) (-7.008)
qxQ2xI 0.008 0.016**
(1.368) (2.327)
txT  (infrastructure) 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.022*** 0.020***
(7.350) (7.356) (3.312) (3.059)
txTxI 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.041*** 0.043***
(4.122) (4.138) (6.521) (6.797)
txT2  (time to export) -0.035*** -0.019***
(-7.730) (-3.123)
txT2xI -0.007 -0.027***
(-1.591) (-4.356)
txT3  (road,rail,port,air) 0.039*** 0.032***
(8.863) (5.120)
txT3xI 0.011** 0.022***
(2.305) (3.615)
kxK (capital) 0.017*** 0.015*** -0.001 0.004 0.025*** 0.023*** 0.005 0.012***
(4.497) (4.089) (-0.239) (1.109) (5.738) (5.379) (1.257) (2.939)
hxH (human capital) 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.018***
(5.247) (6.415) (6.544) (6.121) (4.538) (5.384) (5.199) (4.859)
I (intermediate dummy) -0.078*** -0.081*** -0.075*** -0.075*** -0.014** -0.016*** -0.01 -0.01
(-16.464) (-17.295) (-15.481) (-15.487) (-2.277) (-2.588) (-1.555) (-1.554)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.712 0.711 0.708 0.708 0.695 0.694 0.69 0.691
Numb. of observations 34,868 36,023 33,352 33,352 29,196 30,158 27,925 27,925
Numb. of countries 99 102 93 93 99 102 93 93
Numb. of industries 342 342 342 342 309 309 309 309
Intermediate versus all other exports Intermediate versus consumption exports
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of intermediate or all other (consumption) exports in industry k by country i to the World. Coefficients 
are beta standardized and t-values for robust standard errors are reported in brackets.  * Significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
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at the subsample of “intermediates-only” and “consumption goods-only” industries, we can be 
sure that these intensities really correspond to a certain good type. Our main result is confirmed, 
namely that timeliness in exporting has a larger impact on the export pattern of intermediate 
goods than of final goods (columns B.1 and B.2). Two further results reported in Table 3.12 are 
worth mentioning. First, the coefficient of the human capital interaction has a negative sign for 
exports of consumption goods (column A.2). This result complements findings of Table 3.9 
where human capital had no significant effect in two out of three regressions (columns C.1 and 
C.3). Hence, it seems that while human capital tends to be important for intermediates it does not 
constitute a source of comparative advantage for trade in consumption goods. Furthermore, for 
this subsample we find that in institution-intensive sectors the quality of institutions increases 
exports of intermediates significantly more than exports of final goods.  
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Table 3.12: Comparative advantage patterns for homogenous industries 
  
3.5.5  Robustness: Endogeneity 
One possible concern to our estimation strategy is the potential endogeneity of the quality of 
institutions or transport infrastructure of a country. OLS regressions may capture only the 
correlation between these variables and trade but not necessarily causality. For instance, better 
infrastructure might not only lead to higher exports in time-sensitive sectors, but higher exports 
in these sectors themselves might trigger government spending on infrastructure. However, the 
use of country and industry fixed effects and the fact that time-sensitive sectors only constitute a 
subset of trade flows, makes us confident that the influence of exports in time-sensitive sectors on 
infrastructure investment is limited. Nevertheless, we instrument for the quality of infrastructure 
following Djankov et al. (2010) and run the regressions for a subsample of landlocked countries 
Intermediate Consumption
A.1 A.2 B.1 B.2
qxQ  (institutions) 0.137*** 0.092*** 0.019** 0.022**
(6.655) (2.586) (1.986) (2.248)
qxQxI 0.022** 0.018*
(2.413) (1.828)
txT  (infrastructure) 0.190*** 0.056* 0.025*** 0.029***
(7.431) (1.743) (3.411) (3.834)
txTxI 0.022*** 0.017**
(2.990) (2.236)
kxK (capital) 0.364*** 0.491*** 0.037*** 0.047***
(3.498) (3.409) (6.763) (5.170)
kxKxI -0.012
(-1.300)
hxH (human capital) 0.055*** -0.091*** 0.007* -0.001
(2.594) (-3.097) (1.682) (-0.198)
hxHxI 0.011*
(1.692)
I (intermediate dummy) -0.057*** -0.057***
(-4.817) (-4.814)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.742 0.717 0.728 0.728
Numb. of observations 10,197 4,924 16,889 16,889
Numb. of countries 95 95 95 95
Numb. of industries 134 62 205 205
Separate Regressions Pooled Regressions
Intermediate versus Consumption
Notes: In separate regressions, the dependent variable is either the natural log of intermediate exports or of 
consumption exports. In pooled regressions, the dependent variable is the natural log of intermediate or 
consumption exports. Regressions are run only for homogeneous industries, i.e. industries exporting either only 
intermediate or only consumption goods. Coefficients are beta standardized and t-values for robust standard 
errors are reported in brackets.  * Significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
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using the average quality of infrastructure as well as the average timeliness in exporting of 
neighbouring countries as instrumental variables. The idea is that while exports of a landlocked 
county might affect its infrastructure, it will not affect the investment in infrastructure of its 
neighbours. However, the infrastructure of its neighbours will affect its ability to export timely 
since exports will have to pass these countries and are hence dependent of the quality of 
infrastructure there. Regarding the quality of institutions, we follow Nunn (2007) and use legal 
origins as instruments. It makes intuitive sense to assume that the different legal origins of 
countries, i.e. British, French, German, Social or Scandinavian, are reflected in today‟s quality of 
institutions of countries but that legal origins themselves are not affected by comparative 
advantage in 2000.  
Table 3.13 provides regression results when the transport infrastructure of landlocked countries is 
instrumented using neighbour countries averages for the quality of transport infrastructure and 
the timeliness in exporting. Since we only look at the case of landlocked countries, the number of 
countries left in the regressions shrinks to 13.
 
Results confirm that if countries improve their 
transport infrastructure, they will indeed experience an increase in exports in time-sensitive 
sectors. Further support is given by the Sargan overidentification that does not reject the validity 
of our instruments.
 45
 The small sample size probably explains why the traditional comparative 
advantage interactions for capital and human capital are not significant anymore or have not the 
expected sign. 
                                                     
45
 We have also experimented using the same instruments for the entire sample of countries. While 
coefficients of the instrumented variable are positively signed and are significant, the overidentification test 
rejects the validity of instruments.  
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Table 3.13: 2SLS IV regressions instrumenting for the quality of transport infrastructure 
 
Table 3.14 reports results when the quality of institutions is instrumented using legal origin 
dummies. Coefficients of the institution interaction are all positive and significant. However, as 
in the case of Nunn (2007) the Sargan overidentification test rejects the validity of our 
instruments and the coefficient of the instrumented institution interaction is larger than in the 
OLS regression in Table 3.9. The estimated coefficient should however be smaller in the case of 
a simultaneous relationship as the instruments should only explain the direction from institutions 
to trade. 
Total trade Total trade Intermediate Intermediate Consumption Consumption
A.1 A.2 B.1 B.2 C.1 C.2
qxQ  (institutions) 0.173*** 0.256*** 0.271***
(5.761) (6.626) (5.236)
txT  (infrastructure) 0.188*** 0.160*** 0.263*** 0.211*** 0.121** 0.111**
(5.806) (4.721) (6.383) (4.619) (2.257) (2.043)
kxK (capital) -0.480*** -0.106 -0.546*** 0.089 -0.951*** -0.467*
(-3.782) (-0.734) (-3.410) (0.476) (-4.383) (-1.906)
hxH (human capital) 0.013 0 0.027 0.004 0.062 0.024
(0.462) (-0.012) (0.672) (0.085) (1.230) (0.476)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.771 0.772 0.773 0.772 0.742 0.75
Numb. of observations 3,383 3,249 2,196 1,996 1,299 1,232
Numb. of countries 13 13 13 13 13 13
Numb. of industries 358 342 265 241 142 135
Over-id test (p-value) 0.167 0.139 0.522 0.463 0.24 0.308
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of exports in industry k by country i to the World. txT is instrument 
using two txIV interaction terms where the instruments (IV) are the average T of neighbouring countries and the 
neighbour average of the timeliness component of the LPI index. Reported are the beta standardized coefficients of the 
second stage IV regression with t-values shown in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.          
  
 TIMELINESS, PRODUCT CONTRACTIBILITY AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 
84 
 
Table 3.14: 2SLS IV regressions instrumenting for the quality of institutions 
  
3.6 Conclusions 
Recent literature on production networks has emphasised the importance of a country‟s ability to 
enforce a contract and its ability to meet strict delivery times. This paper complements existing 
studies that show that the quality of institutions and of transport infrastructure provide a 
comparative advantage in exporting institution-intensive and time-sensitive goods, respectively.  
We contribute to the literature by extending these results to trade in intermediates. In particular, 
we find that the hold-up problem and timeliness are both very more important determinants of the 
patterns of trade and this is true both for trade in general and for trade in intermediates. However, 
two of our results underline the importance of the quality of transport infrastructure, i.e. 
timeliness in exporting, for the pattern of trade in intermediate goods. First, we find that the 
impact of transport infrastructure on the comparative advantage pattern of trade in intermediates 
is larger than the respective impact of institutional quality. Second, comparing trade in 
intermediates and trade in final goods, we find that the quality of transport infrastructure is more 
important for comparative advantage in intermediate goods than in final goods. This result 
suggests that timeliness is more crucial to the success of countries to integrate into intermediate 
stages of global production networks than to serve final consumers.  
Total trade Total trade Intermediate Intermediate Consumption Consumption
A.1 A.2 B.1 B.2 C.1 C.2
qxQ  (institutions) 0.256*** 0.230*** 0.295*** 0.267*** 0.450*** 0.447***
(11.103) (9.376) (10.361) (8.529) (11.125) (10.604)
txT  (infrastructure) 0.170*** 0.226*** 0.026
(11.771) (11.155) (1.098)
kxK (capital) 0.374*** 0.486*** 0.338*** 0.472*** 0.572*** 0.580***
(6.039) (7.692) (4.284) (5.914) (5.550) (5.406)
hxH (human capital) 0.089*** 0.044*** 0.138*** 0.075*** -0.013 -0.008
(8.230) (3.843) (9.377) (4.792) (-0.676) (-0.402)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.751 0.753 0.747 0.749 0.719 0.717
Numb. of observations 29,126 27,153 18,993 17,838 11,252 10,414
Numb. of countries 103 95 103 95 103 95
Numb. of industries 343 342 241 241 136 135
Over-id test (p-value) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of exports in industry k by country i to the World. qxQ is instrument 
using four txIV interaction terms where the instruments (IV) are dummies for british, french, german, social and 
scandinavian (omitted) legal origin. Reported are the beta standardized coefficients of the second stage IV regression 
with t-values shown in brackets. * Significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.               
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These results have important policy implications as they emphasise the importance of timeliness 
for the just-in-time needs of production networks and help explain why many countries are left 
out of production networks. By providing a more detailed understanding of the role of institutions 
and transport infrastructure for comparative advantage patterns of trade, our results may also 
provide guidance in the evaluation of possible gains from aid for trade.  
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Appendix 3.A: Data Description 
Exports data at the SITC Rev. 3 5-digit level are from the OECD/UN International Trade 
Commodity Statistics (ITCS) database. Using the correspondence table from Feenstra et al. 
(2002), we create a SITC Rev.3 to NAICS 1997 correspondence. Thereby, we follow Nunn 
(2007) and create a unique mapping of 5-digit SITC Rev.3 products to 6-digit NAICS 1997 
industries.  
Hence, we use the UN SITC Rev.3 to BEC correspondence to identify intermediate, 
consumption, capital and not classified goods at the 5-digit SITC Rev. 3 level. Then we use our 
SITC Rev.3 to NAICS 1997 correspondence to aggregate exports by BEC category to the 6-digit 
NAICS 1997 industry level.  
Capital intensity kk  and skilled labour intensity kh  of 6-digit NAICS industries for the year 2000 
are taken from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database. Capital intensity kk  is 
measured by the natural log of the total real capital stock per worker in industry k . Skilled labour 
intensity kh  is measured by the share of non-production workers in total employment of industry 
k . Differently to trade data, it is not possible to differentiate capital and skilled labour intensity 
by intermediates and other types of goods. 
Institutional intensity kq  of NAICS industry k  is measured as the share of not reference priced 
SITC Rev.3 products in the industry. To construct this variable we use the classification of Rauch 
(1999), which groups goods into goods traded on an organised exchange, reference priced goods 
and not reference priced goods. Since the Rauch classification is based on SITC Rev. 2, we first 
built a SITC Rev.2 to SITC Rev.3 correspondence and then apply our SITC Rev.3 to NAICS 
1997 correspondence. Both correspondences are constructed using the correspondence table of 
Feenstra (2002). However, while SITC Rev.3 lines are uniquely assigned to NAICS industries, 
the correspondence is not unique from SITC Rev. 2 to SITC Rev.3, i.e. one SITC Rev. 2 line can 
be assigned to several SITC Rev.3 lines. The merging of the Rauch classification with the 
correspondence resulted in 688 classified SITC Rev.2 products being assigned to 2,890 SITC 
Rev.3 categories. Note that this measure is significantly different from that built by Nunn (2007) 
that aggregates the classified goods to the industry level using input shares from U.S. input 
output tables, without distinguishing inputs and products consumed by private households. Since 
we are especially interested in the differences between intermediates and final goods, we use the 
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BEC classification to calculate separate institutional intensities for intermediates and 
consumption goods of an industry.  
Timeliness kt  of NAICS industry k  is measured by the share of US imports shipped by air in the 
year 2000. Data on US imports and shipping mode at the HS10 digit level are collected by the 
U.S. Census Bureau and are taken from the homepage of Peter Schott. In constructing this 
measure, bilateral data are first aggregated to total U.S. imports at the HS10 digit level. Using the 
unique HS10 to NAICS 1997 correspondence from Feenstra (2002), the measure of timeliness is 
then calculated as the simple average of HS10 air transport shares in NAICS industry k . As in 
the case of institutional intensity, timeliness varies within an NAICS industry by type of good, 
i.e. intermediate, consumption and capital goods. We used the UN HS1996 to BEC 
correspondence to assign 6-digit HS products to BEC categories. Hence, disaggregated HS10 
products are assumed to be the same BEC type of good as the corresponding more aggregate HS6 
product. 
Country endowments of capital iK  and human capital iH  are measured by the natural log of 
capital stock per worker and the natural log of human capital per worker for the year 1988 taken 
from Hall and Jones (1999).
46
 In our benchmark specification, a country‟s quality of institutions 
iQ  is measured by the rule of law index from the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators 
2009. A country‟s ability to export fast is measured by the quality of transport infrastructure iT  
as captured by the infrastructure component of the World Bank Logistics Performance Index. 
Quality of infrastructure matters because it is an important determinant of the length of time to 
export and of the certainty of delivery, beyond being an important determinant of the financial 
dimension of trade costs. To test the robustness of results, we also use the time to enforce 
contracts and the cost to enforce contracts from the World Bank Doing Business Indicators as 
alternative measures for the quality of institutions. As an additional proxy for a country‟s ability 
to deliver on time, we use the time to export from World Bank Doing Business and, following 
Limão and Venables (2001), we construct an index of the quality of transport infrastructure. This 
is calculated as the average of the deviations from the sample mean of the following four 
variables: (i) the percentage of paved road; (ii) the density of the rail network - both taken from 
the World Development Indicators 2008-; (iii) the number of airports with paved runways over 
3,047 meters – obtained from the CIA Fact book; and (iv) a port efficiency index (ranging 
between 1 and 10) taken from the IMD World Competitiveness year book. 
                                                     
46
 The data is accessible at http://www.stanford.edu/%7Echadj/HallJones400.asc. Previous papers that have 
used these data include for example Romalis (2004), Levchenko (2007) and Bernard, Jensen, Redding and 
Schott (2010). 
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Appendix 3.B: Figures and Tables 
Figure 3.1: Share of intermediate and consumption goods in total exports of countries in 2000 
 
Figure 3.2: Shares of intermediates in exports of office machinery (NAICS 333313) in 2000 
 
0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1 
intermediate consumption 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
A
R
G
A
U
S
B
EL
B
R
A
C
A
N
C
H
L
C
H
N
D
EU FR
A
G
B
R
ID
N
IN
D
IT
A
JP
N
K
O
R
M
EX SL
V
TH
A
TU
R
TW
N
U
SA ZA
F
non-intermediate
intermediate
  
 TIMELINESS, PRODUCT CONTRACTIBILITY AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 
89 
 
Table 3.2: Summary statistics of country endowments 
 
 
Table 3.3: Summary statistics of industry intensities 
 
 
 
Table 3.4: Pairwise correlations between industry intensities and the share of intermediates in 
industry exports 
 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Rule of Law 103 2.650 1.002 1.043 4.425
ln(K/L) 103 9.422 1.504 5.763 11.589
ln(H/L) 103 0.613 0.291 0.072 1.215
LPI Infrastructure 95 2.779 0.746 1.400 4.290
LPI Timeliness 95 3.340 0.651 2.000 4.530
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
capital intensity 360 11.491 0.879 9.547 14.299
skilled labor  intensity 360 0.286 0.114 0.087 0.682
institutional intensity int. 241 0.649 0.433 0 1
institutional intensity con. 136 0.778 0.403 0 1
timeliness int. 265 0.217 0.217 0 0.901
timeliness con. 142 0.187 0.212 0 0.968
Intermediate 
export share
capital int. 0.343*
skilled labor int. -0.080
institutional int. interm. -0.199*
timeliness interm. -0.311*
Note: *Significant at 5%
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Table 3.5: Capital intensity - bottom and top 15 industries and export share of intermediates 
 
 
NAICS Industry Capital int.
Export share - 
intermediates
315991 Hats And Cap 9.55 0.03
315993 Men S & Boys  Neckwear 9.60 0.00
315292 Fur And Leather Apparel 9.62 0.00
315999 Other Apparel Accessories 9.72 0.02
314121 Curtains And Draperies 9.74 0.00
316993 Personal Leather Goods (Except Women'S Handbags And Purses) 9.78 0.00
315239 Women'S And Girls' Other Outerwear 9.85 0.00
339911 Jewelry (Except Costume) 9.89 0.00
337121 Upholstered Household Furniture 9.90 0.00
314912 Canvas And Related Products 10.02 0.27
314911 Textile Sacks And Bags 10.03 1.00
339950 Signs 10.05 1.00
316999 All Other Articles Of Leather 10.05 0.02
336214 Transportation Equipment, Nesoi Including Trailers And Campers 10.10 0.00
336612 Boats 10.12 0.00
NAICS Industry Capital int.
Export share - 
intermediates
311223 Other Oilseed Products 13.28 0.74
325312 Phosphatic Fertilizers 13.29 1.00
325182 Carbon Black 13.31 1.00
325181 Alkalies And Chlorine 13.39 1.00
325193 Ethyl Alcohols 13.41 1.00
311213 Malts 13.59 1.00
325311 Nitrogenous Fertilizers 13.59 1.00
322122 Newsprint Mill Products 13.60 1.00
325192 Cyclic Crude And Intermediates 13.63 1.00
311221 Wet Corn Milling Products 13.69 0.90
325221 Cellulosic Organic Fibers 13.83 0.99
331411 Primary Smelting And Refining Of Copper 13.86 1.00
322110 Pulp Mill Products 14.08 1.00
324110 Petroleum Refinery Products 14.16 0.84
325110 Petrochemicals 14.30 1.00
 Capital intensity - bottom 15 industries
 Capital intensity - top 15 industries
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Table 3.6: Skilled labour intensity - bottom and top 15 industries and export share of 
intermediates 
 
 
NAICS Industry Skilled lab.
Export share - 
intermediates
335110 Electric Lamp Bulbs And Parts 0.09 0.59
313111 Yarns 0.09 0.94
321212 Softwood Veneer And Plywood 0.10 1.00
316219 Other Footwear 0.10 0.00
311615 Poultry, Prepared Or Preserved 0.10 0.00
327213 Glass Containers 0.11 1.00
335222 Household Refrigerators And Home Freezers 0.12 0.00
311513 Cheese 0.12 0.00
313113 Threads 0.13 0.97
313210 Broadwoven Fabrics 0.13 1.00
311611 Meat Products (Except Poultry) 0.13 0.16
336111 Automobiles And Light Duty Motor Vehicles, Including Chassis 0.13 0.00
315221 Men'S And Boys' Underwear And Nightwear 0.13 0.00
321211 Hardwood Veneer And Plywood 0.13 1.00
322215 Nonfolding Sanitary Food Containers 0.13 0.00
NAICS Industry Skilled lab.
Export share - 
intermediates
336411 Aircraft 0.53 0.00
334112 Computer Storage Devices 0.54 0.00
334510 Electromedical And Electrotherapeutic Apparatus 0.55 0.00
325613 Surface Active Agents 0.55 1.00
312112 Bottled Waters 0.55 0.00
334513 Instruments And Related Products  For Measuring, Displaying, And Controlling Industrial Process Variables0.56 0.21
334515 Instruments For Measuring And Testing Electricity And Electrical Signals 0.58 0.22
333313 Office Machinery 0.59 0.36
334119 Other Computer Equipment 0.61 0.57
334210 Telephone Apparatus 0.63 0.55
334517 Irradiation Apparatus 0.63 0.49
334511 Search, Detection, Navigation, Guidance, Aeronautical, And  Nautical Systems And Instruments0.64 0.10
334516 Analytical Laboratory Instruments 0.64 0.01
336414 Guided Missiles And Space Vehicles 0.65 0.00
334111 Electronic Computers 0.68 0.00
 Skilled labor intensity - bottom 15 industries
 Skilled labor intensity - top 15 industries
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Table 3.7: Timeliness: Share of U.S. intermediate goods imports shipped by air 
 
 
NAICS Industry Timeliness Export Share
327410 Lime And Calcined Dolomite 0.00 1.00
312130 Wines 0.00 0.01
327320 Wet, Nonrefractory Mortars And Concretes 0.00 1.00
311421 Fruits And Vegetables Preserved 0.00 0.01
312120 Malt And Beer 0.00 0.02
322130 Paperboard Mill Products 0.00 1.00
324121 Asphalt Paving Mixtures 0.00 1.00
322110 Pulp Mill Products 0.00 1.00
327310 Cements 0.00 1.00
325193 Ethyl Alcohols 0.00 1.00
311213 Malts 0.00 1.00
321113 Sawmill Products 0.00 1.00
331112 Electrometallurgical Ferroalloy Product 0.00 1.00
321213 Engineered Wood (Except Truss) 0.00 1.00
321911 Wood Windows And Doors 0.00 1.00
NAICS Industry Timeliness Export Share
334419 Other Electronic Components 0.65 0.50
325412 Pharmaceutical Preparations 0.65 0.10
334412 Printed Circuits 0.67 1.00
333993 Packaging Machinery 0.67 0.24
334415 Electronic Resistor And Parts 0.67 1.00
334511
Search, Detection, Navigation, Guidance, Aeronautical, And  Nautical 
Systems And Instruments
0.72 0.10
325414 Biological Products (Except Diagnostic) 0.75 1.00
333314 Optical Instruments And Lenses 0.76 0.29
339115 Ophthalmic Goods 0.82 0.50
334414 Electronic Capacitors And Parts 0.83 0.07
334515 Instruments For Measuring And Testing Electricity And Electrical Signals 0.84 0.22
339914 Costume Jewelry And Novelties 0.84 0.19
339913 Jewelers' Material And Lapidary Work 0.87 1.00
334516 Analytical Laboratory Instruments 0.89 0.01
334413 Semiconductors And Related Devices 0.90 1.00
 Timeliness intermediates goods - bottom 15 industries
 Timeliness intermediates goods - top 15 industries
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Table 3.8: Timeliness: Share of U.S. non-intermediate goods imports shipped by air 
 
NAICS Industry Timeliness Cons. Capital
321991 Mobile Homes And Trailers 0.00 1.00 0.00
336414 Guided Missiles And Space Vehicles 0.00 0.00 1.00
312112 Bottled Waters 0.00 1.00 0.00
312120 Malt And Beer 0.00 0.98 0.00
336212 Truck Trailers 0.00 0.00 1.00
311211 Flour And Other Grain Mill Products 0.00 0.08 0.00
336510 Railroad Rolling Stock 0.00 0.00 0.51
311111 Dog And Cat Foods 0.00 1.00 0.00
337124 Metal Household Furniture 0.00 0.38 0.62
311230 Breakfast Cereals 0.00 1.00 0.00
311822 Prepared Flour Mixes And Dough 0.01 1.00 0.00
312140 Distilled Liquors 0.01 0.93 0.00
337121 Upholstered Household Furniture 0.01 1.00 0.00
322291 Sanitary Paper Products 0.01 1.00 0.00
311421 Fruits And Vegetables Preserved 0.01 0.99 0.00
NAICS Industry Timeliness Cons. Capital
334612 Prerecorded Compact Discs (Except Software), Tapes, And Records 0.60 1.00 0.00
334510 Electromedical And Electrotherapeutic Apparatus 0.61 0.18 0.82
334515 Instruments For Measuring And Testing Electricity And Electrical Signals 0.63 0.00 0.78
334518 Watches, Clocks, And Parts 0.63 0.77 0.01
334511
Search, Detection, Navigation, Guidance, Aeronautical, And  Nautical 
Systems And Instruments
0.66 0.00 0.90
333314 Optical Instruments And Lenses 0.70 0.02 0.69
333295 Semiconductor Machinery 0.72 0.00 1.00
325221 Cellulosic Organic Fibers 0.74 0.01 0.00
334112 Computer Storage Devices 0.74 0.00 1.00
339114 Dental Equipment And Supplies 0.75 0.23 0.68
339911 Jewelry (Except Costume) 0.83 1.00 0.00
334516 Analytical Laboratory Instruments 0.84 0.00 0.99
315993 Men S & Boys  Neckwear 0.84 1.00 0.00
331491
Nonferrous Metals (Except Copper And Aluminum) Rolling, Drawing, And 
Extruding
0.91 0.00 0.09
332618 Other Fabricated Wire Products 0.96 0.00 0.05
 Timeliness for goods other than intermediates - bottom 15 industries
Export Share
 Timeliness for goods other than intermediates - top 15 industries
Export Share
Note:  Timeliness  at the NAICS industry level has been calculated as the simple average of HS10 products which are not 
intermediates, i.e. consumption, capital and not classified goods.
  
 TIMELINESS, PRODUCT CONTRACTIBILITY AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 
94 
 
References 
Acemoglu, D., P. Antràs and E. Helpman (2007). "Contracts and Technology Adoption", 
American Economic Review, 97(3), 916-943. 
Anderson, J. and D. Marcouiller (2002). “Insecurity and the Patterns of Trade: An Empirical 
Investigation”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 84(2), 342-352. 
Antràs P. (2003). “Firms, Contracts and Trade Structure”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
118(4), 1375-1418. 
Antràs, P. (2005). “Incomplete Contracts and the Product Cycle”, American Economic Review, 
95(4) (2005), 1054-1073. 
Antràs, P. and E. Helpman (2004). "Global Sourcing", Journal of Political Economy, 112(3), 
552-580. 
Antràs, P. and E. Helpman (2008). "Contractual Frictions and Global Sourcing", in D. Marin and 
T. Verdier (eds.), The Organization of Firms in a Global Economy, Harvard University 
Press. 
Bergstrand, J.H. and P. Egger (2010). “A General Equilibrium Theory for Estimating Gravity 
Equations of Bilateral FDI, Final Goods Trade, and Intermediate Goods Trade”, in S. 
Brakman and P. Van Bergeijk (eds), The Gravity Model in International Trade: Advances 
and Applications, Cambridge University Press, New York. 
Bernard, A.B., J.B. Jensen, S.J. Redding and P.K. Schott (2010). "Intra-Firm Trade and Product 
Contractibility", American Economic Review, 100(2), 444-448.  
Corcos, G., D. Irac, G. Mion and T. Verdier (2009). “The Determinants of Intra-Firm Trade”, 
EFIGE working paper 14. 
Costinot, A. (2005). "Contract Enforcement, Division of Labor, and the Pattern of Trade", 
mimeo, Princeton University.  
De Groot, H.L.F., G.-J. Linders, P. Rievtveld and U. Subramanian (2004). “The Institutional 
Determinants of Bilateral Trade Patterns”, Kyklos, 57, 103-123. 
Djankov, S., C. Freund and C.S. Pham (2010). “Trading on Time”, Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 92(1), 166-173. 
  
 TIMELINESS, PRODUCT CONTRACTIBILITY AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 
95 
 
Evans, C.L. and J. Harrigan (2005). "Distance, Time, and Specialization: Lean Retailing in 
General Equilibrium", American Economic Review, 95(1), 292-313. 
Freund, C. and N. Rocha (2010). “What Constraints Africa‟s Exports?”, Policy Research 
Working Paper Series 5184. 
Grossman, G.M. and E. Helpman (2005). "Outsourcing in a Global Economy", Review of 
Economic Studies, 72(1), 135-59. 
Grossman, S.J. and O.D. Hart (1986). “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of 
Vertical and Lateral Integration”, Journal of Political Economy, 94(4), 691-719. 
Hall, R.E. and C.I. Jones (1999). "Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per 
Worker Than Others?", The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(1), 83-116. 
Hart, O. and J. Moore (1990). "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm", Journal of Political 
Economy, 98(6), 1119-58. 
Hausman, W.H., Lee, L.L. and Subramanian, U. (2005). "Global Logistics Services, Supply 
Chain Metrics and Bilateral Trade Patterns", World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
3773. 
Hummels, D. (2001). "Time as a Trade Barrier", GTAP Working Papers 1152, Purdue 
University. 
Keane, M.P. and S.E. Feinberg (2007). "Advances in Logistics and the Growth of Intra-Firm 
Trade: The Case of Canadian Affiliates of US Multinationals, 1984-1995", Journal of 
Industrial Economics, 55(4), 571-632. 
Kremer, M. (1993). “The O-Ring Theory of Economic Development”, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 118(3), 551-575. 
Levchenko, A. (2007). "Institutional Quality and International Trade", Review of Economic 
Studies, 74(3), 791-819. 
Limão, N. and A.J. Venables (2001). "Infrastructure, Geographical Disadvantage, Transport 
Costs and Trade", World Bank Economic Review, 15(3), 451-479. 
Miroudot, S., R. Lanz and A. Ragoussis (2009). "Trade in Intermediate Goods and Services," 
OECD Trade Policy Working Papers 93. 
  
 TIMELINESS, PRODUCT CONTRACTIBILITY AND COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 
96 
 
Nordas, H.K., E. Pinali and M. Geloso-Grosso (2006). “Logistics and Time as a Trade Barrier”, 
OECD Trade Policy Working Papers 35. 
Nunn, N. (2007). "Relationship-Specificity, Incomplete Contracts, and the Pattern of Trade," The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(2), 569-600. 
Nunn, N. and D. Trefler (2008). "The Boundaries of the Multinational Firm: An Empirical 
Analysis", in D. Marin and T. Verdier (eds.), The Organization of Firms in a Global 
Economy, Harvard University Press. 
Portugal-Perez, A. and J.S. Wilson (2009). "Why trade facilitation matters to Africa", World 
Trade Review, 8(3), 379-416.  
Rauch, J.E. (1999). "Networks versus Markets in International Trade", Journal of International 
Economics, 48(1), 7-35.  
Romalis, J. (2004). “Factor Proportions and the Structure of Commodity Trade”, American 
Economic Review, 94(1), 67-97. 
Williamson, O.E. (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York, The Free Press. 
 
 
97 
 
4 Intra-Firm Trade in Intermediate Goods 
4.1 Introduction 
The activities of multinational enterprises (MNEs) and the international fragmentation of 
production affect international trade along the two dimensions of ownership and use. First, MNE 
activity affects the ownership dimension of trade, i.e. the importance of intra-firm trade relative 
to arm‟s length trade. While reliable estimates on intra-firm trade for the world are not available, 
U.S. trade data reveal that intra-firm transactions accounted for 48 percent of U.S. imports in 
2000. Second, the international fragmentation of production involves trade in goods that are used 
as intermediate inputs. Trade in intermediates accounted for 56 percent of total imports in OECD 
countries in 2006 (see Miroudot et al., 2009) and for 47 percent of U.S. imports in 2000. Hence, 
intra-firm trade and trade in intermediates are both significant in terms of volumes constituting 
almost 50 percent of U.S. imports each. While there has been considerable recent empirical 
research on both intra-firm trade (Bernard et al., 2010a; Costinot et al., 2009; Corcos et al., 2009; 
Nunn and Trefler, 2008) and trade in intermediates (Bergstrand and Egger, 2010; Miroudot et al., 
2009; Yeats, 2001), these papers do not combine the ownership dimension with the use 
dimension of trade. A major contribution of this paper is that it decomposes trade flows by 
ownership and by main end use. This allows us to study the determinants of intra-firm trade of 
intermediate goods as compared to intra-firm trade of final goods bridging the gap between 
empirical research and theoretical models on intra-firm trade. 
This paper builds on recent theoretical and empirical work in assessing the determinants of the 
share of intra-firm trade in total trade. Starting with Antràs (2003), theoretical trade models 
(Antràs and Helpman, 2004 and 2008) have emphasised the role of property rights and 
incomplete contracts for the international sourcing decisions of firms, i.e. whether to source 
intermediate inputs intra-firm through a foreign affiliate or at arm‟s length through an 
independent supplier. Property rights can mitigate the inefficiencies arising from the so-called 
hold-up problem which refers to the exploitation of a contracting party by its counterparty 
because the contract is incomplete or not enforceable while the investment undertaken is 
relationship-specific, i.e. worth less outside the relationship. In line with the modelling 
approaches undertaken by theoretical papers, we argue that the hold-up problem is more severe 
for intermediate goods than for final goods. Recent empirical papers such as Bernard et al. 
(2010a and 2010b), Nunn and Trefler (2008) and Costinot et al. (2009) test predictions of these 
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models. However, these papers do not distinguish between intra-firm trade in intermediate goods 
and intra-firm trade in final goods
47
.  
In our analysis, we use data from the U.S. Census Bureau on U.S. intra-firm imports in the year 
2000 at the Harmonized System 6-digit (HS6) level. We combine these data with the United 
Nation‟s Broad Economic Categories (BEC) classification, which groups imported commodities 
according to their main end use. This allows us to distinguish intra-firm and arm‟s length trade in 
intermediate goods, capital goods and consumption goods. We find that the share of intra-firm 
transactions in imports is 44 percent for intermediate goods imports, 59 percent for capital goods 
imports and only 19 percent for consumption goods imports. In terms of empirical analysis, we 
follow closely Bernard et al. (2010a) by assessing the determinants of intra-firm trade at both the 
extensive and intensive margin and by including interactions of product and country 
characteristics in regressions. However, we go beyond their analysis by modelling the dependent 
variable(s) more accurately, namely as the share of intra-firm intermediate imports in total 
imports of intermediates and the share of intra-firm final imports in total imports of final goods. 
Putting special emphasis on the contracting environment of a country, we test for differences 
regarding the determinants of intra-firm trade for intermediate, capital and final consumption 
goods. 
Our paper makes a number of contributions to the existing literature. First, by distinguishing 
intermediates and capital goods from consumption goods, we bring empirical analysis closer to 
theoretical models. Second, we show that this distinction matters as the share of intra-firm trade 
at the bilateral HS6 level is significantly higher for intermediate and capital goods relative to 
consumption goods. Third, in line with predictions from transaction cost models (Grossman and 
Helpman, 2003) and empirical findings (Bernard et al., 2010a), we find that a better contracting 
environment in a country reduces intra-firm trade relative to arm‟s length trade. According to the 
transaction cost approach, improvements in contract enforcement make the hold-up problem less 
severe so that the cost of outsourcing decreases relative to the cost of integration leading to a 
respective reduction in the share of intra-firm trade. Moreover, our results show that the 
contracting environment has a larger impact on the shares of intra-firm trade of intermediates and 
capital goods relative to consumption goods at both the extensive and the intensive margin. This 
finding suggests that the hold-up problem is more important for intermediates and capital goods 
than for consumption goods. A possible explanation for this result is that intermediates and 
capital goods require more relationship-specific investments of contracting parties as compared 
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 Bernard et al. (2010b) are an exception since they acknowledge this shortcoming of empirical research 
and confirm their results in a robustness check excluding final goods as identified by the HTS Imports 
Index of Sitchinava (2008). 
  
 INTRA-FIRM TRADE IN INTERMEDIATE GOODS 
99 
 
to consumption goods. Intermediates and capital goods are often tailored to the needs of the final 
good producer so that both the supplier and the final good producer might undertake substantial 
relationship-specific investments. In other words, this indicates that intermediate products are 
more contract-intensive. Finally, we confirm the main prediction of Antràs (2003) that intra-firm 
trade is higher in capital intensive sectors and find evidence that this pattern is more pronounced 
for intermediate and capital goods than for consumption goods.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 4.2 describes the theoretical and empirical 
literature regarding the determinants of intra-firm trade and provides the motivation for the 
distinction of intermediate and final goods in the analysis. Section 4.3 describes the trade data 
used and provides an overview of intra-firm trade by type of good. Section 4.4 outlines the 
empirical methodology and the data used in the econometric analysis. Section 4.5 presents results 
and Section 4.6 concludes. 
4.2 The Determinants of Intra-Firm Trade  
4.2.1 Theory 
In explaining the share of intra-firm trade, we draw on predictions from theoretical models that 
focus on the hold-up problem as the main reason for the decision of firms regarding integration or 
outsourcing. Thereby, we especially emphasise the role of the contracting environment and the 
differences between intermediate inputs and final goods. Since intra-firm trade in intermediate 
inputs is a direct consequence of vertical foreign direct investment (FDI), we would like to point 
the interested reader to the more traditional literature on vertical FDI starting with Helpman 
(1984) and Helpman and Krugman (1985) and to general equilibrium models of MNEs, i.e. the 
knowledge-capital model of Markusen (2002) and the knowledge-and-physical-capital models of 
Bergstrand and Egger (2007, 2010).  
4.2.1.1 The Hold-Up Problem 
The decision of firms to engage in either outsourcing or vertical integration is driven among other 
factors by the hold-up problem leading to underinvestment. The hold-up problem arises from the 
incompleteness or the lack of enforceability of contracts and the specificity of investments and 
leads to inefficiencies in a relationship between two parties. For instance, in the relationship 
between a final good producer and a supplier of an intermediate input, the final good producer 
may require the supplier to customise the inputs according to his needs. Hence, the supplier has 
to make a relationship-specific investment that has limited or no value outside the relationship. If 
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contracts are incomplete, there will be ex-post negotiations after the delivery of the input where 
both contracting parties try to extract as much surplus out of the relationship as possible. If the 
supplier has made a relationship-specific investment which is worth less outside the relationship, 
the final good producer has more bargaining power in the ex-post bargaining and will hold-up the 
supplier. Naturally, the supplier will foresee this behaviour of the final good producer and will 
therefore decide to keep the relationship-specificity of his investment low. Hence, the hold-up 
problem leads to underinvestment by the supplier. However, not only the supplier but also the 
final good producer might eventually face a hold-up problem if the latter makes a relationship-
specific investment as well. In that case, there is a two-sided hold-up problem and both parties, 
final good producer and supplier, will underinvest ex-ante.  
4.2.1.2 The Property Rights Approach 
The work of Antràs (2003) introduced the property rights approach as outlined in the seminal 
papers of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) into trade theory. The 
assignment of property rights, i.e. ownership over the investment, gives contracting parties an 
outside option in the case of contract failure and hence mitigates the hold-up problem faced by 
either the supplier or the final good producer. According to the property-rights theory, the party 
which has to burden the larger share of the relationship-specific investment should obtain the 
property rights over the investment. The party holding the property rights has a better negotiating 
position in the ex-post bargaining process so that it can capture a larger share of the surplus. 
Therefore, the party has a greater incentive to invest ex-ante. Hence, property rights are assigned 
to the final good producer if his investments are more important relative to the investment of the 
supplier (vertical integration) or to the supplier if his share in the relationship-specific investment 
is relatively larger (outsourcing).  
Antràs (2003) models the production of an intermediate input assuming that investment sharing is 
easier for capital than for labour. In this setting, the final good producer will share some of the 
capital-investment required for producing the intermediate input with the supplier, while the 
supplier will provide additionally all of the labour input. Hence, the more capital intensive the 
production of an intermediate, the more investment will be shared between the final good 
producer and the supplier, thus increasing the importance of the investment and the potential 
hold-up problem for the final good producer. Above a certain threshold capital intensity of the 
production, firms will therefore integrate in order to alleviate the hold-up problem faced by the 
final good producer. On the other hand, if the production of an intermediate is labour intensive, 
the supplier bears a greater share of the investment and will therefore be assigned the property 
rights. Antràs (2003) embeds this property rights approach in a factor-proportions model in which 
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production and trade are determined by comparative advantage in production factors: A country 
will specialise in the production and exports of industries which intensively use its abundant 
factors. Capital abundant countries will therefore export relatively more in capital intensive 
industries (see also Romalis, 2004). Hence, Antràs (2003) predicts that the share of intra-firm 
imports in total imports is higher for capital intensive industries (due to the hold-up problem) and 
from capital abundant countries (due to the comparative advantage pattern of trade).  
While Antràs (2003) assumes that investment sharing is easier for capital than for labour, Antràs 
and Helpman (2004) model the relationship-specific investment of the final good producer in the 
form of headquarter services leading to the prediction that intra-firm trade will be higher in 
headquarter intensive industries. Headquarter services can be thought of as R&D investment, 
product design or engineering services and might be proxied by the skilled labour intensity of an 
industry. 
4.2.1.3 The Transaction Cost Approach and the Contracting Environment 
The transaction cost approach (see Coase, 1937; and Williamson, 1975, 1985, for seminal 
contributions) is the precursor to and closely related to the property rights approach. While the 
property rights approach focuses on ex-ante inefficiencies arising from incomplete contracts, the 
transaction cost approach is broader in scope and considers both ex-ante and ex-post 
inefficiencies. Ex-ante inefficiencies include underinvestment arising from the hold-up problem, 
while ex-post inefficiencies relate to problems arising at the termination or during the execution 
of the contract. While in property rights models the hold-up problem is still present also within 
the firm‟s boundaries, the transaction cost approach typically assumes that the hold-up problem is 
solved by vertical integration. However, it is assumed that integrated suppliers give rise to higher 
costs than independent ones.
48
  
The contracting environment, i.e. the extent to which contracts are enforceable, is crucial in both 
property rights and transaction cost models since the hold-up problem arises only if contracts are 
incomplete, i.e. it is not possible to specify all details in a contract, or not enforceable. Lafontaine 
and Slade (2007) point out that most of the empirical literature testing the determinants of 
vertical integration disregard the fact that theoretical models assume that contracts are 
incomplete. If the writing of contracts is complete, there is no need for integration under both the 
transaction cost and the property rights approach. However, if contracts are incomplete, the 
transaction cost and the property rights approach may differ in their predictions regarding the 
impact of improvements in the contracting environment on the share of intra-firm imports. 
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 See Lafontaine and Slade (2007) and Antràs and Rossi-Hansberg (2009) for more detail regarding the 
comparison between the property rights and the transaction costs approach.  
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According to the transaction costs approach, an improvement in the contracting environment will 
increase outsourcing relative to vertical integration since the costs associated to ex-ante and ex-
post inefficiencies decrease relative to the costs of vertical integration. For instance, Grossman 
and Helpman (2003) argue that a better contracting environment increases outsourcing relative to 
vertical integration since less investment tasks are left to the discretion of the supplier. On the 
other hand, in the property rights model of Antràs and Helpman (2008) an improvement in the 
contracting environment can increase either intra-firm or arm‟s length trade, depending on 
whether the investment undertaken by the final good producer or by the supplier benefits more. If 
relatively more contractual details can be specified regarding the input provided by the final good 
producer, then arm‟s length trade will increase because the final good producer is affected less by 
the hold-up problem. On the other hand, if the input provided by the supplier experiences an 
increase in contractibility, then more incentives have to be given to the final good producer and 
hence integration and intra-firm trade will increase.  
To test for the overall effect of a country‟s contracting environment on intra-firm trade, we 
include in regressions an index measuring the country‟s quality of rule of law. However, as we 
outline below, we expect the hold-up problem to me more severe in the case of intermediates 
compared to consumption goods. Therefore, we go a step further and test whether an 
improvement in the contracting environment has a different impact on the shares of intra-firm 
trade of intermediate (capital) and consumption goods. This assessment of the interaction 
between a country‟s contracting environment and types of good is related to the studies of Nunn 
and Trefler (2008) and Bernard et al. (2010a), who investigate the interaction between the 
contracting environment and the relationship-specificity of industries and product contractibility 
respectively. 
4.2.1.4 Differences between Intermediates (Capital) Goods and Consumption Goods 
Both, property rights (Antràs, 2003) and transaction cost models (Grossman and Helpman, 2003) 
stress the importance of the hold-up problem in the relationship between a final good producer 
and a supplier of specialised intermediate inputs. Hence, an accurate empirical testing of these 
models should focus on intermediate inputs. The hold-up problem will be less relevant for 
consumption goods if the investments undertaken by the contracting parties are less relationship-
specific and/or require less contractual details, i.e. are less contract-intensive. In the following we 
give two reasons why we expect this to be the case for consumption goods. 
Along the lines of Antràs (2003) and Antràs and Helpman (2004), the hold-up problem regarding 
consumption goods might arise in the context of an U.S. MNE deciding on whether to conduct 
the last stage of the production process, i.e. the assembly of the final product, in-house or through 
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an independent supplier. The assembly stage of a good typically is technologically easy and 
unskilled labour intensive as compared to the production of intermediates which is typically 
assumed to be more capital intensive (see Markusen and Venables, 2007). If this is the case, the 
U.S. MNE does not need to provide much relationship-specific investment through capital or 
skilled labour. Hence, the U.S. importer will not be exposed much to the hold-up problem and 
can give incentives to the supplier by outsourcing the assembly of the final product.  
Furthermore, consumption goods are to a large extent traded in a different context, namely 
between the firm producing it and retailers and/or wholesale traders. Hence, from the point of 
view of a final good producer, the decision to deliver the consumption good through either 
affiliated or unaffiliated distributors (forward integration) is different from the decision to source 
intermediate inputs from affiliated or independent suppliers (backward integration).
49
 The final 
good producer will tailor the good to the tastes of the consumer and the relationship with the 
distributor is less likely to require much relationship-specific investment. Furthermore, a final 
good producer might not find it profitable to set up a distribution network to reach final 
consumers given the high fixed costs of the required investment. In Section 4.3.5, we support 
these arguments by providing correlations between the three good types and the index of product 
contractibility of Bernard et al. (2010a), which they measure as the average wholesale 
employment share of firms importing the product. 
Following the above reasoning, we would expect the share of intra-firm trade to be higher for 
intermediate goods than for consumption goods. Moreover, if the hold-up problem is indeed 
more relevant for intermediates than for consumption goods, then we expect that an improvement 
in the contracting environment of a country affects more intra-firm trade in intermediates 
compared to intra-firm trade in consumption goods. Since capital goods are similar to 
intermediate goods in the sense that they are used by firms in the production process and are not 
targeted at consumers, we expect a similar pattern of intra-firm trade for the two types of good.  
4.2.2 Empirical Findings 
Given the scarcity of data on intra-firm trade, few empirical papers exist on the topic. Only 
recently some papers have used either firm level data (Corcos et al., 2009, Marin, 2006) or trade 
data on intra-firm imports from the U.S. Census Bureau (Bernard et al., 2010a and 2010b, Nunn 
and Trefler, 2008, Costinot et al., 2009) to test the predictions of new trade models. However, 
none of these papers distinguishes between intermediate inputs, capital goods and consumption 
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 Typically, in the literature forward integration is modeled as moral hazard problem and not as hold-up 
problem (see Lafontaine and Slade, 2007, for a review).  Nevertheless, predictions are similar in the sense 
that a firm will choose outsourcing if the effort of the distributor is large relative to the effort of the firm. 
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goods in their data as is actually requested by theory.
50
 One contribution of this paper is that it 
fills this gap between theoretical research and its empirical testing. In the following, we 
summarise the findings of the empirical work on intra-firm trade. 
Bernard et al. (2010) assess the determinants of U.S. intra-firm imports at the HS 10-digit product 
level using their Linked/Longitudinal Firm Trade Transaction Database (LFTTD). They 
emphasise the importance of the interaction of product and country characteristics for intra-firm 
trade. In particular, they find that intra-firm imports are higher in capital intensive industries from 
capital abundant countries and lower for skill intensive products from human capital abundant 
countries. Bernard et al. (2010) is also the only study investigating the non-linearity in the 
determinants of intra-firm trade associated with the extensive and intensive margin of trade. For 
instance, good governance increases the likelihood that intra-firm trade takes place between two 
countries but reduces the share of intra-firm trade once the decision has been made to source 
intra-firm, i.e. to set up a foreign affiliate. Using a new index of revealed product contractibility 
based on the degree of a good being imported by wholesale traders, they find that the share of 
intra-firm imports is lower for products with a high revealed contractibility and that this effect is 
more pronounced for countries with weak governance. In our empirical approach, we interact a 
variable indicating a country‟s rule of law with dummies for intermediate and capital goods. 
Hence, their index and our dummies are related in the sense that both are measuring to what 
extent incomplete contracts matter for the respective good.  
Nunn and Trefler (2008) use data at the HS6 level from the U.S. Census Bureau to assess the 
determinants of the share of intra-firm trade in total trade. Testing the theoretical predictions of 
Antràs (2003) and Antràs and Helpman (2004, 2008), they find that the share of intra-firm trade 
is increasing in the share of non-contractible inputs provided by the headquarter firm (as proxied 
by capital and skill intensities of industries). They also assess the role of the contracting 
environment on intra-firm trade. Surprisingly, they find that intra-firm imports are higher in 
relationship-specific industries from countries with a good rule of law.
51
 According to the 
property rights model of Antràs and Helpman (2008), this would imply that an improvement in 
the contracting environment affects primarily the investment undertaken by the supplier and that 
therefore more incentives need to be given to the final good producer increasing integration. 
Corcos et al. (2009) combine French firm level data from the EIIG (Échanges Internationaux 
Intra-Groupe) dataset with French customs data to estimate a logit model for the sourcing 
decision of French firms at the bilateral product level in 1999. Building on the Rauch (1999) 
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 Bernard et al. (2010b) refer to this shortcoming and confirm their results in a robustness check excluding 
final goods as identified by the HTS Imports Index of Sitchinava (2008). 
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 The variable measuring the relationship-specificity of industries is taken from Nunn (2007). 
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classification, they construct different measures of product complexity for imported and final 
products of French firms. However, they do not distinguish between intermediate inputs and 
consumption goods, but only between the complexity of products French firms import and sell. 
Similar to previous studies, they find that higher product complexity increases the likelihood of 
intra-firm sourcing. Furthermore, contrary to theoretical predictions and evidence in Antràs 
(2003) and Bernard et al. (2010a), they find that capital intensive firms tend to insource labour 
intensive goods from labour abundant countries. 
Costinot et al. (2009) put special emphasis on adaptation as a determinant of the share of intra-
firm imports. Building on the transaction cost approach, they argue that ex-post contractual 
frictions might require headquarters or suppliers to adapt to a problematic state, with adaptation 
being presumably less costly under integration. Using a new measure of sectors‟ routines and 
concentrating on sector characteristics only, they find that the share of U.S. intra-firm imports is 
higher in less routine sectors.  
Marin (2006) uses survey data for German parent firms operating affiliates in Eastern Europe to 
assess the determinants of the decision to offshore or to outsource. Given data limitations, she 
uses an ownership threshold of 30 percent to distinguish outsourcing from offshoring investment. 
Using probit regressions, she finds that less capital intensive and more R&D intensive parent 
firms recur more to offshoring, i.e. intra-firm trade as sourcing strategy. She furthermore finds 
that the hold-up problem is important for the relationship between the parent and the supplier. If 
the supplier has no alternative purchaser for its products, then the supplier is more likely to be 
owned by the German parent.  
Further empirical studies relying on survey data of MNEs that assess intra-firm trade on the basis 
of more traditional trade models include Andersson and Fredriksson (2000), Egger and 
Pfaffermayr (2005), Hanson et al. (2005) and Yeaple (2006). These studies typically assess intra-
firm trade in relation to the activities of MNEs and not the share of intra-firm trade in total 
country trade. Andersson and Fredriksson (2000) analyse intra-firm trade in intermediate and 
finished products of Swedish MNEs applying Tobit regressions. They use parent, affiliate and 
host country variables to assess whether intra-firm trade in intermediates is more related to 
vertical integration and whether intra-firm trade in finished products is more related to horizontal 
integration. However, they find no support for the traditional factor proportions model since GDP 
per capita is positively correlated with the share of intra-firm trade in production for both 
intermediate and finished goods. Using intra-firm trade data of Austrian MNEs, Egger and 
Pfaffermayr (2005) find that markets size and unit labour costs are significant determinants of 
intra-firm exports as predicted by the Knowledge Capital Model (Markusen, 2002). Furthermore, 
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they find support for trade magnification effects, i.e. intra-firm imports and exports being 
complementary, as predicted by models of vertical specialisation (Yi, 2003). Yeaple (2006) 
investigates how the level of development of countries is related to the industry determinants of 
the share of intra-firm imports of U.S. parents from their affiliates in total U.S. imports. He finds 
that capital intensity is a significant determinant, especially for imports from developing and 
emerging countries. Furthermore, R&D intensity increases the share of intra-firm imports from 
emerging and developed countries. Also, he finds a positive impact of productivity dispersion on 
intra-firm trade. Hanson et al. (2005) analyse vertical production networks by assessing the 
determinants of intra-firm exports of intermediate inputs from U.S. parents to their foreign 
affiliates. They find that low trade costs, low wages for unskilled workers and a small host 
market increase the share of intra-firm trade in the revenues of affiliates. On the other hand, low 
wages for skilled workers decrease the share of intra-firm trade. 
4.3 Data on Intra-Firm Trade by Type of Good 
4.3.1 The Ownership Dimension 
In this paper, we use data on U.S. intra-firm imports at the Harmonized System 6-digit (HS6) 
level for the year 2000. Data stem from the related party database of the U.S. Census Bureau in 
which import transactions are recorded as occurring between related parties if either of the parties 
owns or controls 6 percent of the outstanding voting stock or shares.
52
 A drawback of the data is 
that no distinction is made between parent firms and affiliates, i.e. the data do not distinguish 
between imports where the U.S. importer is the parent firm and imports where the U.S. importer 
is the affiliate of a foreign parent firm. Data on intra-firm trade from the U.S. Census Bureau 
have also been used in the discussed papers of Nunn and Trefler (2008), Costinot et al. (2009) 
and Bernard et al. (2010). While Nunn and Trefler (2008) use the same level of aggregation as 
this paper, Costinot et al. (2009) use NAICS 4-digit level data and Bernard et al. (2010a) assess 
intra-firm imports at the HS10 level.  
4.3.2 The Main End Use Dimension 
The related party trade database of the U.S. Census Bureau distinguishes intra-firm and arm‟s 
length trade for all goods. We use the United Nation‟s Broad Economic Categories (BEC) 
classification to group imported commodities according to their main end use into intermediate 
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goods, capital goods and consumption goods.
53
 We use the official UN correspondence between 
HS 1996 and BEC to classify HS6 commodities as consumption goods, intermediate goods, 
capital goods and not classified goods. The correspondence is unique, i.e. each HS6 product 
corresponds to only one BEC category.
 
Table 4.1 reports the 19 basic goods categories identified 
by the BEC classification, of which eight represent intermediate goods, six are consumption 
goods and two cover capital goods. The three BEC categories Motor Spirit, Passenger Motor 
Cars and Goods Not Elsewhere Specified are not assigned a main end use because it may differ 
depending on the user. For instance, passenger motor cars are consumption goods if they are used 
by private households and capital goods if they are used by firms.  
Table 4.1: Classification by Broad Economic Categories and U.S. imports in 2000 
 
4.3.3 Intra-Firm Trade for Intermediates, Capital and Consumption Goods 
Table 4.2 provides an overview of the decomposition of U.S. imports along the dimensions of 
ownership and end use, i.e. intermediate, consumption, capital and not classified goods. It reports 
                                                     
53
 The BEC classification distinguishes these three basic classes of goods in concordance with the System 
of National Accounts. See UN(2007) for a more detailed description. Other studies using the BEC 
classification to assess trade in intermediate goods are Bergstrand and Egger (2009) and Miroudot et al. 
(2009). 
Classification by Broad Economic Categories (BEC) Main end use
Number of 
HS6 lines
Imports in 
Mill. USD
Total 
imports (%)
Intra-firm 
imports (%)
Arm's length 
imports (%)
1 Food and beverages
11 Primary
111 Mainly for industry Intermediate 52 5,378.5 0.5% 7.0% 92.9%
112 Mainly for household consumption Consumption 178 12,864.1 1.1% 18.1% 81.8%
12 Processed
121 Mainly for industry Intermediates 89 2,574.0 0.2% 27.1% 72.9%
122 Mainly for household consumption Consumption 244 24,216.6 2.1% 24.6% 75.0%
2 Industrial supplies not elsewhere specified
21 Primary Intermediate 297 11,287.9 1.0% 26.1% 73.7%
22 Processed Intermediate 2,313 223,895.9 19.4% 38.9% 60.9%
3 Fuels and lubricants
31 Primary Intermediate 9 71,021.4 6.1% 16.9% 68.1%
32 Processed
321 Motor spirit Not classified 1 32,646.6 2.8% 25.6% 74.4%
322 Other Intermediate 15 9,314.2 0.8% 21.9% 49.0%
41 Capital goods (except transport equipment) Capital 627 187,081.5 16.2% 59.9% 40.1%
42 Parts and accessories Intermediate 278 145,886.5 12.6% 62.0% 37.9%
5 Transport equipment, and parts and accessories thereof
51 Passenger motor cars Not classified 8 112,554.0 9.7% 95.2% 4.5%
52 Other
521 Industrial Capital 45 32,795.4 2.8% 56.9% 43.0%
522 Non-industrial Consumption 19 5,144.9 0.4% 54.5% 45.2%
53 Parts and accessories Intermediate 100 75,957.8 6.6% 54.4% 45.1%
6 Consumer goods not elsewhere specified
61 Durable Consumption 164 50,366.8 4.4% 43.0% 56.9%
62 Semi-durable Consumption 411 116,845.6 10.1% 16.2% 83.8%
63 Non-durable Consumption 219 35,460.6 3.1% 42.1% 57.8%
7 Goods not elsewhere specified Not classified 13 1,508.0 0.1% 13.0% 81.6%
4 Capital goods (except transport equipment), and parts 
and accessories thereof
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the number of traded HS commodities, imports in Millions USD, the share of the BEC category 
in total imports as well as the share of intra-firm and arm‟s lengths imports for the respective 
goods category.
54
 Table 4.1 reports the same statistics for the full BEC classification.  
Table 4.2: Decomposition of U.S. imports in 2000 by ownership and main end use  
 
Table 4.2 shows that intermediates dominate trade in terms of both number of goods traded and 
volume. Overall, the U.S. has imported goods falling under 5,082 HS6 lines. More than 60 
percent, that is 3,153 HS6 lines are classified as intermediates. There are only 1,235 and 672 
types of HS6 commodities that are used as consumption and capital goods respectively. Imports 
of the U.S. in 2000 amounted to a value of 1,156,801 Mill. USD. Almost half of the value of 
imports (47.1 percent) can be attributed to intermediate goods. Consumption and capital goods 
are clearly less relevant accounting for only 21.2 percent and 19 percent of imports respectively. 
Hence, the importance of intermediate goods in world trade clearly justifies a distinct analysis of 
intra-firm trade by type of goods. 
The share of intra-firm imports in total imports was 47.5 percent in 2000. However, the sole 
decomposition of goods into intra-firm and arm‟s length trade misses an important characteristic 
of intra-firm trade. That is, intra-firm trade is more prevalent in the case of intermediate and 
capital goods than for consumption goods. Capital goods are the category of goods which are 
traded most frequently between related parties with an intra-firm import share of almost 60 
percent. For intermediates, more imports are at arm‟s length (53.9 percent) than intra-firm (43.5 
percent). However, the comparison with consumption goods is still striking. Only 27.2 percent of 
consumption goods imports are intra-firm, while 72.7 percent of imports occur at arm‟s length. 
This discrepancy in the share of intra-firm trade between intermediates and capital goods on the 
one hand and consumption goods on the other hand underscores systematic differences in the 
characteristics of these goods. We argue in this paper that one difference is that intermediates and 
capital goods are more prone to the hold-up problem than consumption goods and have hence a 
higher share of intra-firm trade. 
                                                     
54
 The reported shares for intra-firm and arm‟s lengths imports do not sum up to 100 percent because for a 
small percentage of imports the ownership information is not available.  
Main end use   
(BEC classification)
Number of HS6 
lines
Imports in Mill. 
USD
Total imports 
(%)
Intra-firm 
imports (%)
Arm's length 
imports (%)
Total 5,082 1,156,801.0 100.0% 47.5% 51.2%
Intermediate 3,153 545,316.3 47.1% 43.5% 53.9%
Consumption 1,235 244,898.6 21.2% 27.2% 72.7%
Capital 672 219,876.8 19.0% 59.4% 40.5%
Not classified 22 146,708.7 12.7% 78.9% 20.9%
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Goods which are not classified in BEC terms, had an import share of 12.7 percent, most of which 
can be attributed to imports of Passenger motor cars as Table 4.1 shows. Despite consisting of 
only 8 HS6 lines, Passenger motor cars had a share of 9.7 percent in total U.S. imports in 2000. 
Even more striking is that 95.2 percent of these imports were intra-firm. This high share can be 
explained by the fact that car producers are typically large multinational firms with subsidiaries 
in host markets through which they import. 
4.3.4 Descriptive Statistics by Partner Country 
Table 4.3 in Appendix 4.A provides country detail of trade by BEC categories and intra-firm 
trade. The first three columns contain the number of traded HS6 lines, total exports of the country 
to the U.S. in 2000 and the share of intra-firm transactions in total exports. Columns 4-8 report 
the shares of intermediate, capital, consumption and not classified goods in a country‟s exports to 
the U.S. as well as the shares of intra-firm trade within these BEC categories. The table is sorted 
in descending order of the intra-firm trade share and includes 154 countries that exported more 
than 10 Mill. USD to the U.S. in 2000. To ensure presentational clarity, 70 countries with an 
export volume below 10 Mill. USD have not been included in the table. 
Across countries, the average share of intra-firm exports was 24 percent in 2000, which is clearly 
below the 47.5 percent overall intra-firm trade share of the U.S.. In 2000, the five largest 
exporters to the U.S. were Canada (214,271 Mill. USD), Japan (141,707 Mill. USD), Mexico 
(128,838 Mill. USD), China (98,443 Mill. USD) and Germany (55,643 Mill. USD). While the 
four OECD countries had all shares of intra-firm exports above the 24 percent sample average, 
only 18 percent of China‟s exports to the U.S. were between related parties. These two facts 
illustrate that developed countries with high trade volumes tend to engage more in intra-firm 
trade with the U.S. than developing countries. A natural explanation is that the data include not 
only intra-firm imports of U.S. parents but also intra-firm imports of U.S. affiliates from foreign 
parents. While many developing countries have only few multinational firms, rich industrialised 
countries have more multinational parents with subsidiaries in the U.S. For instance, Japan and 
Germany are big exporters of cars to the U.S. market, which can be seen by their export shares of 
24.5 percent and 28.6 percent in the BEC category “not classified” and the respective intra-firm 
trade shares of 92.5 percent for Japan and 93.3 percent for Germany.  
Another pattern is that less developed countries are more likely to have higher export shares in 
consumption goods. For instance, China‟s exports to the U.S. consist to a large part of 
consumption goods (56.7 percent) and only to a lesser extent of intermediate (22.9 percent) and 
capital goods (20.1 percent). Other Asian emerging economies that export relatively more 
consumption goods are India (47.4 percent), Vietnam (71.7 percent) and Indonesia (51.7 
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percent). These countries are more likely to be specialised in agriculture or textile products or in 
the assembly stage of the production process. 
4.3.5 Descriptive Statistics for 2-digit HS (HS2) Goods Groupings 
Table 4.4 provides information on U.S. imports at the HS2 level decomposed by BEC category 
and intra-firm trade. In addition, the third column shows the intermediation index of Bernard et 
al. (2010a) that captures the revealed contractibility of products. Bernard et al. (2010a) measure 
the contractibility of a product as the weighted average of the wholesale employment share of 
firms importing the product, using imports of firms as weights. Hence, product contractibility is 
increasing in the share of importing firms which are wholesale traders. Table 4.5 shows pairwise 
correlations of import shares of BEC categories at the HS2 level and the product contractibility of 
the respective HS2 category. While the correlation between product contractibility and the share 
of consumption goods in HS2 imports is significant and positive, there is a negative correlation 
between the index and the share of intermediates and capital goods in HS2 imports. Hence, the 
contractibility measure of Bernard et al. (2010a) is related to the type of good traded and lends 
support to our argument that intermediates and capital goods are more prone to the hold-up 
problem than consumption goods because they are traded in a different context.  
Table 4.5: Correlation between import shares of BEC categories and product contractibility 
 
Furthermore, distinguishing between intermediate and consumption goods provides further 
insight into some of the puzzling components in the index. Bernard et al. point out that some HS2 
product lines with a similar index value vary substantially in their intra-firm share. Table 4.4 
shows that Footwear (HS 64) and Organic Chemicals (HS 29) have a comparable level of 
intermediation - 0.136 and 0.135 respectively - but very different levels of intra-firm import 
shares, i.e. 6 percent for Footwear and 62 percent for Organic Chemicals. It is important to notice 
that Footwear consists to 100 percent of consumption goods, while the category Organic 
Chemicals consists to 100 percent of intermediate goods. Hence, the breakdown into 
intermediates and consumption goods can provide additional explanation of the pattern of intra-
firm trade.  
 
Share in HS2 imports Product Contractibility
Intermediate -0.147
Consumption 0.322
Capital -0.466
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4.4 Empirical Model 
We analyse the pattern of intra-firm trade at the HS6 level relying on country variables, product 
(industry) variables and the interaction of product (industry) and country characteristics. Our 
empirical estimation strategy follows closely Bernard et al. (2010a) in terms of variables used but 
also in terms of functional form, especially by considering both the extensive and the intensive 
margin of intra-firm trade. However, we are the first to distinguish intra-firm trade in 
intermediates and capital goods from intra-firm trade in consumption goods. We will use two 
estimation strategies to assess whether the determinants of intra-firm trade differ for intermediate, 
consumption and capital goods. First, we estimate empirical models separately by BEC category. 
Second, we use dummy variables in a pooled model to assess the impact of the type of good on 
intra-firm trade and whether the impact of explanatory variables differs depending on the type of 
good.  
4.4.1 Dependent Variables - Extensive and Intensive Margin 
The extensive margin relates to whether intra-firm trade takes place or not and is investigated 
using probit models. In probit regressions the dependent variable takes the form of a dummy     
that is one if there is intra-firm trade between the U.S. and the exporting country   in HS6 
product   t. If no trade is observed, the dummy is zero: 
    
                            
                           
  
The intensive margin of intra-firm imports relates to the volume of intra-firm trade relative to 
total trade and is assessed using OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the share of U.S. 
intra-firm imports in total U.S. imports of HS6 digit product   from country  :  
    
                   
               
                                
4.4.2 Basic Estimating Equation 
Since we use the same model specification for the extensive and intensive margin, we present 
models only once with     indicating the dependent variable. Hence,     denotes either     or     
depending on whether Probit or OLS regressions are used respectively. Then, we can write our 
empirical model as:  
                            (1) 
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where   is a constant,    are characteristics of NAICS6 industries  ,    are characteristics of the 
exporting country  ,      are interaction terms of industry and country characteristics and     
denotes the error term. More concretely, our basic empirical model includes the following main 
variables: 
                                                             
               (2) 
Following predictions of Antràs (2003) and Antràs and Helpman (2004), we include capital 
intensity          and skilled labour intensity        of industry   to proxy for headquarter 
intensity. Using data from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database for the year 2000, 
         is the natural log of the total real capital stock per worker and        is the share of non-
production workers in total employment.
55
 While intra-firm trade shares are observed at the HS6 
product level  , capital and skilled labour intensity are only available at the NAICS6 industry 
level  . To account for this difference in aggregation between dependent and explanatory 
variables, we estimate standard errors clustered at the NAICS6 level. A further drawback of 
industry intensities is that we cannot break down industry intensities by BEC category. Hence, 
we have to assume that within a NAICS industry all type of goods, i.e. intermediate, capital and 
consumption, have the same capital and skilled labour intensity. We address this issue in our 
robustness analysis, where we run regressions for homogenous industries consisting of either 
only consumption or intermediate goods. Following Helpman et al. (2004), we proxy for the 
productivity dispersion (dispersion) of firms in industry   using the standard deviation of the log 
of sales of firms in industry  . In the 1997 U.S. Census of Manufacturing, firm sales are 
aggregated according to 10 categories of firm sizes. Assuming that all firms within a size 
category have equal sales, we then calculate the size distribution of firms as the standard 
deviation of the log sales of the ten size categories using the number of firms in each category as 
weights.
56
 Antràs and Helpman (2004) predict that intra-firm trade should be higher for industries 
which have both a high dispersion and a high headquarter intensity.  
           is an indicator taken from the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators 2009 
and measures the quality of the rule of law, which comprises the quality of contract enforcement, 
of country   in the year 2000. Data on endowments of capital      and human capital       of 
                                                     
55
 Since industry intensities are available only for manufacturing industries, we do not use trade 
information on 63 non-manufacturing industries or 488 HS6 lines respectively. 
56
We deal with undisclosed sales data as follows. We merge two undisclosed size categories if they are 
neighbours in terms of size and allocate the remaining sales as inferred from the industry total to this newly 
merged category. We disregard undisclosed sales of an industry, if the industry has three or more 
undisclosed sales observations or if in the case of two undisclosed observations, the respective categories 
are not neighbours. 
  
 INTRA-FIRM TRADE IN INTERMEDIATE GOODS 
113 
 
country   are taken from Hall and Jones (1999) and are measured by the natural logs of the capital 
stock per worker and the human capital stock per worker for the year 1988.
57
    denotes a set of 
additional country variables. These additional controls are population (     ) from the World 
Bank Indicators 2010 as a measure for country size and restrictiveness indices of trade 
(         ) and investment (              ) taken from the Heritage Foundation Economic 
Freedom Indices. Summary statistics for explanatory variables are reported in Table 4.6. Table 
4.7 in Appendix 4.A provides the respective correlation matrix.  
Table 4.6: Summary statistics of explanatory variables 
 
Besides investigating the separate impact of industry and country characteristics, we follow 
Bernard et al. (2010a) and include interactions of industry and country variables (    ). 
Concretely, we include interactions of capital intensity with capital abundance and skilled labour 
intensity with human capital abundance. In order to increase the interpretability of coefficients, 
we subtract the sample mean from industry and country variables that are used in interaction 
terms. For instance, the capital interaction term allows to test whether the effect of the capital 
intensity of industries on intra-firm trade is more or less pronounced for capital abundant 
exporting countries. By demeaning variables that enter interaction terms, coefficients indicate the 
marginal effect of capital intensity for a country with average capital abundance instead of a 
capital abundance of zero. 
 
                                                     
57
 Using capital stocks from Hall and Jones(1999) leads to a loss of 109 mostly small countries but 
including also the following economically more relevant economies: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Kuwait, 
Qatar, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates and Vietnam. 
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
capital 375 11.456 0.860 9.547 14.299
skilled labour 375 0.284 0.113 0.087 0.682
Dispersion 375 1.624 0.388 0.213 3.047
RuleofLaw 109 0.027 1.045 -2.267 1.925
K/L 109 9.258 1.569 5.763 11.589
H/L 109 0.587 0.292 0.072 1.215
Population 109 16.300 1.545 12.436 20.956
HFI_trade 109 0.389 0.179 0.100 0.850
HFI_investment 109 0.428 0.177 0.100 0.900
capital x K/L 20,665 0.101 1.079 -11.018 8.452
skilled labour x H/L 20,665 0.0005 0.030 -0.287 0.163
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4.4.3 Testing for Differences between Intermediates, Capital and Consumption 
Goods 
We start our analysis by estimating equation (2) for all goods in line with Bernard et al. (2010a) 
and compare results to separate regressions for intermediate, consumption and capital goods. This 
allows us to assess whether explanatory variables, especially contract enforcement and 
headquarter intensities, have the same qualitative impact on intra-firm trade
58
. However, to test 
more thoroughly whether intermediates are more affected by the hold-up problem than 
consumption goods, we pool data and introduce dummies intermediate goods      and capital 
goods      in regressions. First, we include only simple dummies      and      to test whether 
there are significant differences in intra-firm trade between intermediate and capital goods 
relative to consumption goods. Second, we interact the dummies      and      with 
           to test our main prediction: If the hold-up problem is more severe in the case of 
intermediates and capital goods, then the contracting environment will be more important for 
these goods than for consumption goods. Third, to test for further differences in the determinants 
of intra-firm trade across goods types, we interact      and      with intensities, endowments 
and interaction variables of capital and human capital. The general regression specification 
becomes then the following: 
                                                                 
                                                             (3) 
4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Separate Regressions for Intermediate, Capital and Consumption Goods  
Table 4.8 reports the results of regression model (2) for the share of intra-firm imports in overall 
imports, i.e. including all good types (columns 1-2), and separate regressions for the shares of 
intra-firm trade in intermediate, consumption and capital goods (columns 3-8). Results of Probit 
and OLS regressions show the impact of variables on the extensive and the intensive margin of 
intra-firm imports respectively. Since data and estimation specification follow closely Bernard et 
al. (2010a and 2010b), results for intra-firm trade not differentiated by goods category of columns 
1 and 2 are very similar, so that we will not describe them in too much detail. While also results 
                                                     
58
 In a similar spirit, Bernard et al. (2010b) test the robustness of their results by estimating their model on 
a subset of goods, i.e. excluding finished goods, using the HTS Imports Index of Sitchinava (2008). 
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for intermediate goods, consumption goods and capital goods are qualitatively similar, there are 
some important differences we will focus on.  
Table 4.8: Extensive (Probit) and intensive (OLS) margin by BEC category 
 
A country‟s rule of law is our variable of main interest, since it measures the quality of contract 
enforcement in the country and consequently the extent to which the hold-up problem is relevant. 
Column 1 shows that the higher the rule of law of the exporting country, the higher the 
probability that there is intra-firm trade with the U.S. for a given product. This is not surprising, 
as a higher rule of law can be associated with more investment security and hence U.S. 
multinational firms are more likely to invest. However, once a firm has invested and hence intra-
firm trade is taking place, further improvements in the rule of law decrease the share of intra-firm 
trade (column 2). This result is in line with predictions of transaction cost theories. The better the 
Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
RuleofLaw 0.223*** -0.024*** 0.226*** -0.021** 0.170*** -0.011 0.298*** -0.064***
(0.015) (0.006) (0.021) (0.008) (0.021) (0.008) (0.029) (0.009)
capital -0.124*** 0.079*** -0.129*** 0.077*** -0.208*** 0.038*** -0.194*** 0.062***
(0.022) (0.005) (0.032) (0.006) (0.034) (0.010) (0.074) (0.013)
K/L 0.167*** 0.069*** 0.275*** 0.061*** 0.032** 0.070*** 0.175*** 0.065***
(0.016) (0.006) (0.025) (0.009) (0.015) (0.007) (0.029) (0.009)
capital x K/L 0.073*** 0.004 0.023 0.018*** 0.040*** -0.008* -0.048 -0.016
(0.012) (0.005) (0.015) (0.006) (0.013) (0.005) (0.032) (0.011)
skilled labour 1.286*** 0.292*** 1.812*** 0.259*** 0.597* 0.243*** 0.385 0.106**
(0.256) (0.050) (0.423) (0.084) (0.305) (0.082) (0.261) (0.054)
H/L 0.035 -0.139*** 0.023 -0.151*** 0.066 -0.089*** 0.022 -0.212***
(0.040) (0.015) (0.044) (0.023) (0.087) (0.022) (0.065) (0.032)
skilled labour x H/L 0.879*** -0.597*** 0.228 -0.437*** 0.355 0.011 1.088** -0.367**
(0.313) (0.101) (0.345) (0.134) (0.667) (0.160) (0.468) (0.158)
Dispersion 0.073 0.013 0.101 0.012 0.058 0.048** 0.389*** 0.003
(0.105) (0.022) (0.134) (0.029) (0.087) (0.024) (0.148) (0.021)
Population 0.242*** -0.046*** 0.227*** -0.044*** 0.260*** -0.058*** 0.277*** -0.043***
(0.007) (0.002) (0.010) (0.004) (0.011) (0.003) (0.011) (0.004)
HFI_trade -1.004*** 0.234*** -0.578*** 0.174*** -1.334*** 0.304*** -1.673*** 0.231***
(0.087) (0.026) (0.125) (0.039) (0.090) (0.034) (0.157) (0.054)
HFI_investment 0.248*** 0.009 0.301*** -0.035 0.034 0.077*** 0.622*** 0.011
(0.049) (0.019) (0.062) (0.030) (0.085) (0.026) (0.085) (0.029)
Constant -4.119*** 1.136*** -4.034*** 1.178*** -4.243*** 1.114*** -5.088*** 1.194***
(0.217) (0.062) (0.262) (0.094) (0.232) (0.067) (0.342) (0.078)
Pseudo R-squared 0.089 0.1 0.073 0.104
R-squared 0.099 0.084 0.083 0.045
Observations 130,010 71,999 67,088 38,199 42,439 21,010 20,483 12,790
Countries 109 104 108 99 108 97 107 87
HS6 Goods 4,574 4,421 2,845 2,733 1,059 1,024 670 664
NAICS6 Industries 375 375 310 309 161 161 111 111
All Intermediate Consumption Capital
Notes: Regressions are run including all goods and seperately  for intermediate, consumption and capital goods. The 
dependent variable in probit regressions is a dummy indicating whether there is intra-firm trade in a HS6 product between 
two countries or not, while in OLS regressions it is the share of intrafirm trade if the latter is positive. All variables entering 
interactions terms have been centered at the mean so that coefficients of main effects can be interpreted at sample means. 
Robust standard errors clustered at the 6-digit NAICS level are reported in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
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rule of law, the more contracts are complete and hence the less severe is the potential hold-up 
problem between the two parties. The costs associated with incomplete contracts decrease 
relatively to the costs of integration. Therefore, better contract enforcement reduces integration 
and intra-firm trade. Columns 4 and 8 show that the respective coefficient of rule of law is also 
negative and significant for intermediates and capital goods. However, in the case of 
consumption goods (column 6), the coefficient is very small and not significant. Hence, an 
improvement in the rule of law will diminish the share of intra-firm trade for intermediate and 
capital goods but it will not affect the share of intra-firm trade for consumption goods. This 
indicates that the hold-up problem is less severe in the final good producer-distributor 
relationship (consumption goods) than in the final good producer-supplier relationship 
(intermediate and capital goods).  
At the intensive margin (column 2), the capital intensity of industries and capital abundance of 
countries significantly increase the share of intra-firm trade confirming Antràs (2003). 
Interestingly, the size in coefficients for capital intensity is clearly smaller for consumption goods 
than for intermediate and capital goods. This might indicate that headquarter intensity as proxied 
by the capital intensity is less important for the decision on whether to integrate or not in the case 
of consumption goods. Furthermore, the effect of the interaction term is different for intermediate 
and consumption goods. The positive impact of capital intensive industries on intra-firm trade is 
stronger in capital abundant countries for intermediates, while it is weaker in capital abundant 
countries for consumption goods.  
As capital intensity, skilled labour intensity proxies headquarter intensity and is associated with 
significantly higher intra-firm trade at both the extensive (column 1) and intensive margin 
(column 2) confirming the model of Antràs and Helpman (2004) and findings of Nunn and 
Trefler (2008). The human capital abundance of countries has no significant impact on the 
probability of intra-firm trade to occur, but it decreases intra-firm imports once affiliates are 
established. This negative relationship between human capital abundance and the intensive 
margin of intra-firm trade is found for all three types of goods. The respective interaction term in 
column 2 between skill intensity and human capital abundance is significant and negative 
indicating that the positive effect of skill intensive industries on the share of intra-firm trade is 
even stronger for skill scarce countries. A possible explanation might be that if headquarter 
services can be provided at low cost across borders, firms may choose to integrate in human 
capital scarce countries in order to be able to provide necessary skilled labour services from the 
headquarters at home. Differently, in human capital abundant countries the workforce is more 
skilled and services can be provided locally so that no integration with the foreign final good 
producer is necessary. While this negative effect of the interaction term is also found in 
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regression using only intermediate or capital goods, the interaction term is positively signed but 
not significant in the case of consumption goods.  
Separate regressions for intermediates, consumption and capital goods have shown some 
distinguishing features through differences in significance and signs of coefficients. However, in 
this setting, we cannot test whether coefficients of explanatory variables are significantly 
different for intermediate, consumption and capital goods. To do so, we proceed in the next 
section to estimate equation (3) using dummies for intermediates and capital goods and 
interactions thereof with explanatory variables. 
4.5.2 Pooled Regressions including Intermediate and Capital Goods Dummies 
Table 4.9 reports regression results for pooled data including dummies for intermediates and 
capital goods and interactions thereof with explanatory variables. Columns 1 and 2 correspond to 
equation (1) but include additionally an intermediate dummy and a capital good dummy. In 
columns 3 and 4 the interaction of these dummies with the rule of law variable are added and 
columns 5 and 6 correspond to estimating equation (3) with dummies being interacted 
furthermore with capital and human capital variables. 
Results in columns 1 and 2 show that the pattern of intra-firm trade is significantly different for 
consumption, intermediate and capital goods. The coefficient of the intermediate dummy is 
significant and positive for both the extensive (column 1) and the intensive margin (column 2). 
Hence, the probability of intra-firm taking place between the exporting country and the U.S. is 
significantly higher for an intermediate good as compared to consumption goods. Furthermore, if 
there is intra-firm trade for a good, the share of intra-firm trade tends to be significantly higher 
for both intermediate and capital goods as compared to consumption goods.  
To test whether contract enforcement is more important for intermediates and capital goods, we 
interact the rule of law variable with the respective dummies. Improvements in the contracting 
environment increase the extensive margin of intra-firm trade, i.e. the probability of intra-firm 
trade to occur (column 3). This effect is stronger for both intermediate and capital goods as 
compared to consumption goods. Hence, a sound contracting environment is more important for 
intermediate and capital goods than for consumption goods in the decision to set up a foreign 
affiliate.  
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Table 4.9: Extensive (Probit) and intensive (OLS) margin using BEC dummies 
 
Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dint 0.111* 0.066*** 0.122** 0.062*** 0.175*** 0.076***
(0.061) (0.013) (0.062) (0.013) (0.049) (0.013)
Dcap 0.065 0.084*** 0.063 0.087*** 0.192*** 0.109***
(0.057) (0.012) (0.058) (0.011) (0.051) (0.012)
RuleofLaw 0.221*** -0.026*** 0.101*** 0.001 0.169*** -0.007
(0.015) (0.006) (0.019) (0.007) (0.020) (0.008)
Dint x RuleofLaw 0.176*** -0.028*** 0.059** -0.017
(0.017) (0.007) (0.029) (0.011)
Dcap x RuleofLaw 0.221*** -0.076*** 0.126*** -0.061***
(0.022) (0.009) (0.033) (0.012)
capital -0.150*** 0.068*** -0.150*** 0.067*** -0.208*** 0.040***
(0.024) (0.006) (0.024) (0.006) (0.035) (0.009)
Dint x capital 0.075 0.035***
(0.048) (0.012)
Dcap x capital 0.068 0.023
(0.078) (0.015)
K/L 0.165*** 0.066*** 0.167*** 0.065*** 0.077*** 0.059***
(0.017) (0.006) (0.018) (0.006) (0.016) (0.007)
Dint x K/L 0.161*** -0.002
(0.025) (0.010)
Dcap x K/L 0.108*** 0.001
(0.029) (0.010)
capital x K/L 0.075*** 0.006 0.049*** 0.010** 0.040*** -0.007
(0.011) (0.005) (0.010) (0.004) (0.013) (0.004)
Dint x (capitalx K/L) -0.019 0.025***
(0.019) (0.007)
Dcap x (capital x K/L) -0.092** -0.009
(0.036) (0.012)
skilled labour 1.270*** 0.219*** 1.287*** 0.215*** 0.659** 0.219***
(0.288) (0.058) (0.289) (0.058) (0.311) (0.081)
Dint x skilled labour 1.185** 0.049
(0.568) (0.129)
Dcap x skilled labour -0.189 -0.112
(0.411) (0.099)
H/L 0.034 -0.142*** 0.032 -0.143*** 0.137 -0.100***
(0.040) (0.015) (0.039) (0.016) (0.096) (0.022)
Dint x H/L -0.16 -0.043
(0.101) (0.031)
Dcap x H/L -0.208* -0.079**
(0.117) (0.039)
skilled labour x H/L 0.892*** -0.589*** 0.337 -0.352*** 0.345 0.02
(0.323) (0.098) (0.267) (0.097) (0.673) (0.161)
Dint x (skilled labour x H/L) -0.169 -0.442**
(0.761) (0.209)
Dcap x (skilled labour x H/L) 0.703 -0.385*
(0.803) (0.224)
Dispersion 0.078 0.013 0.082 0.011 0.116 0.018
(0.113) (0.023) (0.114) (0.023) (0.100) (0.022)
Population 0.240*** -0.046*** 0.246*** -0.048*** 0.247*** -0.048***
(0.007) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002)
HFI_trade -1.005*** 0.223*** -1.013*** 0.223*** -1.029*** 0.227***
(0.088) (0.025) (0.088) (0.025) (0.086) (0.025)
HFI_investment 0.252*** 0.011 0.238*** 0.012 0.248*** 0.011
(0.049) (0.019) (0.050) (0.019) (0.050) (0.019)
Constant -3.976*** 1.078*** -4.080*** 1.110*** -4.227*** 1.087***
(0.239) (0.067) (0.242) (0.067) (0.208) (0.062)
Pseudo R-squared 0.09 0.093 0.096
R-squared 0.105 0.108 0.11
Observations 130,010 71,999 130,010 71,999 130,010 71,999
Notes: The dependent variable in probit regressions is a dummy indicating whether there is intra-firm trade in a HS6 
product between two countries or not, while in OLS regressions it is the share of intrafirm trade if the latter is positive. 
All variables entering interactions terms have been centered at the mean so that coefficients of main effects can be 
interpreted at sample means. Robust standard errors clustered at the 6-digit NAICS level are reported in brackets. * 
significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
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Column 4 shows that an improvement in a country‟s rule of law has no significant impact on the 
share of intra-firm trade for consumption goods, but it decreases significantly the share of intra-
firm trade for intermediates and capital goods. Hence, intermediates and capital goods differ 
significantly from consumption goods in their reaction to improvements in contract enforcement, 
which indicates that these goods are more prone to the hold-up problem than consumption goods. 
This result is closely related to the findings of Bernard et al. (2010a) and Nunn and Trefler 
(2008). Bernard et al. (2010a) interact an index of revealed product contractibility with a measure 
of a country‟s governance quality and find that intra-firm trade is higher for products with limited 
contractibility. We have shown in the descriptive section that their contractibility index is closely 
related to a good being an intermediate or a consumption goods. Hence, an alternative 
interpretation could be that intermediate goods have a lower revealed contractibility than 
consumption goods. Nunn and Trefler (2008) interact a measure of the relationship-specificity of 
industries from Nunn (2007) with a country‟s rule of law. Their opposite finding of a slightly 
positive relationship of relationship-specificity of industries in countries with good rule of law on 
the share of intra-firm trade can be explained by property rights models (see Antràs and 
Helpman, 2008) but might be also a result from the fact that they did not deal separately with the 
extensive and intensive margin of intra-firm trade. 
In column 5 and 6, we test whether industry and country characteristics have a different impact 
on intra-firm trade depending on the type of good. Two results are worth highlighting. First, in 
column 6 intuitive findings from separate regressions can be confirmed. While intra-firm trade 
shares are higher in capital intensive industries, this effect is significantly stronger for 
intermediate goods. Furthermore, intermediate goods also differ significantly from consumption 
goods regarding the interaction of industry and country characteristics. The capital intensity of 
industries increases intra-firm trade. In the case of consumption goods, the effects tends to be 
stronger if the country is capital scarce, while for intermediates the relationship is stronger if the 
country is capital abundant. Similarly, regarding the interaction between skill intensity and 
human capital abundance, intermediates and capital goods differ significantly from consumption 
goods.  
4.5.3 Robustness Analysis 
Next, we assess the robustness of results using three different sets of regressions. Table 4.10 
reports results for these robustness regressions using the most extensive specification of equation 
3. In columns 1 and 2 regressions include a joint intermediate and capital goods dummy, i.e. the 
dummy is one if the HS6 good is either an intermediate or a capital good and 0 in the case of a 
consumption good. Intermediate and capital goods are both used in the production process by a 
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firm and capital goods might also be tailored to the needs of the acquiring final goods firms. 
Hence, the hold-up problem arises in the same context for intermediates and capital goods and 
might be evaluated jointly against the pattern of consumption goods. Columns 3 and 4 present 
results for homogeneous industries only. With homogeneous industries we mean industries that 
produce either only intermediates or only consumption goods. Since capital and skilled labour 
intensities cannot be distinguished according to goods type, in other regressions we have to 
assume that within a NAICS industry intermediate goods, capital goods and consumption goods 
are all produced with the same capital and skilled labour intensity. By looking only at the subset 
of homogenous industries, we assess whether this assumption matters for results. Finally, we also 
run regressions for a subsample of intermediates and consumption goods (columns 5 and 6). For 
intermediates, we include only parts and accessories of capital goods and transport equipment as 
they better represent inputs frequently utilised in international production networks, and exclude 
thereby intermediates derived from oil for instance. Furthermore, we restrict consumption goods 
to the BEC category consumption goods not elsewhere specified (durables, semi-durables and 
non-durables) and do not consider food and beverages as well as consumption goods related to 
transport equipment. 
Main results are robust across all three models. First, the share of intra-firm trade is significantly 
higher for intermediates than for consumption goods. The joint intermediate-capital dummy in 
columns 1 and 2 as well as the intermediate dummy in the regression for parts and accessories 
columns and consumption goods n.e.s. (columns 5 and 6) are positive and significant for both the 
extensive and intensive margin of intra-firm trade. Furthermore, in the case of homogeneous 
industries, intermediate goods are traded significantly more intra-firm as compared to 
consumption goods (column 4). 
Also the second main finding regarding the importance of the contracting environment is 
supported. The impact of the rule of law variable on the share of intra-firm trade is not significant 
(column 2 and 6) or even positive for consumption goods (4). The interaction term between rule 
of law and the intermediate dummy is significant and negative in all three regressions for the 
intensive margin. Hence, better contract enforcement increases outsourcing as measured by arm‟s 
length trade as compared to intra-firm trade for intermediates but not or not to a similar extent for 
consumption goods. This indicates that the hold-up problem is indeed more a problem in the 
context of intermediates than of consumption goods.  
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Table 4.10: Using a joint intermediate-capital dummy and different industry subsamples 
 
Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dint 0.154*** 0.083*** 0.002 0.075*** 0.380*** 0.111***
(0.049) (0.012) (0.094) (0.024) (0.054) (0.013)
RuleofLaw 0.169*** -0.007 0.212*** 0.027*** 0.191*** -0.011
(0.020) (0.008) (0.025) (0.006) (0.022) (0.009)
Dint x RuleofLaw 0.073*** -0.027*** -0.013 -0.029** 0.204*** -0.065***
(0.027) (0.010) (0.038) (0.012) (0.030) (0.012)
capital -0.202*** 0.040*** -0.163*** 0.052*** -0.113*** 0.051***
(0.036) (0.010) (0.052) (0.015) (0.035) (0.013)
Dintx capital 0.092** 0.030*** 0.085 0.015 0.06 -0.023
(0.045) (0.011) (0.075) (0.020) (0.077) (0.019)
K/L 0.078*** 0.059*** 0.115*** 0.031** 0.049*** 0.066***
(0.016) (0.007) (0.029) (0.015) (0.017) (0.008)
Dint x K/L 0.152*** 0 0.138*** 0.004 0.173*** 0.01
(0.022) (0.009) (0.040) (0.019) (0.032) (0.010)
capital x K/L 0.040*** -0.007 0.060*** -0.007 0.060*** -0.010*
(0.013) (0.004) (0.019) (0.009) (0.019) (0.006)
Dint x (capitalx K/L) -0.024 0.027*** -0.027 0.029*** -0.166*** -0.006
(0.019) (0.007) (0.026) (0.011) (0.037) (0.016)
skilled labour 0.628** 0.218*** 0.763* 0.138 0.560* 0.264***
(0.309) (0.081) (0.427) (0.103) (0.332) (0.095)
Dint x skilled labour 0.754 0.036 0.864 0.267 -0.182 -0.378***
(0.502) (0.116) (0.877) (0.201) (0.402) (0.111)
H/L 0.138 -0.100*** -0.149 -0.106*** 0.073 -0.097***
(0.096) (0.022) (0.107) (0.030) (0.104) (0.022)
Dint x H/L -0.155 -0.044 0.109 -0.041 -0.359*** 0.003
(0.099) (0.028) (0.118) (0.049) (0.124) (0.032)
skilled labour x H/L 0.366 0.021 -0.824 0.042 -0.07 -0.293
(0.674) (0.161) (0.806) (0.153) (0.803) (0.187)
Dint x (skilled labour x H/L) 0.102 -0.594*** 0.24 -0.468* 1.195 -0.212
(0.730) (0.189) (0.959) (0.275) (0.962) (0.237)
Dispersion 0.08 0.016 0.045 0.018 0.118* 0.054***
(0.111) (0.023) (0.119) (0.027) (0.067) (0.016)
Population 0.246*** -0.048*** 0.235*** -0.050*** 0.275*** -0.056***
(0.007) (0.002) (0.011) (0.004) (0.010) (0.002)
HFI_trade -1.018*** 0.224*** -0.806*** 0.170*** -1.243*** 0.288***
(0.087) (0.025) (0.137) (0.037) (0.078) (0.031)
HFI_investment 0.244*** 0.011 -0.01 -0.027 0.155* 0.068***
(0.049) (0.019) (0.068) (0.033) (0.081) (0.020)
Constant -4.152*** 1.084*** -3.832*** 1.162*** -4.490*** 1.107***
(0.225) (0.066) (0.262) (0.097) (0.207) (0.048)
Pseudo R-squared 0.095 0.083 0.111
R-squared 0.108 0.151 0.122
Observations 130,010 71,999 60,209 32,544 54,383 31,578
Countries 109 104 109 101 108 98
HS6 Goods 4,574 4,421 2,324 2,242 1,149 1,136
NAICS6 Industries 375 375 194 194 217 217
Notes:  In columns 1-2, the dummy Dint is one if the HS6 good is either an intermediate or a capital good. In columns 3-
6 only intermediate and consumption goods enter the regressions and therefore Dint is a simple intermediate good 
dummy. Homogeneous industries are industries that import either only intermediates or only consumption goods. Parts 
and accessories include BEC categories 42 (for capital goods) and 53 (for transport equipment), while the selected 
consumption categories are  61 (durable), 62 (semi-durable) and 63 (non-durable). All variables entering interactions 
terms have been centered at the mean so that coefficients of main effects can be interpreted at sample means. Robust 
standard errors clustered at the 6-digit NAICS level are reported in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
Joint intermediate-capital 
dummy
Homogeneous industries 
only
Parts and accessories vs. 
consumption goods n.e.s.
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Also other results are similar to findings presented in column 6 of Table 4.9. High capital and 
human capital stocks are associated with high and low shares of intra-firm trade in all three 
models (columns 2, 4 and 6). Furthermore, both measures of headquarter intensity of industries, 
capital and skilled labour, have a positive impact on the intensive margin of intra-firm trade in all 
regressions. A noteworthy difference is that while the positive effect of capital intensity on intra-
firm trade is found to be stronger for intermediates also in the case of a joint intermediate-capital 
dummy (column 2), the effect is not significant anymore in the industry subsamples of columns 4 
and 6.  
As a further robustness test we address the issue of the inclusion of both U.S. parents and of U.S. 
affiliates of foreign parents in trade data. Table 4.11 presents results for equation (3) for two 
country subsamples
59
. In column 1 and 2, we follow Nunn and Trefler (2008) and include only 
countries for which at least two-thirds of intra-firm U.S. imports are imported from U.S. parents 
as indicated by MNE data for 1997 from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. In columns 3 and 4, 
we use the World Bank country classification and exclude high-income countries of the year 
2000. Main results are confirmed also for these two subsamples of countries. Intra-firm trade is 
significantly higher for intermediate and capital goods relative to consumption goods. 
Furthermore, the impact of a country‟s rule of law on intra-firm trade is significantly different at 
both the extensive and intensive margin for intermediate and capital goods as compared to 
consumption goods.  
Finally, Table 4.11 also reports results for OLS regressions including HS6 product and country 
fixed effects. In all three specifications (columns 5-7), the intermediate goods dummy is now 
negatively signed but also not significant. Hence, much of the explanatory power of the simple 
dummies is now captured by product fixed effects. However, the main result is still confirmed, 
namely that improvements in a country‟s rule of law lead to stronger reductions in the share of 
intra-firm imports for intermediate and capital goods as compared to consumption goods. 
Furthermore, column 7 confirms findings of Table 4.9 that intermediate goods differ significantly 
from consumption goods regarding the interaction of capital intensity and capital abundance.  
  
                                                     
59
 Some control variables are omitted in the table due to space constraints. 
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Table 4.11: Using different country samples and product and country fixed effects 
  
Probit OLS Probit OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dint 0.073 0.097*** 0.003 0.120*** -0.044 -0.151 -0.045
(0.046) (0.012) (0.047) (0.015) (0.430) (0.429) (0.429)
Dcap 0.096* 0.170*** 0.045 0.222*** -0.773* -0.168 -0.523
(0.051) (0.016) (0.049) (0.019) (0.429) (0.427) (0.427)
RuleofLaw 0.073*** -0.043*** 0.027 -0.030***
(0.021) (0.009) (0.021) (0.009)
Dint x RuleofLaw 0.144*** -0.049*** 0.128*** -0.030** -0.037*** -0.028***
(0.030) (0.013) (0.031) (0.015) (0.004) (0.004)
Dcap x RuleofLaw 0.195*** -0.130*** 0.065* -0.080*** -0.091*** -0.080***
(0.035) (0.016) (0.039) (0.016) (0.005) (0.005)
capital -0.186*** 0.059*** -0.203*** 0.055***
(0.032) (0.011) (0.036) (0.014)
Dint x capital 0.073 -0.012 0.088* -0.018
(0.048) (0.014) (0.050) (0.016)
Dcap x capital 0.065 0.019 0.141* 0.029
(0.083) (0.026) (0.084) (0.030)
K/L 0.108*** 0.040*** 0.024 0.038***
(0.022) (0.011) (0.017) (0.008)
Dint x K/L 0.212*** 0.007 0.166*** 0.012
(0.030) (0.012) (0.023) (0.010)
Dcap x K/L 0.204*** 0.028** 0.084*** 0.023**
(0.038) (0.014) (0.029) (0.011)
capital x K/L 0.098*** -0.001 0.061*** -0.003 -0.003* 0.001 -0.021***
(0.019) (0.005) (0.014) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Dint x (capitalx K/L) -0.089*** 0.019* -0.015 0.001 0.036***
(0.027) (0.010) (0.022) (0.011) (0.003)
Dcap x (capital x K/L) -0.146*** -0.003 -0.041 0.002 0.015*
(0.054) (0.017) (0.047) (0.015) (0.008)
skilled labour 0.642** 0.190** 0.524 0.235**
(0.270) (0.093) (0.319) (0.104)
Dint x skilled labour 0.773 0.157 0.991 0.102
(0.588) (0.112) (0.616) (0.132)
Dcap x skilled labour -0.532 -0.089 -0.389 -0.115
(0.394) (0.118) (0.416) (0.135)
H/L 0.459*** 0.048* 0.334*** -0.015
(0.088) (0.028) (0.086) (0.029)
Dint x H/L -0.770*** -0.140*** -0.489*** -0.171***
(0.114) (0.044) (0.103) (0.039)
Dcap x H/L -0.429** -0.210*** -0.071 -0.277***
(0.170) (0.063) (0.129) (0.056)
skilled labour x H/L 0.17 0.052 -0.315 0.045 -0.671*** -0.410*** -0.301***
(0.745) (0.221) (0.731) (0.324) (0.050) (0.052) (0.113)
Dint x (skilled labour x H/L) -0.954 -0.226 -0.901 -0.934** -0.172
(0.930) (0.348) (0.871) (0.382) (0.134)
Dcap x (skilled labour x H/L) -0.816 -0.314 0.515 0.029 -0.086
(1.100) (0.310) (0.965) (0.389) (0.153)
Pseudo R-squared 0.084 0.05
R-squared 0.17 0.186 0.322 0.325 0.327
Observations 50,472 23,185 56,417 24,063 130,346 72,144 72,144
Countries 75 70 81 76
Excluding countries with 
many parent firms 
Excluding high-income 
countries
Full sample using product and country 
fixed effects
Notes: The dependent variable in probit regressions is a dummy indicating whether there is intra-firm trade in a HS6 product 
between two countries or not, while in OLS regressions it is the share of intra-firm trade if the latter is positive. Columns 1 and 
2 include countries for which the share of U.S. parents in intra-firm imports is  2/3. In columns 3 and 4, high-income countries 
are excluded. All variables entering interactions terms have been centered at the mean so that coefficients of main effects can 
be interpreted at sample means. Robust standard errors clustered at the 6-digit NAICS level are reported in brackets. * 
significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.
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4.6 Conclusions 
In this paper, we distinguish intra-firm trade in intermediates, intra-firm trade in capital goods 
and intra-firm trade in consumption goods. By making this distinction between intermediates and 
other good types, we are able to test more accurately theoretical models focusing on incomplete 
contracts and intra-firm trade. We show that the pattern of intra-firm trade differs significantly 
between intermediates and capital goods on the one hand, and final consumption goods on the 
other hand. The share of intra-firm trade in total trade is significantly higher for intermediate and 
capital goods as compared to consumption goods. We furthermore find that a main factor driving 
these differences is that intermediates and capital goods are more sensitive to the hold-up 
problem as compared to consumption goods. In particular, we find that improvements in the 
contracting environment of a country cause larger reductions in the shares of intra-firm trade of 
intermediates and capital goods compared to consumption goods. This result suggests that 
intermediates and capital goods require more relationship-specific investments of contracting 
parties as compared to consumption goods. A related explanation is that intermediate, capital and 
consumption goods are traded in a different context. While intermediates and capital goods are 
mainly traded between a final good producer and a supplier, much of trade in final goods is 
taking place between the final good producer and a distributor, i.e. a retailer or a wholesale 
trader. We further support our arguments by providing correlations between the three good types 
and the index of product contractibility of Bernard et al. (2010a), which they measure as the 
average wholesale employment share of firms importing the product. 
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Appendix 4.A: Tables 
Table 4.7: Correlation matrix of explanatory variables 
RuleofLaw capital K/L capital x K/L skilled labour H/L skill. lab. x H/L Dispersion Population HFI_trade HFI_invest.
RuleofLaw 1
capital 0.118 1
K/L 0.815 0.134 1
capital x K/L -0.084 -0.011 -0.131 1
skilled labour 0.083 0.231 0.081 -0.017 1
H/L 0.787 0.113 0.740 -0.102 0.083 1
skilled labour x H/L -0.045 -0.013 -0.058 0.192 0.034 -0.052 1
Dispersion 0.019 0.259 0.021 -0.029 -0.090 0.011 -0.002 1
Population -0.351 0.091 -0.372 -0.042 -0.019 -0.311 -0.015 0.026 1
HFI_trade -0.660 -0.055 -0.738 0.042 -0.045 -0.638 0.025 -0.011 0.536 1
HFI_investment -0.291 0.005 -0.363 0.045 -0.021 -0.322 -0.002 0.001 0.455 0.549 1
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Table 4.3: Countries (part 1/4) 
 
Country
Number of 
HS6 lines
Imports in 
Mill.s
 Intra-firm 
(%)
Inter-mediate 
(%)
Intra-firm in 
Intermediates 
(%)  
Consumption 
(%)
Intra-firm in 
Consumption(
%) 
Capital (%)
Intra-firm in 
Capital  (%) 
Not class.
Intra-firm in 
Not class. (%) 
Lesotho 26 140.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Palau 13 13.5 0.0 0.5 0.0 99.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
F. States of Micronesia 36 13.7 0.0 1.2 0.0 98.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Brunei 71 383.6 0.0 48.7 0.0 46.9 0.0 0.1 1.0 4.2 0.0
Equatorial Guinea 14 153.3 0.0 76.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.9 0.0
Republic of Yemen 28 144.2 0.1 79.4 0.1 0.9 0.7 0.0 0.0 19.6 0.0
Turkmenistan 35 28.0 0.1 18.3 0.0 81.7 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mozambique 25 24.2 0.3 45.1 0.4 54.9 0.1 0.0 100.0 0.1 0.0
Oman 126 253.0 0.3 16.9 0.7 83.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Swaziland 75 52.2 0.5 30.1 0.7 69.6 0.2 0.2 72.8 0.0 0.0
Mauritius 163 285.1 0.7 6.2 0.8 93.5 0.5 0.2 75.9 0.0 0.0
Uzbekistan 87 34.4 0.7 82.7 0.7 16.6 0.6 0.7 2.6 0.0 0.0
Algeria 40 2,688.1 0.8 39.1 1.3 0.0 3.7 0.0 0.0 60.9 0.5
Botswana 45 12.4 0.9 9.8 0.0 87.4 1.0 2.2 0.0 0.6 0.0
Cambodia 212 821.7 0.9 0.4 14.8 99.6 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Faroe Islands 29 31.3 1.1 3.1 0.2 96.6 0.9 0.2 100.0 0.0 0.0
Madagascar 181 156.6 1.1 8.1 5.6 91.8 0.7 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0
Namibia 60 40.4 1.2 18.4 3.8 47.8 0.0 0.5 100.0 33.3 0.0
Bangladesh 350 2,413.4 1.9 1.5 2.0 98.5 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Ethiopia 55 28.5 2.2 97.4 2.3 2.4 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0
Macedonia 160 137.5 2.4 32.9 4.5 65.8 1.3 0.3 10.2 0.9 0.0
Myanmar (Burma) 213 467.2 2.4 4.8 13.6 95.1 1.9 0.1 1.7 0.0 0.0
Cameroon 116 145.0 2.6 61.9 3.9 1.0 7.8 0.4 37.3 36.6 0.0
British Virgin Islands 78 22.4 2.7 66.3 4.1 32.3 0.1 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
Uruguay 290 280.4 2.9 58.3 3.5 41.5 2.0 0.2 3.6 0.0 0.0
Peru 874 1,955.8 2.9 62.2 4.1 32.0 1.1 0.1 12.9 5.7 0.0
Netherlands Antilles 179 606.2 3.0 26.4 5.0 3.2 1.3 0.4 49.2 70.0 2.1
Nepal 285 226.8 3.2 0.7 0.5 99.3 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Pakistan 835 2,157.1 3.5 17.4 1.5 80.5 3.9 1.5 5.7 0.6 7.4
Haiti 256 293.7 3.5 4.5 26.3 95.2 2.4 0.3 6.0 0.0 0.0
Macao 372 1,262.4 3.6 5.7 21.2 92.5 1.4 1.8 59.2 0.0 0.0
Fiji 171 139.2 3.6 12.1 0.0 87.7 4.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Angola 29 3,338.9 3.6 95.5 3.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 27.0 4.5 3.4
Estonia 265 539.4 3.8 9.3 18.1 4.2 14.6 0.6 14.2 85.9 1.7
Uganda 31 23.0 3.8 67.4 3.1 32.5 5.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mongolia 120 116.1 3.9 1.7 21.0 98.2 3.6 0.1 13.9 0.1 0.0
Iran 72 168.3 4.2 17.5 0.2 82.5 5.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Jordan 253 68.5 4.5 4.1 32.5 94.9 2.8 0.7 36.7 0.3 95.3
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Table 4.3: Countries (part 2/4) 
 
Country
Number of 
HS6 lines
Imports in 
Mill.s
 Intra-firm 
(%)
Inter-mediate 
(%)
Intra-firm in 
Intermediates 
(%)  
Consumption 
(%)
Intra-firm in 
Consumption(
%) 
Capital (%)
Intra-firm in 
Capital  (%) 
Not class.
Intra-firm in 
Not class. (%) 
Papua New Guinea 32 36.0 4.7 63.9 6.5 35.8 0.5 0.3 97.4 0.0 100.0
Lebanon 272 68.3 4.7 37.3 4.7 61.4 4.6 1.2 6.0 0.0 0.0
Paraguay 99 39.1 4.7 81.1 4.2 18.4 6.0 0.5 38.9 0.0 0.0
Azerbaijan 41 19.9 4.7 12.3 0.0 66.1 7.2 0.0 0.0 21.6 0.0
Vietnam 566 816.6 5.4 24.0 12.4 71.7 3.2 0.3 54.1 4.0 0.0
Moldova 98 105.1 6.0 72.1 8.1 27.9 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Zimbabwe 196 112.0 6.5 67.8 9.2 32.1 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Grenada 35 21.8 6.5 77.0 7.9 22.0 0.2 0.9 39.6 0.1 0.0
Armenia 105 22.1 6.5 13.9 37.0 81.6 1.3 4.5 6.6 0.0 0.0
Syria 292 144.9 6.7 3.9 20.9 62.3 4.4 0.2 47.2 33.7 9.1
Greenland 11 15.5 6.7 0.1 79.2 99.8 6.5 0.1 100.0 0.0 0.0
Latvia 262 288.6 7.0 34.9 17.5 5.5 15.7 1.0 0.8 58.7 0.0
India 2710 10,486.1 7.4 49.9 7.8 47.4 5.2 2.3 41.3 0.4 13.0
Belize 100 86.8 7.4 7.7 0.0 91.2 8.1 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
United Arab Emirates 574 808.1 7.4 48.9 14.0 50.6 0.8 0.3 18.3 0.2 75.6
Egypt 626 822.9 7.7 22.8 10.4 64.9 7.8 0.2 21.4 12.1 1.2
Nicaragua 225 590.3 7.9 17.5 11.7 82.5 7.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Bulgaria 561 225.3 8.2 38.1 11.1 58.1 6.0 3.2 16.0 0.6 0.0
Guyana 149 120.3 8.6 51.1 3.7 48.6 13.7 0.3 3.8 0.0 0.0
Belarus 221 103.7 8.6 59.6 13.7 34.8 0.9 1.2 7.8 4.5 0.0
Qatar 78 424.4 9.0 66.8 12.9 32.0 1.0 0.0 35.2 1.1 5.6
Ecuador 677 2,204.0 9.1 56.3 3.1 36.2 20.2 0.1 12.3 7.4 0.0
Panama 451 240.6 9.2 29.0 5.6 54.4 13.9 1.2 2.6 15.5 0.0
Turkey 1441 2,970.8 9.6 37.8 13.7 58.8 7.0 2.4 12.9 1.0 0.0
Kenya 303 99.8 9.8 33.7 6.9 62.4 10.7 3.9 19.9 0.0 0.0
Cyprus 152 18.5 10.0 20.2 17.8 60.0 10.4 19.7 0.7 0.0 0.0
Greece 824 541.5 10.4 48.6 10.1 39.5 12.9 2.2 15.2 9.7 0.0
Ghana 213 202.2 10.9 75.5 8.7 3.9 2.5 0.0 0.0 20.6 20.4
Guatemala 694 2,562.4 12.2 23.9 2.6 76.0 15.3 0.2 5.8 0.0 0.0
Lithuania 341 129.9 12.4 45.1 20.3 47.1 6.9 1.1 0.1 6.6 0.0
Hong Kong 2250 10,593.0 13.6 27.5 32.1 65.0 4.7 7.5 23.3 0.0 0.0
Ivory Coast 176 366.3 13.6 76.8 17.4 1.8 3.0 0.4 50.7 21.0 0.0
Sri Lanka 567 1,989.8 13.8 9.6 30.5 89.6 11.5 0.7 68.9 0.0 0.0
Congo, Dem. Rep. 67 211.9 14.5 99.2 14.6 0.4 0.2 0.0 4.2 0.4 0.0
Venezuela 915 17,266.8 14.8 72.1 17.7 1.5 5.6 0.2 19.9 26.3 7.2
Georgia 117 22.9 14.9 29.2 29.4 21.1 19.2 3.1 73.2 46.7 0.0
South Africa 1604 4,062.5 15.2 85.9 13.3 8.5 4.5 4.2 66.9 1.5 39.5
Tanzania 69 32.7 15.4 79.5 7.6 20.3 46.1 0.2 1.2 0.0 0.0
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Table 4.3: Countries (part 3/4) 
. 
Country
Number of 
HS6 lines
Imports in 
Mill.s
 Intra-firm 
(%)
Inter-mediate 
(%)
Intra-firm in 
Intermediates 
(%)  
Consumption 
(%)
Intra-firm in 
Consumption(
%) 
Capital (%)
Intra-firm in 
Capital  (%) 
Not class.
Intra-firm in 
Not class. (%) 
Bahrain 73 318.0 15.4 47.4 32.3 49.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 3.5 0.0
Barbados 176 34.3 15.5 41.1 11.7 32.2 9.4 26.7 28.5 0.0 0.0
Argentina 1276 2,956.5 15.7 62.0 16.9 21.7 18.9 0.7 20.9 15.6 6.5
Ukraine 543 864.4 16.7 79.3 8.2 10.1 18.1 8.9 94.0 1.8 0.0
Zambia 37 16.6 17.6 91.8 19.2 8.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Chile 820 3,164.4 18.2 51.4 21.9 46.0 14.8 0.2 4.4 2.4 5.4
China 3810 98,443.0 18.3 22.9 20.3 56.7 10.7 20.1 37.6 0.3 0.7
Malawi 33 68.1 19.0 72.8 21.8 27.0 11.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Tunisia 304 88.6 20.3 11.3 49.0 56.7 21.1 3.1 3.4 28.8 9.3
Monaco 127 20.0 20.5 32.9 5.4 38.3 47.4 1.3 38.6 27.5 0.0
Taiwan 3143 39,293.8 21.9 47.1 23.3 19.9 10.3 32.8 27.1 0.2 3.8
Romania 600 458.4 22.0 49.4 23.7 45.6 21.8 3.7 10.9 1.2 0.0
Croatia 334 138.2 22.2 70.8 15.6 18.8 29.8 9.5 58.0 0.9 0.0
Indonesia 1652 10,243.7 22.9 34.0 30.2 51.7 11.7 12.6 50.5 1.7 14.1
French Polynesia 49 42.7 23.7 83.6 21.8 16.4 33.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Colombia 1192 6,271.4 23.7 65.6 23.8 19.7 18.6 0.2 49.1 14.6 30.3
Aruba 56 1,155.0 24.0 12.9 52.2 0.1 82.4 0.0 0.0 86.9 19.7
Slovenia 663 306.6 24.7 41.0 26.4 48.0 26.1 10.7 12.1 0.2 1.7
Israel 2091 12,358.0 25.0 69.3 22.8 10.9 13.8 19.0 40.5 0.8 0.7
Spain 2941 5,229.1 25.1 50.6 33.2 32.7 13.7 10.3 35.2 6.4 3.7
Trinidad and Tobago 335 2,149.1 25.4 72.0 30.7 2.7 13.8 0.1 4.4 25.2 11.5
Kazakhstan 75 429.7 25.4 97.0 26.0 2.5 8.7 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0
Russia 1326 7,718.6 26.7 80.6 31.0 9.8 9.0 0.8 65.7 8.9 3.5
Congo, Rep. 80 507.2 27.2 61.7 24.2 0.5 17.1 0.0 85.5 37.8 32.2
Bosnia-Hercegovina 98 15.7 28.1 54.2 1.8 44.0 60.7 0.6 69.5 1.2 0.0
Australia 2403 5,721.9 28.3 55.7 24.9 30.4 21.3 8.6 49.8 5.4 69.2
Poland 1288 983.2 28.5 53.2 33.4 38.5 15.5 8.3 57.5 0.0 0.0
Brazil 2348 12,995.6 29.5 56.2 34.0 17.8 5.9 19.1 32.9 6.9 44.8
Kuwait 114 2,452.7 31.1 81.6 25.1 0.7 1.0 0.0 3.5 17.7 59.9
Italy 3738 24,049.3 31.6 38.8 34.0 44.2 29.0 14.0 36.0 3.0 19.8
Portugal 1272 1,501.0 31.8 41.3 50.0 39.7 13.4 10.2 50.2 8.8 8.0
Bolivia 239 179.7 32.5 47.8 38.3 46.4 18.3 0.1 11.1 5.7 100.0
Thailand 2084 16,085.6 34.4 28.3 51.9 48.6 10.6 22.9 63.5 0.2 0.7
Czech Republic 1387 1,035.0 34.4 45.1 31.1 19.8 19.0 34.2 47.5 0.9 43.3
Norway 1297 5,451.7 35.5 66.8 29.3 5.5 23.6 4.8 53.6 22.9 52.7
Nigeria 204 9,676.2 36.4 69.3 25.8 0.0 24.3 0.0 31.3 30.6 60.2
St Lucia 108 20.1 36.4 63.7 37.1 30.2 41.5 6.1 3.9 0.0 0.0
Maldives 56 93.1 37.2 0.3 0.0 99.7 37.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Iraq 33 4,392.9 37.2 81.6 34.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.4 47.5
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Table 4.3: Countries (part 4/4) 
Country
Number of 
HS6 lines
Imports in 
Mill.s
 Intra-firm 
(%)
Inter-mediate 
(%)
Intra-firm in 
Intermediates 
(%)  
Consumption 
(%)
Intra-firm in 
Consumption(
%) 
Capital (%)
Intra-firm in 
Capital  (%) 
Not class.
Intra-firm in 
Not class. (%) 
Morocco 482 448.8 38.6 57.8 62.2 35.2 3.8 0.4 67.0 6.6 15.7
New Zealand 1342 1,951.2 39.5 44.1 60.9 49.9 20.4 6.0 40.0 0.0 0.0
Gabon 45 2,036.1 40.3 71.3 26.9 0.0 1.9 0.0 0.0 28.6 74.0
Belgium 2918 9,388.2 41.2 65.7 33.8 8.2 45.2 10.0 60.5 16.1 57.9
France 3858 27,750.3 41.4 45.3 53.8 25.4 28.6 27.4 35.3 1.8 5.9
Slovakia 454 239.0 42.5 55.2 40.6 24.5 43.8 20.4 46.0 0.0 100.0
Iceland 284 239.0 44.0 9.0 38.1 84.5 45.0 6.5 39.7 0.0 0.0
Canada 4459 214,271.4 45.6 57.3 31.8 8.7 31.0 16.0 55.6 18.0 87.8
El Salvador 540 1,905.6 45.8 10.0 4.4 88.3 49.7 1.7 85.4 0.0 0.0
Dominican Republic 942 4,263.8 46.0 15.1 59.2 74.2 36.3 10.8 94.3 0.0 0.0
Bahamas 170 247.0 46.5 47.7 70.8 28.4 44.6 0.7 6.5 23.2 0.0
Denmark 2007 2,801.7 47.2 44.5 56.3 31.2 33.2 21.2 51.8 3.0 23.3
Jamaica 276 607.2 48.8 43.5 58.0 56.3 41.9 0.2 12.5 0.0 0.0
Philippines 1456 13,706.0 50.1 55.4 57.7 24.7 15.5 19.9 72.3 0.0 15.7
United Kingdom 4088 39,310.4 50.4 53.3 46.3 16.7 45.5 18.8 53.0 11.2 72.6
St Kitts and Nevis 113 34.6 51.1 88.9 54.3 6.1 0.0 4.9 56.8 0.0 0.0
Suriname 82 128.5 51.7 84.8 60.9 14.9 0.0 0.3 32.4 0.0 0.0
Honduras 459 3,048.7 51.9 8.8 26.4 91.0 54.5 0.2 3.9 0.0 100.0
Austria 2196 2,987.4 52.6 55.8 53.0 17.1 56.6 23.3 41.6 3.7 95.8
Saudi Arabia 415 14,236.0 55.2 81.3 55.3 0.5 2.8 0.0 36.1 18.1 56.1
Netherlands 3144 8,672.7 55.4 45.1 53.9 21.8 46.9 20.8 63.5 12.3 62.5
Korea, South 3044 39,158.8 55.9 44.0 54.8 15.2 15.1 27.7 63.5 13.1 91.4
Switzerland 2966 9,267.3 57.0 46.4 52.4 30.7 62.9 22.9 58.4 0.1 22.6
Luxembourg 344 309.9 59.0 92.6 58.3 5.1 78.2 2.3 40.6 0.0 100.0
Finland 1455 3,163.7 62.8 51.1 68.6 5.0 23.7 20.2 58.8 23.7 61.9
Malaysia 1651 25,056.6 65.2 50.8 64.8 14.8 39.1 33.4 79.3 1.0 0.9
Germany 4147 55,642.6 66.8 38.9 58.4 8.3 57.4 24.2 52.3 28.6 93.3
Mexico 3632 128,838.0 67.0 43.9 57.1 20.0 54.1 23.3 81.4 12.8 94.8
Malta 150 455.9 68.3 84.5 79.5 6.7 1.6 3.6 27.9 5.2 0.0
Costa Rica 798 3,441.4 69.9 43.8 67.2 50.2 70.5 6.0 86.0 0.0 0.0
Hungary 1082 2,678.8 70.1 32.8 54.0 7.4 35.1 52.2 81.3 7.6 96.8
Sweden 2378 9,108.6 72.6 38.5 68.1 15.0 62.8 18.9 72.5 27.6 84.2
Singapore 1604 17,830.2 73.9 45.8 71.3 5.4 24.8 47.1 84.6 1.7 3.1
Japan 3877 141,707.0 75.5 40.4 68.8 10.2 74.2 24.9 70.0 24.5 92.5
Ireland 1741 15,764.3 77.8 84.0 82.6 8.7 43.9 6.9 66.5 0.4 6.0
Guinea 57 86.7 88.4 98.6 89.5 0.9 19.8 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0
Liberia 31 45.1 89.2 99.3 89.6 0.1 0.0 0.6 34.8 0.0 0.0
Liechtenstein 188 287.4 90.3 78.2 90.8 1.1 0.9 20.7 93.3 0.0 0.0
New Caledonia 32 31.4 97.3 97.6 99.6 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
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Table 4.4: HS2 industries (part 1/2) 
  
HS2 Chapter
Interme
diation
Number 
HS2
Total 
imports
of wich 
intra-
firm (%)
Interm. 
(%)
of wich 
intra-
firm (%)
Cons. 
(%)
of wich 
intra-
firm (%)
Capital 
(%)
of wich 
intra-
firm (%)
Not 
class. 
(%)
of wich 
intra-
firm (%)
1 Live animals 0.023 16 1,928.9 1.7 99.6 1.7 0.4 0.5
66 Umbrella, walkingsticks 0.334 7 283.6 2.5 11.4 3.1 88.6 2.4
46 Straw; basketware 0.379 6 300.4 3.6 100.0 3.6
67 Feathers and down articles 0.44 8 1,090.8 3.9 65.9 5.4 34.1 1.0
50 Silk 0.327 10 293.7 5.6 99.8 5.6 0.2 16.2
14 Vegetable products 0.414 10 53.1 5.8 100.0 5.8
64 Footwear, gaiters 0.136 29 14,855.6 6.2 100.0 6.2
6 Trees and plants 0.516 12 1,159.8 6.9 47.3 8.8 52.7 5.2
41 Raw hides, skins, leather 0.345 34 1,166.7 7.3 100.0 7.3
9 Coffee, tea, spices 0.474 32 3,199.4 7.9 73.4 7.1 26.6 10.1
65 Headgear and parts thereof 0.415 11 1,244.9 8.3 2.8 2.7 97.2 8.5
51 Wool, woven fabric 0.223 36 414.5 9.1 98.3 9.2 1.7 4.8
52 Cotton 0.529 131 2,104.2 9.6 99.0 9.0 1.0 70.6
16 Preparations of meat, fish 0.339 26 2,219.5 10.5 0.2 16.4 99.8 10.5
3 Fish, crustaceans 0.469 86 8,152.5 10.9 0.0 0.3 100.0 10.9
42 Leather; saddlery and harness 0.314 22 7,131.1 10.9 0.5 59.9 99.5 10.7
44 Wood articles; wood charcoal 0.213 68 15,448.5 11.2 94.0 11.3 6.0 9.5
71 Pearls, precious metals, coin 0.135 50 29,797.0 11.4 76.3 11.5 21.4 12.0 0.1 29.3 2.2 1.0
53 Vegetable textile fibres 0.5 30 185.1 11.6 100.0 11.6
12 Oil seeds, grains, plants 0.181 42 822.9 11.9 100.0 11.9
97 Works of art, antiques 0.068 7 5,860.9 12.1 100.0 12.1
78 Lead and articles thereof 0.631 10 214.7 12.1 100.0 12.1
5 Animal products 0.433 17 539.7 12.3 100.0 12.3
43 Furskins and artificial fur 0.454 17 330.4 12.8 26.5 22.4 73.5 9.4
63 Other made up textile articles 0.291 59 4,572.7 13.6 5.1 21.6 94.9 13.1
36 Explosives 0.247 8 267.0 13.6 96.2 14.0 3.8 2.1
58 Woven fabrics; tapestries 0.369 41 591.4 13.6 99.2 13.7 0.8 3.2
26 Ores, slag and ash 0.03 32 1,568.4 13.9 100.0 13.9
57 Carpets, floor coverings 0.384 23 1,464.4 14.1 100.0 14.1
74 Copper and articles thereof 0.186 59 5,125.5 14.6 98.3 14.8 1.7 5.0
62 Apparel, not knitted or crocheted 0.232 119 32,735.1 15.0 100.0 15.0
55 Manmade staple fibres 0.373 115 1,165.7 16.1 98.4 16.4 1.6 0.4
88 Aircraft, spacecraft 0.024 15 18,167.6 17.0 29.0 19.1 0.2 30.4 69.2 16.2 1.5 7.4
4 Dairy produce; honey 0.433 27 1,037.1 17.0 17.1 52.2 82.9 9.8
61 Knitted or crocheted apparel 0.207 113 26,356.9 17.3 100.0 17.3
49 Printed books, newspapers 0.122 19 3,489.1 18.7 20.7 22.5 79.3 17.7
10 Cereals 0.172 15 805.8 20.8 80.6 22.9 19.4 12.0
7 Vegetables 0.46 56 2,647.3 20.9 1.1 0.4 98.9 21.1
2 Meat 0.341 53 3,371.7 21.7 1.1 14.6 98.9 21.8
27 Mineral fuels, oils, waxes 0.019 40 121,566.1 22.0 73.1 20.7 26.9 25.6
68 Stone, plaster, cement 0.295 52 3,431.6 22.4 99.9 22.4 0.1 23.6
69 Ceramic products 0.247 29 4,067.6 22.7 55.8 31.9 44.2 11.0
13 Gums, resins 0.374 12 493.5 23.1 100.0 23.1
47 Pulp of wood 0.088 20 3,380.9 23.2 100.0 23.2
15 Animal, vegetable fats and oils 0.297 46 1,383.6 23.3 67.5 12.4 32.5 46.0
60 Knitted or crocheted fabrics 0.465 18 1,004.0 24.4 100.0 24.4
94 Furniture; prefab buildings 0.179 37 23,826.2 25.0 32.7 38.7 51.6 16.6 15.7 23.8
22 Beverages, spirits 0.241 21 8,040.6 25.2 2.0 20.7 98.0 25.3
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Table 4.4: HS2 industries (part 2/2) 
 
 
 
HS2 Chapter
Interme
diation
Number 
HS2
Total 
imports
of wich 
intra-
firm (%)
Interm. 
(%)
of wich 
intra-
firm (%)
Cons. 
(%)
of wich 
intra-
firm (%)
Capital 
(%)
of wich 
intra-
firm (%)
Not 
class. 
(%)
of wich 
intra-
firm (%)
80 Tin and articles thereof 0.274 8 340.6 25.3 100.0 25.3
20 Vegetables, fruit, nuts 0.447 44 2,605.0 25.6 100.0 25.6
24 Tobacco 0.108 9 1,130.2 26.2 56.1 23.5 43.9 29.6
95 Toys, games 0.199 43 19,244.7 26.5 0.7 15.9 89.9 25.1 9.4 41.3
11 Milling industry products 0.301 34 310.3 29.4 88.6 30.8 11.4 18.3
23 Residues from food industries 0.13 23 615.5 29.7 79.6 21.4 20.4 62.0
81 Other base metals 0.173 36 1,106.7 30.4 100.0 30.4
83 Misc. articles of base metal 0.196 36 4,612.8 30.6 88.6 33.8 9.7 5.6 1.7 8.5
79 Zinc and articles thereof 0.242 10 1,343.6 30.9 100.0 30.9
56 Wadding, yarns, ropes, cables 0.293 34 849.1 31.2 94.2 28.4 5.8 75.6
96 Misc. manufactured articles 0.259 50 2,852.4 31.3 27.6 36.6 71.5 29.5 1.0 9.3
8 Fruit and nuts 0.345 53 3,917.7 31.5 1.4 8.7 98.6 31.8
89 Ships, boats, etc. 0.034 14 1,193.0 31.7 92.4 33.1 6.4 13.8 1.2 19.6
45 Cork articles 0.409 7 175.1 31.7 100.0 31.7
33 Oils; perfumery 0.234 35 2,635.9 32.6 16.8 35.5 83.2 32.0
19 Cereals, flour, milk 0.482 17 1,775.6 32.9 5.8 36.8 94.2 32.7
73 Articles of iron or steel 0.214 122 14,082.8 33.6 82.0 34.8 13.8 26.7 4.1 33.0
17 Sugars 0.123 16 1,489.4 33.8 42.9 13.1 57.1 49.3
82 Tools, implements, cutlery 0.212 66 4,522.6 34.9 46.9 52.7 28.5 19.8 24.5 18.4
28 Inorganic chemicals+Z77 0.094 186 7,019.3 35.3 100.0 35.3
21 Misc. edible preparations 0.262 16 1,240.1 36.6 7.1 57.6 92.9 35.0
54 Manmade filaments 0.282 66 2,089.4 37.7 99.8 37.7 0.2 39.1
34 Soap, waxes, candles 0.195 23 1,491.6 37.9 36.3 54.0 63.7 28.8
86 Railway locomotives 0.025 24 1,827.8 38.1 43.4 51.9 56.6 27.5
25 Salt; earths and stone 0.106 72 2,731.2 39.1 100.0 39.1
59 Textile fabrics 0.211 25 791.3 39.2 98.0 38.3 2.0 81.3
39 Plastics and articles thereof 0.192 126 18,977.1 39.5 73.4 46.4 26.6 20.4
93 Arms and ammunition 0.373 17 836.4 39.8 12.6 62.3 30.3 45.1 0.2 22.7 57.0 32.1
48 Paper; articles of paper pulp 0.101 109 15,385.2 40.5 94.0 39.2 6.0 59.6
70 Glass and glassware 0.141 66 4,373.4 41.9 78.7 48.9 21.3 16.1
72 Iron and steel 0.193 171 14,597.2 42.0 100.0 42.0
18 Cocoa 0.175 11 1,404.3 43.8 69.2 40.1 30.8 52.0
91 Clocks and watches 0.322 55 3,354.0 46.4 3.5 37.8 92.0 46.1 4.5 60.1
76 Aluminum and articles thereof 0.1 36 9,193.8 46.9 93.6 47.7 5.2 35.4 1.2 29.5
92 Musical instruments 0.327 23 1,412.8 49.2 14.7 44.2 85.3 50.1
75 Nickel and articles thereof 0.05 17 1,542.6 49.3 100.0 49.3
31 Fertilisers 0.056 26 1,713.5 50.0 100.0 50.0
38 Misc. chemical products 0.09 62 4,388.6 56.6 88.6 53.6 11.4 79.9
32 Tanning or dyeing extracts 0.162 46 2,707.3 57.6 98.1 58.2 1.9 26.4
84 Nuclear reactors, machinery 0.102 511 179,439.2 58.1 45.0 56.6 2.1 38.0 52.9 60.2
90 Instruments 0.095 160 36,098.9 59.2 25.0 52.8 11.2 56.7 63.9 62.1
35 Starches, glues, enzymes 0.168 15 1,245.0 60.0 94.9 60.3 5.1 53.3
29 Organic chemicals 0.135 310 34,049.8 61.7 100.0 61.7
40 Rubber and articles thereof 0.118 72 10,093.3 62.8 96.3 64.0 3.7 30.9
85 Electrical machinery 0.084 293 184,992.2 64.6 53.9 65.5 14.0 64.2 32.1 63.1
30 Pharmaceutical products 0.027 29 12,170.2 72.0 24.5 53.7 75.5 77.9
37 Photographic goods 0.043 36 2,707.0 77.1 91.4 77.7 8.6 70.6
87 NonRailway vehicles 0.012 76 164,767.5 85.3 16.5 50.9 2.3 61.6 12.8 81.6 68.4 95.1
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